“The Iranian Revolution”

1. “The Iranian Revolution” Charles Kurzman

2. Explaining a Revolution Failure of States: Objective and Subjective Factors Structural: Govt undercuts or alienates its social bases of support (either through repression OR reform) Perception: A sense that state repression has loosened, thus opportunity for action emerges

3. Explaining a Revolution SM theorist have long emphasized either Structural or subjective and failed to treat them in combination. Some Example of Combined Analysis McAdam, in Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency (1982), did look at structure and consciousness. Need structural opportunity or opening, but you also need “cognitive liberation.” Oppressed need to “break out of pessimistic and quiescent patterns of thought and begin to do something.”

4. Revolutionary Opportunity Structural Opportunities and Perception “Structural opportunities generally coincide with perceived opportunities…” People typically feel optimistic that opportunities for change exist when the system is in fact opening to change… Of course, this is not always true.

5. Revolutionary Opportunity Iran: Structural Opportunity and Perception did NOT Match Protestors “based their assessment of…opportunities” based not on the strength of the state than the perceived strength of the opposition movement itself.

6. Revolutionary Opportunity Historical Context of Iranian Revolution (1977-1979) The revolutionary process started in mid-1977, when liberal opponents began questioning the monarchy. Opposing the Shah In 1977, some Islamic leaders called for removal of the Shah. State responded with violence, and a cycle of mourning sustained the protests. But, the bulk of the population did not take part.

7. Revolutionary Opportunity Revolutionary Movement: Starts in September 1978 A massacre of peaceful demonstrators dramatically expanded the movement. A series of strikes followed, culminating in a general strike that lasted until the revolution’s success in February 1979. Shah’s Response:Repression and Reform (appointed a reformist PM in late 1978).

8. The Structure of Political Opportunity Explaining Fall of the Shah: Four (4) Reasons “Four structural weaknesses are often cited as constituting a structure of political opportunities conducive to revolution.”

9. The Structure of Political Opportunity 1) Monarchy’s Social Support Undermined by Reforms Shah’s efforts at reform actually undermined his base of support. Response:Three problems with this argument: 1) Affected groups (elites, shop owners: bazaari) were oppositional 2) Reforms created enemies, but also allies 3) Shah did not depend on internal support 4) Many elites (including military) benefited from the Shah.

10. The Structure of Political Opportunity 2) International Pressure on the Monarchy Did international pressure prevent the Shah crack down? Response: There was no real international pressure on the shah. Carter backed the shah.

11. The Structure of Political Opportunity Overcentralization and Paralysis of the State Would a crack down by the state have worked? Did the state simply lack the will? Response: Shah did not crack down, but he could have, that the state had the capacity.

12. The Structure of Political Opportunity State Vacillation State response was inconsistent, repression, then reform, then repression, reform, again. Response: 1) Shah had used similar co-opting tactics for years. Shah sought to suppress and 2) appease his opponents. His message was two- part (but consistent): protest and 3) you will be killed, stop and you will get reforms.

13. Perception of Political Opportunity Perception of the State’s Coercive Power People feared the govt, but state repression only heightened their revolutionary zeal. Perception of the Opposition’s Power The people consistently thought the opposition was stronger than it was. It was not, initially a well founded idea.