The Early Cold War, 1948-1953

1. Young & Kent: International Relations since 1945 The Early Cold War, 1948-1953 The onset of the Cold War in earnest

2. The US security state • The meaning and application of National Security - the bureaucratic functioning of the National Security Council and the Department of Defense • The relationship of American foreign policy to international requirements in the Cold War - the greater Cold War need for external economic and political links due to - the wartime developments of a) the US economy b) the projection of US military power • The role of American intelligence - the continuation of SOE European covert operations through British wartime personnel and MI6 links with eg the Ukrainian rebels in 1946 - the limitations and problems of getting access to sympathizers and information in a tightly controlled communist society

3. The Soviet Stalinist state and its cautious ambition • Stalin’s personal role in government • The relationship of Soviet foreign policy to domestic requirements in the Cold War -the greater Cold War need for internal controls due to a) the campaign against ‘imperialist spies’ b) the elimination of ‘enemies’ who threatened Stalin’s psychotic need for total personal power and control • The role of Soviet intelligence - to use the open nature of Western society to infiltrate moles - to use moles to clarify Soviet suspicions of democratic capitalist governments • The desire to achieve greater Soviet power and international influence but the fear of risking military conflict with the West in so doing – Berlin crisis 1948

4. The new American application of containment as defense • Containment as the political and ideological containment of communism within the West • The use of CIA money in 1948 to influence the electoral defeat of communism in Italy • The strengthening of political alliances with non-communist governments in the West to deter any Soviet organization of coups by indigenous Western European communists • Removing the root causes in the West i.e. the social and economic conditions (poverty) that were deemed to make communism attractive

5. Armaments and Militarization: • The reductions in Soviet and Western military forces • The creation of NATO as a political organization to help prevent the spread of Soviet backed communism - the nature and importance of the communist coup in Czechoslovakia - the way in which western claims concerning Soviet military aims and capabilities were used to justify political actions against communism and military preparedness (NATO) - the nature of British and American military strategy for global war from 1948 • The important impact of Soviet acquisition of the atomic bomb in 1949

6. The Cold War/Hot War distinction • Hot War as international military conflict of a global or regional nature • Cold War as a war fought by all means short of an international armed conflict • The connections between the two - the deployment of western military forces used in Hot War to prevent Soviet influence (Cold War) - propaganda, covert operations, human and signal intelligence psychological warfare (Cold War) - the greater need to prevent Cold War leading to Hot War after the advent of the hydrogen bomb

7. US policy: NSC 7 and the new application of containment as offense • NSC 7 March 1948 “The position of the US with respect to Soviet directed world communism” • Early definition of roll back policy - objective of defeating the forces of communism deemed vital to US security - such an objective cannot be achieved by a defensive policy alone - creating a co-ordinated programme to support resistance movements behind the iron curtain and in the Soviet Union

8. NSC 20/4, November 1948 • NSC 20/4, November 1948: “US objectives with respect to Russia” -Soviet aims defined as world domination by: a) placing Soviet controlled groups in political power everywhere b) no deliberate armed Soviet action – only political means supported by military intimidation -US policy therefore became “the gradual retraction of undue Soviet power… and the emergence of satellite countries as independent of the USSR” • Divisions within the US administration over Soviet policy • Creation of the Office of Special Projects responsible for covert operations and its replacement the Office of Policy Co-ordination 1949

9. NSC 68, April 1950 • Causes: - the Soviet atomic explosion - Soviet increased military capability in Hot War • Objective: - to link the fighting of the Cold War more firmly to avoiding a Hot War through military deterrence • Means: - a massive increase in US armaments to deter any Soviet military reaction to the fighting of the Cold War • Nitze, the draft and its critics • Consequences: - the idea of scrapping coexistence and a full commitment to liberation - the creation of the Psychological Strategy Board - the choice between winning the Cold War by: a) destroying Soviet control of the satellites b) destroying the Soviet system within the Soviet Union • The growth of opposition in 1951 to the ideas in NSC 68: - Bohlen’s critique in response to NSC 114 defining (exaggerating) an increased danger - the idea of world domination and the importance of Soviet aims as an influence on US policy

10. The victory of Mao Tse Tung and the communists in China • The success of Mao’s strategy in attracting support from the peasants and middle classes - land reform and rent reductions - military concentrations to launch successful attacks • The weakness of the Nationalists - political corruption - military overextension • The failure of the 1946 US mission of reconciliation under George Marshall • The communist use of American arms given to the Nationalists and of the Soviet arms left behind • Stalin’s initial reluctance to give wholehearted help to the communists • Sino-Soviet relations by 1950 - Stalin’s and Mao’s mutual distrust and its legacy - Stalin’s fear of an inability to control Mao - alliance in 1950 because of Mao’s ideological antipathy to co- operating with the Americans

11. The origins of the Korean War • The desire for unification in both North and South • Mutual Korean fears of the other side using force • Stalin’s rejection of Kim il Sung’s 1949 requests for his approval of an attack on the South until January 1950

12. Stalin and the Korean War • Reasons for Stalin’s change of mind on supporting the attack by the North: -Less fear of an American response to an invasion after Acheson’s speech of January 1950 -Soviet fear of China being free to pursue regional ambitions • Stalin’s aims - to have a Korean warm water port - to replace the loss of the port of Darien, returned to the communists after being ceded by the nationalists in 1945 • The Stalin-Mao links • Stalin’s miscalculations

13. The US and the Korean War • Truman’s response to the invasion through the UN and the nature of the US/UN force • Mistaken Western assumptions: a) the attack was a result of Soviet instigation rather than approval b) the Cold War would lead to regional Hot Wars • Immediate consequences - US adoption of NSC 68 - Soviet military equipment and personnel given to the North • The US/UN military advance north of the 38th parallel and the Chinese military response • Chinese involvement transforming the Korean War from a civil war (Cold War) into a Sino-American international conflict (Hot War) • The communist advance south • The US response and stalemate near the 38th parallel • Armistice talks 1951 - Negotiations over the repatriation of prisoners - Reasons for the agreement a) the growing threat of escalation including the use of nuclear weapons b) the death of Stalin’s and the reduction of the advantages from keeping the Chinese in a state of war