DPRK Strategic Intentions and US Policy Goals John Steinbruner

1. School of Public Affairs at University of Maryland. [Paper presented Nautilus Institute's US-DPRK Next Steps Workshop on January 27, 2003] DPRK Strategic Intentions and US Policy Goals John Steinbruner

2. Background Observations • Internal DPRK deliberations are not closely monitored or directly understood by anyone outside the country. • All international comprehension of their intentions depends primarily on imputed logic

3. Starkly different intentions are being imputed by engaged observers Outcomes can diverge substantially from any set of formulated intentions

4. Contending Assumptions Implacable dedication to the acquisition of nuclear weapons: a) emanating from the ruling regime b) inherent in the culture c) dictated by the strategic situation

5. 2. Commitment to productive international engagement Reversal of traditional self-reliance doctrine Presumably motivated by acknowledged pressures of globalization

6. 3. Regime survival, whatever it takes 4.Response in kind as a procedural rule force against force concession for concession

7. Plausible Judgments Productive Accommodation is the most plausibly imputed intention Pressures of globalization demonstrated in other instances to be capable of overriding traditional inclinations DPRK grasp of that fact demonstrated in their negotiating behavior

8. 2. Implacable dedication to the acquisition of nuclear weapons is far less plausible DPRK can expect to defend the right but not the actual fact of weapons deployment Observable, active deployment would be quire dangerous under doctrine of preemption Negotiating history suggests understanding of that

9. 3. Ambiguity about the current status and ultimate disposition of DPRK nuclear weapons capability is a very plausible interim negotiating objective Nuclear materials program is a major source of leverage in efforts to negotiate terms of productive accomodation

10. 4. The procedural rule – response in kind – is more plausibly seen as an behavioral inclination than as the DPRK’s central determining commitment, but the inclination is strong enough to be a major source both of opportunity and of danger.

11. Implications US policy has not yet tested the assumption of intended accommodation – the most plausible and most constructive of those available. Terms of political, security and economic accommodation offered up to this point are not adequate to determine ultimate DPRK commitment to an overall settlement

12. 2. Given that widely appreciated fact, it is quite unlikely the US could successfully extend the recently declared doctrine of coercive preemption to the Korean situation under current circumstances.

13. 3. There is considerable danger, however, that an interaction between the US procedural rule – do not reinforce blackmail – and the DPRK procedural rule of response in kind might produce a violent confrontation that neither side intends or expects.

14. Evident Conclusions A comprehensive settlement is the common interest. It would fundamentally involve: termination of the DPRK nuclear materials production and long range ballistic missile programs and reduction/redeployment of its conventional forces In exchange for full political normalization, formal security protection regionally endorsed, and a program of international economic engagement commensurate with the DPRK’s inherent needs

15. A comprehensive settlement of that sort must be initiated by the stronger party – the US in this case – particularly if the corrosive dynamics of blackmail are to be avoided.