Suspending Judgment to Create Value: Suspicion and Trust in Negotiations

1. Suspending Judgment to Create Value: Suspicion and Trust in Negotiations Marwan Sinaceur

2. Skepticism, a long-standing idea • In ancient Greece the Skeptics philosophers recommended epochê (ἐποχή), or the suspension of judgment • Epochê stems from recognizing how ambiguous (i.e., subject to opposite interpretations) the world can be • Recognizing ambiguity –considering that both something and its opposite may be true– is an important facet of an inquiring mind • Different cognitive activity • Greater information search

3. The current research • I set out to explore these ideas in the context of negotiations • Will suspicion, defined as the state in which perceivers experience ambiguity about a target person’s motives, be more efficient than trust in generating information search in negotiations? • In turn, could suspicion lead to more mutually beneficial agreements?

4. Ambiguity vs. uncertainty • Oxford English Dictionary • Ambiguity = thinking that a single stimulus can have two meanings and be interpreted in opposite ways; considering that both something and its opposite may be true • Uncertainty = not knowing for sure or with confidence • Example: a sign such as “±” (Leibniz, 1684) • Ambiguity in psychology • The same stimulus can be interpreted in different, non-compatible ways(Ittelson & Kilpatrick, 1951) • A figure can be seen either as the letter B or the number 13(Balcetis & Dunning, 2006) • A face can be interpreted in opposite ways(Huart et al., 2005) • A target’s behavior can be interpreted in opposite ways (Fein, 1996)

5. Suspicion: Ambiguity about motives • Ambiguity about motives • Suspicion = the state in which perceivers entertain different, plausibly rival, hypotheses about a target’s motives (Fein, 1996; Hilton, Fein, & Miller, 1993) • Suspicion = the state in which perceivers experience ambiguity about a target’s motives • Consequences for attributions • Belief that another might have hidden motives (Fein, 1996; Fein, Hilton, & Miller, 1990) • Less prone to making the fundamental attribution error (Hilton et al., 1993) • Conscious deliberation about plausible causes and categorizations (Hilton et al., 1993) • More likely to give consideration to motives (Fein, 1996)

6. Suspicion: Ambiguity about motives • Suspicion and information search • Should increase speculative information search (arguments by Kramer, 1998, 1999a; Schul et al., 1996) • Less susceptibility to biases in seeking information (e.g., Fein et al., 1997; Millar & Millar, 1998; Schul et al., 1996) • These effects should generalize to negotiation • Prediction: Suspicion will lead to greater propensity for information search

7. Suspicion vs. distrust/trust • Lack of trust • Suspicion: experiencing ambiguity about a target’s motives, i.e. suspending judgment • Distrust: definitely not trusting, i.e. making a definitive judgment, albeit negative • Distinction consistent with definition of trust (distrust) • Trust (distrust): positive (negative) expectations or beliefs about a target’s motives (Kramer, 1999b; Lewicki et al., 1998; McAllister, 1995)

8. Suspicion vs. distrust/trust • No distinction between suspicion and distrust made before • Suspicion not empirically disentangled from distrust (e.g., Fein, 1996; Schul et al., 1996) • Terms “suspicion” and “distrust” used interchangeably

9. Suspicion and information providing • However, suspicion (and distrust) likely to decrease information providing to others (cf. argument by Kramer, 1998) • Indeed, trust is beneficial because it increases information providing in negotiation • Higher joint outcomes (e.g., De Dreu et al., 2006; De Dreu et al., 1998; Rubin & Brown, 1975) • Greater information exchange(Butler, 1995), whichfacilitates trading off issues (Bazerman & Neale, 1983) • Specifically, greater information providing about preferences (Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977; Rubin & Brown, 1975)

10. Summary of arguments Suspicion compared to trust… • … will havea positive effect on information search • … but has a negative effect on information providing

11. Suspicion and joint outcomes • Information search increases information exchange and joint outcomes, independently of information providing(Thompson, 1991)

12. Suspicion and joint outcomes • Prediction: Dyads in which one party is suspicious and the other trusting (Suspicious-Trusting) will attain higher joint outcomes than will either dyads in which both parties are trusting (Trusting-Trusting) or dyads in which both parties are suspicious (Suspicious-Suspicious)

13. Overview of experiments • Expt 1a • Vignette • Do suspicious individuals explain a target’s behavior differently? • Expt 1b • Method identical to Expt 1a • Are suspicious individuals more willing to seek information? • Expt 2 • Pilot Study: Pre-tested a different operationalization of suspicion • Face-to-face, role-played negotiation • Can suspicion lead to higher joint outcomes in negotiations? • Expt 3 • Method identical to Expt 2 • Do information search behaviors mediate the positive effect of suspicion over trust?

14. Overview of experiments: Uncertainty • Ambiguity is likely to involve some general uncertainty • Uncertainty has effects on • Attributions (Weary et al., 2006; Weiner, 1985) • Information processing and search (Tiedens & Linton, 2001) • Especially in negotiation (Anderson & Neale, 2005; Neale & Fragale, 2006) • Thus, I controlled for uncertainty in all experiments • Through the design: the trust and distrust conditions were associated with uncertainty • Through measuring uncertainty: items were adapted from Tiedens & Linton (2001)

15. Experiment 1a • Do suspicious individuals explain a target’s behavior differently? • Between-subject design • 2 (Trust vs. Distrust) x 2 (Uncertainty associated with trust/distrust vs. Certainty associated with trust/distrust) factorial design with an extra condition (Suspicion) • Negotiation vignette (N = 105)

16. Experiment 1a: Manipulation • Suspicion • The counterpart’s motives in making the offer could both be benevolent and malevolent • Trust [Distrust] associated with Uncertainty • The counterpart is likely to have benevolent [malevolent] motives in making the offer • Trust [Distrust] associated with Certainty • The counterpart undeniably has benevolent [malevolent] motives in making the offer

17. Experiment 1a: Main Measure • Participants’ spontaneous attributions about a target’s offer were coded • Used Malle’s coding scheme (e.g., Malle, 1999, 2003; Malle et al., 2000; O’Laughlin & Malle, 2002) • “Conscious attributions of motives” are explanations… • (a) … That describe the target’s motives and purposes • What the target tries to fulfill through performing his/her actions • (b) … In which the motives and purposes are explicitly marked as mental states with a mental state verb • The perceiver consciously attributes motives to the target through using such verbs as “she wants to achieve”, “he wishes”, “she needs”, “she intends to”

18. Experiment 1a: Results • Checks – Uncertainty (6-item scale, α = .65) Participants’ uncertainty

19. Experiment 1a: Results • Checks – Trust (3-item scale, α = .66) Participants’ trust

20. Experiment 1a: Results • Suspicion vs. Distrust/Trust– Conscious attributions of motives Conscious attributions of motives Coding scheme from Malle (2003) Suspicion against every other condition

21. Experiment 1a: Summary • Some evidence that suspicion is a distinct state from distrust/trust • It entailed thinking more about conscious attributions of motives • This difference was not due to uncertainty

22. Experiment 1b • Are suspicious individuals more willing to seek information? • Procedure and Manipulation identical to Experiment 1a • Between-subject design • 1 x 3 (Suspicion vs. Trust associated with uncertainty vs. Distrust associated with uncertainty) • N = 99

23. Experiment 1b: Main Measure • Strategy statements • Participants were asked to mention the strategies they would intend using in the negotiation • Participants’ statements were coded for the number of strategies focusing on information search to create value (2 coders, α = .85) • Examples: Listening; asking open-ended questions; uncovering interests; understanding why the target wanted the patent

24. Experiment 1b: Results • Suspicion vs. Distrust/Trust– Information search strategies to create value Information search strategies Suspicion against every other condition

25. Experiment 1b: Summary • Suspicion elicited greater propensity for information search to create value

26. Experiments 2-3 • Do suspicious negotiators create more value (i.e., higher joint outcomes) than do trusting negotiators?

27. Experiment 2: Pilot • Pilot Study: Pre-tested a different operationalization of suspicion in the context of face-to-face negotiations • Experiment 1a-1b: Thinking that another’s motives could be both benevolent and malevolent • Experiments 2-3: Thinking that a counterpart may fall in two categories (s/he could be trustworthy or untrustworthy) but that the judgment about this needs to be fully suspended • In both cases, ambiguity stems from inclining in no particular direction and considering that both something and its opposite may be true

28. Experiment 2: Pilot • Manipulation • Suspicion • About half of the classmates assigned to the other party’s role had been instructed to provide inaccurate information about their true interests, while the other half of the classmates assigned to the other party’s role had been instructed to provide accurate information • Trust (with Uncertainty) • Their counterpart would probably have benevolent motives. Their counterpart was likely to provide accurate information about her/his true interests. Indeed, s/he was likely to think that […] ongoing cooperation was important in this negotiation between classmates

29. Experiment 2: Pilot • Information search behaviors • Participants were asked to describe the strategies + the behaviors they would intend using in the negotiation (2 open-ended items for strategies + behaviors) • Coded for the number of information search behaviors that they mentioned • Examples from the suspicion condition: • “Ask specific questions; listen carefully; drop notes” • “I will not say much”

30. Experiment 2: Pilot • Close-ended Measures • Trust check (1 item) • Uncertainty check (2 items; α = .61) • Willingness to make motive attributions (1 item)

31. Experiment 2: Pilot • Total of Information search behaviors (Sum of the values obtained from coding strategies + behaviors) Information search behaviors

32. Experiment 2: Pilot • Summary • This second operationalization of suspicion was successful • Results consistent with Expts 1a-1b • Suspicion elicited a greater willingness to make motive attributions and mention information search behaviors than did trust

33. Experiment 2 • Can suspicion lead to higher joint outcomes in negotiations? • Negotiating dyads randomly assigned to one of three conditions • Suspicious-Trusting (or Trusting-Suspicious) • Suspicious-Suspicious • Trusting-Trusting • N = 96

34. Experiment 2: Procedure • Face-to-face negotiation • Role information: 15 minutes • Suspicion vs. Trust manipulation: 5 minutes • Role-play negotiation: 35 minutes

35. Experiment 2: Results • Manipulation check • 97% of Participants correctly recalled the information about the other’s motives given in their instructions • Trust check (1 item) • Uncertainty check (3 items; α = .73) • Speculation about motives (1 item)

36. Experiment 2: Results • Value creation by dyads – Joint outcomes (Suspicion against every other condition) Total points earned by the dyad

37. Experiment 2: Results • No difference between suspicion and trust in the distributive issue (and no effect for role) Points on the distributive issue

38. Experiment 2: Summary • Suspicious-Trusting dyads attained higher joint outcomes (i.e., created more value) than did either Suspicious-Suspicious or Trusting-Trusting dyads • However, needs more direct evidence that information search explains the positive effect of suspicion over trust

39. Experiment 3 • Do information search behaviors mediate the positive effect of suspicion over trust? • Negotiating dyads randomly assigned to one of two conditions • Suspicious-Trusting (Parties always in same role since no effect for role) • Trusting-Trusting • Procedure and Manipulation identical • N = 64

40. Experiment 3: Measures • Information search behaviors • Based on the coding performed in the Pilot Study • Total of four different information search behaviors measured through participants’ ratings • Asking questions • Taking notes when the other speaks • Not interrupting [other-reported; reverse scored] • Remaining silent to gather information

41. Experiment 3: Results • Total of information search behaviors Total of four different behaviors (ratings)

42. Experiment 3: Results • Value creation by dyads – Joint outcomes Total points earned by the dyad

43. Experiment 3: Results • Information search behaviors by the suspicious party mediate the effect of suspicion on value creation in the negotiation Information search behaviors by the suspicious party β= .41 * β= .66 *** / β= .58 ** Suspicious-Trusting dyads Joint vs. Trusting-Trusting dyads outcomes β= .40 * / β= .17 ns

44. Limitations • Suspicion was manipulated as an initial state (intrapersonal) • But initially suspicious perceivers may not remain in this state • Suspicion is likely to be eventually replaced by distrust or trust • Suspicious individuals are likely to be uncomfortable with ambiguity and be motivated to resolve it • Suspicion may induce negative impressions or distrust in the target of the suspicious perceiver over time (interpersonal)

45. Implications • Motive attributions(e.g., Ames, 2005; Malle et al., 2002; Reeder et al., 2004)can shape actual behavior in interpersonal interactions • Motivated information processing helps to create value in negotiation (De Dreu et al., 2000, 2006) • Ambiguity about another’s motives – suspicion – provides a motivation for wanting to be more accurate about those • Suspicion is more attuned to effortful information search than is trust • Trust may reflect “the sign of a person who falls asleep” (Alain, 1924) • A trust paradox in negotiation • Rubin and Brown (1975) speculated that trusting negotiators may develop incorrect expectations about each other’s preferences • Through greater information search suspicious negotiators can attain more integrative agreements in negotiations than trusting ones

46. Future directions • Suspicion vs. distrust in negotiation • Suspicious-Distrusting vs. Distrusting-Distrusting vs. Suspicious-Suspicious dyads • Data were collected • Being suspicious and expressing trust • Suspicious negotiator vs. Suspicious negotiator who expresses trust • The positive effect of suspicion (i.e., ambiguity about another’s motives) might be enhanced by greater tolerance to ambiguity • Suspicion vs. trust in group decision-making • Information search vs. Information providing