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Case for change – HCM Enhancements Qualifications Verification

Case for change – HCM Enhancements Qualifications Verification. SAPO Corporate Strategic Plan Parliamentary Portfolio Committee. 05 May 2015. Contents. INTRODUCTION. 1. 2. STRATEGIC TURNAROUND PLAN. 3. STRATEGIC FOCUS. 4. BUDGETS 2015/16 – 2017/18. 5. STP IMPLEMENTATION READINESS.

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Case for change – HCM Enhancements Qualifications Verification

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  1. Case for change – HCM Enhancements • Qualifications Verification SAPO Corporate Strategic Plan Parliamentary Portfolio Committee 05 May 2015

  2. Contents INTRODUCTION 1 2 STRATEGIC TURNAROUND PLAN 3 STRATEGIC FOCUS 4 BUDGETS 2015/16 – 2017/18 5 STP IMPLEMENTATION READINESS 6 WAY FORWARD 7 KEY PERFORMANCE INDICATORS – Included as the Additional Notes Pack

  3. Introduction • The labour environment remains stable. • Cash flow challenges continue with the backlog in payments to suppliers which constraints operations. • Long term funding of is crucial to clear backlog payments and support the implementation of the STP. • The growth in Government business to position SAPO as a delivery arm of Government, through the cabinet decision. • Monopoly reserved area encroachment complaint has been lodged with ICASA. • The implementation of the Strategic Turnaround Plan is key to the recovery and sustainability of SAPO. • The turnaround quick wins are in implementation phase whilst the other detailed plans are being finalised.

  4. SAPO Footprint Strategic Importance 2486 Points of Presence & 382 Mail Processing Centres 23,820 Employees R 5,69 billion Revenue 7,5 million Postbank accounts 1,4 billion mail items delivered a year R4,74 billion Postbank deposits 13,8 million households serviced 66 million customer visits to branches p.a. 13 500 business customers (Bulk and frank mail & Docex) Collection agent for +/- 250 3rd party clients

  5. Global postal trends Internationally, the postal industry is undergoing a transformation. Business models that have existed for generations are clashing with the latest technology and social trends.

  6. Summary SWOT Analysis The SWOT analysis builds on the other components of the strategic context work and identifies where SAPO is positioned with regard to trends, developments and the broader environment in which it operates and affect the organization’s future.

  7. Challenges - Summary Diverse range of challenges

  8. Long-ranging reforms for sustainability SAPO’s future will be secured by addressing a number of “systemic challenges” • SAPO’s traditional clients are large business and the strategic role that SAPO should be playing in government service delivery is limited • SAPO has extensive citizen-facing infrastructure in the remotest parts of the country, yet access to government services remains a challenge in those areas • Leveraging infrastructure investments will dramatically reduce the cost of service delivery • Current policy and regulatory prescripts emanate from a period of low access to communications infrastructure • SA’s mobile penetration exceeds 100% and the physical and electronic communication technologies are converging • What is the role of postal communication in present day South African ICT landscape? FUNDING MODEL FOR SAPO’S DEVELOPMENTAL AGENDA ROLE OF SAPO AS DELIVERY ARM OF GOVERNMENT ROLE OF SAPO IN SOCIO-ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT POLICY DIRECTION and REGULATORY LANDSCAPE SAPO • SAPO provides critical social and economic inclusion infrastructure for millions of vulnerable South African • The role that SAPO can play of connecting citizens to the South African government is poorly developed • The USO mandate specifies a Point of Presence in every 3km radius, the potential of this massive investment is severely under-utilised • The massive physical distribution infrastructure related to SAPO’s developmental mandate, imposes high fixed costs to SAPO’s financial model • When the USO subsidy was withdrawn in 2011, SAPO’s suboptimal financial structure was exposed • What is the role of SAPO in development, and how should it be funded?

  9. Cost of Universal Service Obligation • The cost of the USO is represented by the retail network. • The size and reach of the branch network is a direct result of ICASA’s licensing requirements. • Although the retail business generates revenues, it is not nearly adequate to cover the cost of the vast network of retail outlets. • Not only is the profit from reserved services decreasing, but the cost of the USO is increasing. • Over the past six years, retail losses have outstripped reserved services profits, except for 2012 in which here was an abnormally high cost recovery from other business units. • In 2015, the shortfall in reserved services profit is expected to be in excess of R1.75bn. Source: SAPO, Evolut

  10. SAPO’s business model immature Banking Financial Services Banking Financial Services Service Broker • Postbank currently offers basic savings and transactional banking products • After Corporatisation a holistic financial service offering is envisaged Government Banking Transactions • The retail network asset is not sweated optimally towards becoming a ‘retail destination’ • A limited number of services are drawing feet into the branches such as Postbank transactions and MVL Insurance Retail Banking Non-Banking Financial Services Service Broker Payments aggregator and distributor Service Platform Savings Virtual top-up and e-ticketing E-Tailer Non-Banking Financial Services Convenience Store Money Transfers Post Bank Payments Retailer Logistics of Goods PO Outlet PO Outlet • Limited capability to play a in a R15 billion revenue market • Massive untapped potential in the space of consumer-consumer, government & bill payments, wages, payments for goods and services (prepaid electricity and airtime, e-ticketing) • SAPO is underperforming in this fast-growing sector, whilst one of the top players in the market it lacks scale and is unprofitable • Positioning as the government logistics partner to support volume growth PO Outlet Parcel Government Services Express Security Provider Freight Mail Forwarding Workflow / Archiving Business Outsource Partner for Government Fulfilment 4PL Warehouse Distribution Public Service Operations Partner Public Service Operations Partner Communication Fulfillment Logistics of Goods Creation • Mail is viewed from a physical letter point of view despite considerable investment in hybrid mail capability • The hybrid mail offering is reliant on a handful of clients, whilst the market is vast • Offerings to government exist, however SAPO is not seen as a government outsource partner even in its core areas such as mailroom management • Penetration of value proposition to the breadth of government is poor Make Selection Customer Targeting Communication Fulfilment

  11. SAPO’s business model overhaul • Unsustainable financial model – costs exceed revenue; and have been growing faster than revenue • Human and physical infrastructure has excess capacity and low productivity • Volumes growth focus versus value in mail • Poor performance from retail and CFG is strangling the business FINANCIAL HEALTH • SAPO business model not centred around the customer • The organisation is inward-looking – the Post Office not recognised as a key element of the South African economic infrastructure • SAPO’s revenue is concentrated within a highly vulnerable customer base, particularly given recent service disruptions, understanding and pursuing new growth markets is lacking CUSTOMER-FOCUS RETAIL REVENUE PERFORMANCE • Retail Business Unit key revenue drivers are contracted government bill payments, including Telkom, Motor Vehicle Licencing, Municipal accounts, etc. • As seen in the period following the loss of the SASSA account in 2008/09, reliance on contracted business in not sustainable • Driving robust transactional volumes to sustain the business is key, however Information Technology deficiencies are hampering the ability of retail to compete in lucrative markets such as non-banking financial services

  12. SAPO’s business model overhaul INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY PARCELS BUSINESS INTEGRATION • SAPO IT systems are unstable, in an unsafe environment, without adequate connectivity, weak redundancy, without independent testing environment; without disaster recovery and certain to collapse in the immediate future if no drastic and urgent intervention is taken • Mission critical IT systems failure introduces excessive inefficiencies, losses and waste • Whilst integration of Parcels business (Speed Services and CFG had occurred at a linehaul and route sharing business level, fundamental issues remained unaddressed • The courier business continues to run two parallel brands resulting in internal competition and cannibalisation • Ill-defined USO is burdensome to the business and SAPO’s pursuance of USO targets at all costs has left the business severely exposed • The strategy has been to “own” the majority of the fixed cost of the branch network, in contrast to global trends, where Postal Agencies and Franchising model are the dominant models and thus reducing the burden of universal service obligation to the operator COMPLIANCE TO REGULATION DELIVERY PLATFORMS • The “silos” that have developed within SAPO have resulted in duplication of costs, poor efficiency and sub-optimal investment decisions in areas such as transport, property, technology, call centres, etc.

  13. SAPO’s business model overhaul LABOUR ENVIRONMENT • The labour environment at SAPO is broken, mistrust prevails between management and staff – due to a long history of unfulfilled agreements • The conversion process of casual labour has aggravated an already ailing organisation, leading to the current situation • SAPO leadership has been unstable for the past 5 years, and presently, leadership vacancy rate is sitting at 49% - a successful implementation of a turnaround programme is impossible without a stable leadership team • Internally the organisation lacks a high-performance culture and accountability for performance LEADERSHIP AND STRATEGIC DIRECTION • Clear warning signs for financial disaster were masked by poorly segmented financial reporting and the Board seems to have taken reported information at face value • Robust strategic leadership, performance management and monitoring is lacking • Organisational health indicators not monitored and organisation not steered in the right direction GOVERNANCE AND OVERSIGHT • SAPO is good at developing strategies, however implementation has been elusive in the past – turnaround proposals not “operationalised” into corporate plans down to individual performance with relevant accountability • SAPO lacks a single consolidated programme management, operations management and performance management process and tools IMPLEMENTATION CAPABILITY AND CAPACITY

  14. Bloated and inflexible cost structure 70-80% of cost base is fixed in nature – negative operational gearing Source: SAPO, Evolut

  15. Long-term expense growth exceeds revenue growth • For many years, SAPO barely managed to recover all of its expenses. • This precarious existence was only made possible through a subsidy from government. • Unfortunately, the point at which this lifeline ceased to exist in 2014, is also the point at which SAPO’s business model was exposed and labour unrest reared its head. • Even though revenues are expected to recover and grow following the 2013-2014 labour unrest, the business model in its current state will continue to produce losses. CAGR = 5.4% CAGR = 5.7% CAGR = 4.5% CAGR = 2.0% CAGR = 2.1% Source: AFS, management forecast, Evolut calculations

  16. Mail volumes not the main reason for revenue slump • Despite the international trend of declining mail volumes, mail revenues grew at 4.1% p.a. from 2005 to 2014. • PostBank revenues (fees and interest income) increased from R243m in 2005 to R724m in 2014. • Retail and logistics revenues remained negative to flat over the same period, even though a large amount of investment went into both business areas. • SAPO will remain dependent on mail revenues for the foreseeable future but it is imperative that other business units accelerate revenue growth. (rhs) CAGR = 4.1% Source: AFS

  17. Retail business is the largest contributor to SAPO’s losses • Impact of labour unrest on mail division is clear. However, this division still managed a profit in 2014 and 2015e. • Postbank has performed steadily, its only hiccup being the loss of SASSA revenues in 2012. • The retail business is the largest loss maker in SAPO. • This is largely due to the high and inflexible cost base but also due to a lack of retail transactional volumes over the counter. • Retail’s revenue 95% reliant on contracted business, largely motor vehicle licencing and public sector bill payments Source: SAPO, Evolut

  18. Lost retail revenues must be replaced • The loss of the social grant payments had quite a significant impact on retail revenues (26% loss in revenues) • Government related services contribute the bulk of retail revenues (currently 64%) and has been growing handsomely (+23% CAGR) • However, there are more opportunities to grow revenue from government sources. • Bill payments relate mainly to Telkom accounts. • Although bill payments are very competitive, it is an area where there is further opportunity for growth. Slight decline in revenues (-2.8% CAGR) Source: Management Accounts

  19. Branch property and staff costs are too high • Since 2010, total expenses increased by 5.1% per annum. • Property leases, however, has increased by 15.1% over the same period. • This is largely due to the recent trend of vacating existing post office premises in favour of leased spaces in shopping malls. • The loss making branches have a total property cost to revenue of 35% compared to just 8% for the profitable branches. • Loss making branches have on average 3.5 staff compared to 4.5 for profitable branches. • Yet, the loss making branches have a higher staff cost to revenue. CAGR 15.1% Source: Management

  20. There is misalignment between cost of branches and performance • The top 20 worst performing branches are mostly all in large metropolitan areas. • A large number of these are in shopping malls. • The average bottom 20 branch is Type A with 11 staff and a very high relative property cost • The average top 20 branch is a Type B, most likely in the Eastern Cape with only 6 staff members and a property cost of only 2% of revenue Average Top 20 branch Average bottom 20 branch Type: B Region: E/Cape Staff: 6 Revenue: R3.8m p.a. Property cost: R0.1m p.a. (2% of revenue) USO: No Type: A Region: W/Cape or Wits Staff: 11 Revenue: R1.6m p.a. Property cost: R0.9m p.a.(75% of revenue) USO: No Source: Management & Evolut

  21. Logistics product profitability needs review • More than half of the products in logistics are making losses. XPS and PX products are almost all loss making. • The five worst performing products are responsible for 65% of the total cost base in logistics. • The biggest single loss maker is the Speed Services Parcel Door to Counter product which lost R52m for the year ended March 2014. It is also the 2nd biggest revenue generator. • PostNet charges R190 for a 1kg parcel from JHB Door to CPT Counter. • SSC charges R166.55 for the same service – a 12% discount. • The bulk of the loss is therefore down to volumes and cost. • Given that the cost base is more fixed in nature than variable, the impact of volume changes become very meaningful. 84% of cost – 72% of revenue 65% of cost – 52% of revenue Source: SAPO

  22. Revenue mix diversification Total return to shareholder including taxes paid – sufficient to cover government borrowing cost

  23. Summary of Strategic Turnaround Plan Income derived from the reserved markets must be sufficient to meet operating costs for developmental obligations; whilst ensuring that business activities in the unreserved markets are competitive, profitable and commercially viable for SAPO’s sustainable growth. Sustainable social mandate delivery leveraging Reserved Area Profitable revenue growth from diversified customer base and product mix Grow financial resource base Improve productivity & asset utilisation and reduce costs Restore public confidence in the South African Post Office Social cohesion and economic/financial inclusion infrastructure & solutions for citizens Trusted partner for government service delivery Value-based solutions for corporate customers as partners Customer centric ethos across the organisation Improved customer satisfaction Rebuild SAPO’s brand Social Mandate Delivery Product Diversification Customer Intimacy Improve Operational Efficiency and Quality Responsible Corporate Citizen Remodel and optimise channel mix to reduce cost of social mandate Massification of new products to leverage innovation Understand customer segments and value International Postal Reputation Optimised mail operations to align capacity to mail volumes Grow on government and SMME revenue contribution Social mandate aligned to NDP Transformation towards a needs-based policy and regulatory regime Cross-selling of existing products Continuous process improvement Customer experience improvement across all channels Enterprise Development Logistics solutions to capture e-commerce opportunities Reduce property, transport and IT costs Reserved Area revenue protection Environmental sustainability Agency model improvement and support Improve supply chain efficiency and effectiveness Improve product development and lifecycle management Stakeholder management and effective communication Sales Force Effectiveness Leverage strategic partnerships Efficient and effective Technology High Performance Culture Optimise knowledge sharing Implement new operating model, build strategic capabilities and capacity Develop leadership accountability and an execution-driven culture Foster conducive organisational climate Optimise technology effectiveness – systems, network, databases Technology solutions to support current and future products and operations

  24. STP Business Case 4 600 1 540 4 435

  25. STP Business Case Detail

  26. Quick wins

  27. Operating Model • Implementation of the new business model will necessitate a change in SAPO’s operating model to place the customer at the heart of the business: • Break Business Unit silos • Create market facing commodity-based SCM • Create a commercial capability at SAPO and consolidate all “commercial” functions. • Outsource SAPO and Postbank IT • Break down e-Business into Mail and Channels. • 6 Regional centers to be headed by Regional GM (report to Operations Exec in the office of the COO; 2 GM levels dependent on size and complexity) • Integrated delivery teams • Network and logistics managed centrally through the NCC supported by Transport teams regionally • Regional NCC re-established • Support services integrated under Regional GM’s with dotted line reporting into HQ Support Exec’s

  28. PROPOSED MACRO-STRUCTURE SAPO Board • Internal audit • Company secretariat 100% Subsidiary 100% Subsidiary Bank Controlling Company Ltd Postbank (Pty) Ltd CEO Executive Assistant Chief Technology Officer Chief Operations Officer Chief Financial Officer Chief Commercial Officer GE: Strategy and Sustainability GE: HCM GE: Governance • Mail Operations • Parcels Operations • Property • Transport and Logistics • Head of Regions • Corporate Finance • Management Accounting • Tax and Retirement Fund • Treasury • Capex Management • Financial Planning and Reporting • Supply Chain Management • Market and Customer Intelligence • Product Management • Sales & Marketing • Customer Service • Channels • Strategy planning, monitoring and reporting • PMO • Risk Management • Group Communication • Stakeholder Management • Sustainability • Enterprise development • CSI • Legal • Economic Regulation • Regulatory Reporting • Security and Investigations • Ethics • Talent attraction and retention • Organisation design and remuneration • Performance Management • Employee Relations • Corporate IT • Networks & Connectivity • Services Partner Management • IT Design • IT Services • Product Innovation & Test Environment Hub

  29. PROPOSED STAFF NUMBERS TO BE REDUCED

  30. COST TO FILL CRITICAL ROLES

  31. IMPACTED POSITIONS BY LEVEL General workers Management Administrative/ Operational

  32. SAPO EMPLOYEE PROFILE • SAPO’s current attrition rate is 3% annualized. However, care must be taken as current resignations are on the increase. • If considering natural attrition, the staff numbers retiring over a 5 year period only accounts to 501 • Potential early retirement could be considered but this will still only present 1807 headcount • Engagement and consultation with Union currently underway to consider strategies and options

  33. MITIGATION MEASURES The following will be considered to reduce the impact on employees: • The DTPS will engage the Regulator to strengthen the Reserved Market Inspection and Enforcement capability with "impacted" mail processing staff. • Scaling up of the Mailroom Management Offering and deployment of Mailroom Coordinators in government departments' mailrooms. • An average of R3.4m/month is spent on cleaning services. An opportunity analysis will be done on in sourcing; alternatively a business opportunity could be presented to impacted staff. This could accommodate an average of 300 employees. • An average of R1.5m/month is spent on catering services. An opportunity analysis will be done on in sourcing; alternatively a business opportunity could be presented to impacted staff. This could accommodate an average of 150 employees in the opportunity. • R126m/month spent on third-parties line haulage. An opportunity in owner-driver scheme will be explored. • The proposed agency model in Retail to be deployed over the next 5 years furthermore presents an opportunity for staff to be empowered as entrepreneurs, the extent of impact in this area will be dependent on the outcome of the Agency model redesign. • Review vacancies across the organisation to identify areas where impacted employees could be accommodated, e.g. JIMC, etc.

  34. IMPLEMENTATION OF ORGANOGRAM Notes • Much opportunity in the assumptions has been presented for further work study. It is recommended as part of the implementation process to deploy the HR org design team to execute critical area work studies to further optomise and address inefficiencies and potential duplication • Update of micro design roles and profiles

  35. SAPO’s Strategic Intent • Strategic Intent The strategic intent is to turn SAPO around in line with the Strategic Turnaround Plan, which establishes a new business model, such that SAPO becomes customer–centric, with income derived from the reserved markets being sufficient to meet operating costs for the developmental obligations of SAPO such as the universal service obligation (USO) whilst ensuring that business activities, including government business, in the unreserved markets are competitive, profitable and commercially viable to achieve sustainable growth for SAPO. We will position SAPO as a key service provider that delivers government services to citizens. Business derived from government will grow to levels of 50 - 55% of SAPO revenue per annum whilst still growing from the current revenue levels from private and consumer segments of the market.

  36. Vision, Mission and Values • Vision • A leading provider of postal, logistics and financial services that is responsive to market changes whilst achieving sustainable growth. • Values • SA Post Office subscribes to the following values when planning and executing business delivery within the agreed mandate: • We are customer centric and will meet customer specific needs through excellent service; • We contribute positively to our communities and environment; • We treat each other with respect, dignity, honesty and integrity; • We strive for a high performance culture and recognise individual contributions; • We embrace change and diversity in the way we conduct business. • Mission • We facilitate communication and delivery of services by linking government, business and customers with each other across the world by leveraging our broad reach, employees, technology and innovation.

  37. Strategic Goals and objectives Note: The detailed performance measures are included in the Additional Notes Pack

  38. Shareholder mandates and NDP The SA Post Office is mandated through the Postal Act 44 of 1958 and the Postal Services Act 124 of 1998 to provide postal services to all South Africans. These Acts provide for the regulation of postal services and the operational functions of the company, including its Universal Service Obligations (USO), as well as the operation of the Postbank. Postal Services Act 124 of 1998 SA Post Office SOC Ltd Act 22 of 2011 Postbank Act 9 of 2010 The National Development Plan

  39. SAPO’s strategic planning model • This integrated strategic management model enables SAPO to develop informed strategic responses. • Adjust the strategy, if required through a continuous environmental scan. • Understand the impact of all internal and external factors that may influence SAPO’s ability to maintain its competitive advantage as well its ability to deliver on its universal service logistics. • A key component of the strategic formulation is to assess the business and operating model for relevance in the situation it finds itself. • If there is a need for organisational adjustments, then SAPO will move, with speed, to ensure that the organisation is optimised for efficiency and effectiveness. The strategic plan informs the various programs, projects and operational plans that will move the organisation towards its strategic goals. These plans are under-pinned by critical success factors along with the applicable key performance indicators ensuring that effective monitoring and evaluations mechanisms are in place for the strategic journey that SAPO plans to undertake.

  40. STP Roadmap Year one is crucial to get SAPO back on track.

  41. SAPO Income Statement • SAPO Group preliminary net loss for financial year ending 31 March 2015 was R1 155m. • SAPO Group net loss position for 2015/2016 FY reduced to R102 million. • Postbank net profit of R123 million for 2015/2016FY. • Strategic Turnaround Plan (2016 to 2018) • Revenue increase of R5,9bn. • Government business R4,1bn. • Cost reduction initiatives of R3,5bn. • Total cost of borrowing included in Interest expenditure.

  42. SAPO Statement of Financial Position • SAPO Group • The forecasted net loss position for the 2014/2015 financial year has reduced the retained earnings • The Postbank short-term investments and cash surplus over depositor’s funds is maintained over the medium term. • SAPO Group excluding Postbank • A 3-year term loan of R1 200 million will be secured in the 2015/2016 financial year to fund. • Solvency for 2015/2016 Current liabilities exceed current assets.

  43. SAPO Statement of Cash Flows • SAPO Group • Postbank depositors’ funds is projected to growth annually by 5%. • Capital expenditure for Postbank over the medium term amounts to R453m. • Capital expenditure of Post Office over the medium term amounts to R707m. • SAPO Group excluding Postbank • Allocation of R56,888m (after payment of vat) subsidy allocation for the 2015/2016 financial year. • A 3-year term loan of R1 200m will be secured in the 2015/2016 financial year. • Overdraft facility of R270m.

  44. Borrowing / funding plan • The Standard bank approved overdraft facility of R270 million • Facility is backed by State Guarantee. • Facility is revolving and utilized for day-to-day operational requirements. • Term loan of R200million was approved during April 2014 ; repayable in 3 months • Facility is backed by State Guarantee of R1.67 billion issued in December 2014. • Facility is utilized for day-to-day operational requirements. • A further request to increase borrowings by R1.250 billion has been lodged to DTPS /NT • Facility to be backed by State Guarantee of R1.67billion issued in December 2014. • Binding Term sheets of R1 billion have already been obtained from interested Banking Institutions.

  45. Regulation • Effective monitoring and policing of the reserved area and monopoly is crucial to stop revenue leakage for SAPO. • Discussions have commenced with ICASA. • A Task Team has been set up to move the process forward: • SAPO • ICASA • DTPS • NT • An encroachment complaint has been officially lodged with ICASA. • ICASA has committed to investigate the matter. • DTPS has requested that ICASA fast-track this investigation. • The Task Team will be meeting during next week.

  46. Implementation Readiness • Implementation is key to the success of the STP. • Labour stability can be ensured through transparent ongoing engagement: • Engagements with the leadership of labour unions on the STP have taken place. • Labour leadership have submitted their inputs into the STP on the 15 April 2015. • Communication forums have been re-established for labour unions. • Leadership stability will ensure continuity and implementation inertia: • The recruitment and selection is being fast-tracked for critical positions. • Key vacant executive positions are in process – Chief Commercial Officer and Company Secretary. • Performance Management is a key pillar to ensure implementation: • To ensure accountability and delivery the STP initiatives will be incorporated in the performance contracts of Group Executives. • The long term funding availability will enable the key resources required for the STP.

  47. Way forward • Implementation of the 30% government business as per the cabinet decision is crucial for the STP. • The approval of the R1.25bn long term funding from commercial banks is a crucial next step to address long outstanding suppliers and enable operations. • Increase customer engagements to regain their confidence in SAPO. • Fast track recruitment of key executive positions to ensure continuity and stability. • Continue labour engagements to maintain labour stability. • ICASA to add speed to the encroachment complaint and investigation to recover revenue leakage – task team in place to move the process forward. • The implementation of the STP initiatives to gain traction to commence financial recovery for SAPO.

  48. End

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