Humanitarian Intervention in a Fragile State: A Case Study of Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka

1. 1 Humanitarian Intervention in a Fragile State: A Case Study of Indian Intervention in Sri Lanka Dr. Shaheen Akhtar Research Fellow Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad.

2. 2 Defining Humanitarian Intervention in a Fragile State Fragile State: A �fragile State� is a state significantly susceptible to crisis in one or more of its subsystems. It is vulnerable to internal and external shocks and domestic and international conflicts. Crisis States Research Centre (CSRC). Drivers of fragility: weak political institutions, economic decline, poverty, geogrphy, history and violent conflict. Weak institutions are central driver of a state fragility. Violent conflict is the ultimate manifestation of state fragility A state�s geogrphy and history can also play a role in driving fragility. A low strategic value in eyes of int. actors contribute/ reinforces to a state�s fragility.

3. 3 Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention Humanitarian Intervention Definition: HI is a principle in Int. customary law, referred to the armed interference in a sovereign state by another with the stated objective of ending or reducing suffering within the first state. That suffering may be the result of civil war, humanitarian crisis, or crimes by the first state including genocide. The legal context of HI: The legal framework of HI incl.military intervention is based on various provisions of the UN Charter. The legal experts, however, interpret it either in justify or oppose humanitarian intervention. Opponents argue: Article 2 (4), of the UN charter, prohibits the �threat or use of force against� another state. It states: �All Members shall refrain in their int. relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or pol. independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the UN.�

4. 4 Contd� Article 2 (7) also states: �Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the UN to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state ..� The proponents of HI justify it primarily in the name of a moral imperative: "we should not let people die." This idea is grounded in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948 . Exceptions: They also base their claims on the two exceptions to the Article 2 (4) prohibition. 1) Article 51that allows a nation to use force in �self-defense if an armed attack occurs against� it or an allied country. 2) The charter also authorizes the Security Council to employ force to counter threats to or breaches of international peace. For the defenders, intervention is only legitimate when it is motivated by a massive violation of human rights and when it is put in motion by the UN Security Council. Chapters VI and VII also support this notion.

5. 5 Contd� The Political Context of HI: In line with post-World War II Int.law, most govts. & jurists have rejected unilateral humanitarian military intervention because of the potential that powerful states will abuse such a doctrine. The history of �humanitarian� military intervention is replete with examples of stronger states or coalitions invoking the doctrine of humanitarian intervention in order to conceal their own geopolitical interests. Somalia, Haiti, Sierra Leone, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor are examples of such interventions, to varying degrees justified in humanitarian terms. US-led coalition forces justified the invasion of Iraq on a variety of grounds, only one of which�a comparatively minor one�was humanitarian.

6. 6 Drivers of Fragility in Sri Lankan State Domestic, Regional & international drivers of SL�s fragility Domestic Drivers of Fragility Weak/small: in terms of size and capability (mil. Eco, natural resources) Geography: locational factor-. proximity with India, a strong regional power. low strategic value as compared to India Weak state institutions: majoritarian structures of governance denying Tamils their due pol. eco. educational & cultural rights that have remained at the heart of ethnic conflict in SL. Violent Tamil-Sinhala conflict since 1983, now spearheaded by the LTTE. LTTE is running a virtual defacto Tamil state in the Jaffna peninsula of SL in the North. Lack of economic growth/ discriminatory developmental policies are both a cause of the conflict & sustaining it too.

7. 7 Map of Tamil Eelam

8. 8 Contd� Regional Drivers of SL�s Fragility India, the most powerful factor: big in size & powerful in terms of mil. Eco & natural resources. Tamil Nadu linkages with the Sri Lankan Tamils playing imp. role in SL�s ethnic conflict, especially in the 1980s. Hegemonic attitude of India towards the region in general and SL ethnic crisis in particular. Supportive to Sri Lankan Tamils militants- sheltering, arming training, financing them in the 1980s. . Supportive Int. attitude towards Indian humanitarian mil. intervention in 1987-90. Feeble regional response to Indian intervention in SL in 1987-90.

9. 9 Contd� International Drivers of SL�s Fragility As a small state, Sri Lanka was never taken seriously in the superpower rivalry in the Indian Ocean/South Asian region. Even during the time of tight bipolarity SL�s position vis-�-vis India was marginal. From 1983 to 1990, loose bipolarity also did not enhance SL�s position in the strategic calculations of the superpowers In fact, US/SU Cold War rivalry enhanced India�s strategic value in the 1980s and that continued even in the unipolar world. Thereby, superpowers� attitude was more favourable to India than SL in the 1980s. Endorsed India�s geo-political interests in SL Supported Indian mediation (1983-86) & military intervention in SL (1987-90).

10. 10 Nature/Implications of Indian Humanitarian Military intervention in Sri Lanka 1983-1990 Looking from both Indian and Sri Lankan perspectives and at three main stages of the ethnic crisis: a) July 1983 anti-Tamil riots, b) Forced airdrop, c) ISLA, July 1987 and induction of IPKF in Sri Lanka Indian Stance: Humanitarian Considerations V Strategic Interests: The entire Indian argument justifying Indian mediation in SL�s ethnic crisis and subsequent military intervention was weaved around humanitarian considerations. In reality, however, India tried to protect its geo-political interests in SL. i.e. awarding of Trincomalee Oil Farm to a Western Consortium and expansion of VOA facilities in SL. July 1983 anti Tamil riots : India highlighted atrocities against Tamils & plight of Tamil refugees but kept arming sheltering, training & training Tamil militants so as to maximize its leverage in mediation with SLG in the ethnic crisis as well as secure its geo-strategic interests in the island.

11. 11 Contd� Indira Doctrine: ethnic violence in SL in 1983 led to the formulation of Indira doctrine- an Indian �s version of the Monroe Doctrine, wherein India viewed entire region as a single strategic unit and herself as the sole custodian of security and stability in the region. On 5 August 1983, intervening in a debate in Lok Sabha on the developments in Sri Lanka, Indira Gandhi stated: In this matter, India cannot be regarded just [like] any country. Sri Lanka and India are the two countries who are directly concerned. Any extraneous involvement will complicate matters for both our countries. Forced Air drop/Operation Poomalai June 1987: 3 June : Failing to secure �Consent� from SLG, on 3 June 1987, India sent a flotilla of 19 fishing boats carrying relief supplies under the Red Cross flag led by Vikram, a 1000-tonne Indian offshore patrol vessel out of

12. 12 Contd� Rameshwaran. A helicopter of the Indian navy and coastguard planes also accompanied the flotilla. The SL navy refused entry of the �uninvited Indian vessels� to SL and they returned to Rameshwaram. 4 June 1987: On 4 June India summoned the SLG High Commissioner in New Delhi B. Tilakaratne to the South Block and Indian Min. of State for External Affairs, K. Natwar Singh told him that in 35 minutes, India would airdrop relief supplies over Jaffna. 4 June 1987, India launched its �Operation Poomalai (garland)�. It sent five Indian Antonov- 32 transport planes escorted by four Mirage 2000 jet fighters to air drop relief supplies over Jaffna. They dropped 25 metric tones of food and medicines over Jaffna. They were instructed to return fire in the event that they were attacked, and the Indian air force was placed on full alert to meet any eventuality.

13. 13 Contd� Indo-Sri Lanka Accord (ISLA) July 1987: Intervention upon Invitation: India justified its military intervention/induction of IPKF in SL under the ISLA which was signed on 29 July 1987. India maintained that ISLA was a product of a consensus between SLG and GOI wherein SL invited IPKF to SL. and. In fact, Accord was primarily geared to secure India�s geo-strategic interests vis-�-vis SL. Induction of IPKF: The stated objective of the IPKF was to disarm the insurgents within 72 hours, guarantee and enforce the cessation of hostilities and provide security to the Tamils. However, PM Rajiv Gandhi envisaged a wider political role by stating that they would �help implement the agreement to end the ethnic struggle� in SL.

14. 14 Sri Lankan Stance on Indian Humanitarian Intervention As a fragile state, dominant perception in SL regarding India�s involvement in its ethnic crisis and subsequent intervention was that India readily exploited ethnic conflict in the island to coerce it into abandoning pro-Western foreign policy, eco. liberalization as well as extracting more concessions for the Tamils in SL. July 1983 riots: SL as a fragile state could not properly handle the enormity of anti-Tamil riots in July 1983. The riots unleashed a wave of refugees into neighbouring Indian State of Tamil Nadu which have 50 million Tamil population, having deep cultural, linguistics links with the SL Tamils.

15. 15 Contd� The strong Indian reaction to 1983 riots and subsequent support to Tamil insurgents greatly scared the SL leadership of Indian intensions and they feared an Indian invasion of SL. June 1987: Forced air drop: SLG pointed out that �neither has the GOSL solicited any humanitarian aid nor does the situation prevailing in the North require any assistance from any outside sources the GOSL is in a position to meet all the requirements. The SLG strongly condemned the Indian forced airdrop calling it �a naked violation of our independence� and an unwarranted assault on our sovereignty and territorial integrity� a rehearsal for �an invasion�, and lodged a formal protest note with the UN Security Council.

16. 16 Contd� A SL analyst Rohan Gonartna observed: �Sri Lanka did not have the capability to fight back- otherwise, the mood was war.� However as a fragile state SLcould not prevent India from airdrop. In fact SL halted its mil ops in the North as India desired. July 1987 ISLA: Sri Lanka regarded the Accord and subsequent Indian military intervention in Sri Lanka by way of induction of Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) as a product of �coercive diplomacy�. The Annexures& letters of exchange to the Accord ensured that SL changes its policy on Tricomalee Oil Tank Farms and VOA.

17. 17 International Response to Indian Humanitarian Military Intervention in SL  As a fragile state SL could not secure the support of any superpower, including its ally, the US. In August 1983, President Jayewardene had stated that �if in the future, the SL govt. felt that there was a threat from India, it would turn to the US, UK and like-minded powers for military assistance in defending its territory against the Indians�. None of them came to SL�s rescue, when India actually intervened. US Response Although US strongly supported the unity and territorial integrity of SL and sought a peaceful negotiated settlement of the ethnic crisis, it extended limited support to Colombo to combat terrorism, urged Colombo to address human rights concerns and strongly supported Indian mediation in finding a political solution of the ethnic crisis. The US never gave commitment to SL of support in case of invasion of Sri Lanka.

18. 18 Contd� The US supported India�s forced airdrop over Jaffna peninsula. The State Department only expressed regrets that the discussions between Indian and Sri Lanka on the modalities of delivering relief supplies to Jaffna failed �and consequently the GOI felt it necessary to deliver supplies by air.� The US endorsed ISLA and extended full support to Indian intervention and stationing of Indian troops (IPKF) in Sri Lanka. The Soviet Response The Soviet attitude towards Sri Lanka�s ethnic crisis during the Cold War era was primarily determined by her close relationship with India with which it had a �community of fundamental interests�. Moscow found an imperialist connection in Sri Lanka�s ethnic crisis that was meant to hurt Indian interests. It did not criticize Indian support for arming and training of the Tamil militants.

19. 19 Contd� Moscow strongly supported Indian mediation in Sri Lanka�s ethnic crisis. At the time of the Indian airdrop on Jaffna, the Indian External Affairs Minister N. D. Tiwari was in Moscow and �appreciated� the Indian �position� on the issue. Moscow supported the ISLA and India�s �peacekeeping role in Sri Lanka for political and strategic reasons. The provisions contained in the Letters of Exchange indirectly served not only India but also Soviet interests in the region. Regional Response Pakistan, Bangladesh and China criticized the airdropping as violation of int. law and as interference in the internal affairs of a small country. They also mildly criticised ISLA, but it did not prevent India from intervening in SL.

20. 20 Conclusion The case study of the humanitarian intervention in the fragile state of Sri Lanka shows that Indian intervention in SL was �unilateral� and against Article 2 (4) & 2 (7) of the UN charter. It was not covered by the UN Security Council or Chapter VI and VII of the UN Charter. So legally speaking it was untenable. As far as moral imperative of the HI was concerned, the intervention in fact, led to more violence in SL. .In the North & East, IPKF was fighting the same Tamils that it had come to protect while creation of TNA pitted Tamils against Tamils. In the South the ISLA led to second JVP uprising that resulted in the killings of thousands of Sinhalese youth. Most importantly, the Indian HI aggravated the fragility of the Sri Lankan state, it widened the wedge between the Tanils and the Sinhalese. It also led to the emergence of the LTTE as the most powerful armed group in SL which continues to resist a solution of the conflict within the framework of a united SL. It also hardened Sinhalese stance on Tamils� demands who felt that Indian intervention manifested that SL�s territorial integrity and sovereignty was at stake.