The Fallacies of Humanitarian Intervention

1. The FallaciesofHumanitarian Intervention A chapterfromthePutinizationof International Politics

2. This file can be downloaded from my website • http://reinhardmeyers.uni-muenster.de • Thereyoucan also find further material toaccompanyourseminars on International Theoryand International Politics • Lost in themaze ??? Send email to meyersr@uni-muenster.de

3. Talk based on myarticle: Interventionen als Instrument der internatio-nalen Politik: Entwicklung, Anspruch, Wirklich-keit, in: Bernhard Rinke/Christiane Lammers/ Reinhard Meyers/Georg Simonis (eds.): Inter-ventionenRevisited. Friedensethik und Huma-nitäre Interventionen. Wiesbaden: Springer VS 2014, S. 21 - 85

4. Structure: • The Background: changes in warfarefrom inter-state via asymmetricintrastateto hybrid warfare • The Problem: overridingtheprohibitionoftheuseof [inter-state] force [UN-Ch. Art. 2(4)] andtheban on intervention in thedomesticaffairsofnations [UN-Ch.Art. 2(7)] byhumanitarianintervention in thenameoftheResponsibilitytoProtect • The Consequence: thelegitimation/exculpation/ camouflageof traditional actsof power politicsundertheheadingofhumanitarianintervention • The Remedy: conceptualclarity – call a spade a spade… [ foodforfurtherdebate: cf. thehandoutaccompanyingthispaper]

5. Background: Traditional Warfareas Clausewitz sawit… War The state‘smonopolyofforce [ius ad bellum] turnsoutward, intothe international sphere - war is a continuationofthepoliticaltrafficbetweennationswiththeinterminglingofothermeans Centralizedpoliticalcontrolbylegitimatedecision-makers Strugglebetween large well-structuredmilitaryorganisations Primacyofpolitics Central [staff] directionaccordingto rational strategicprinciples Principleofcommand & obedience

6. War turnsinward…

7. New Wars: theClausewitzianconceptof war dissolves… Organizedmilitaryforceturnsintothedomesticsphereofcrumblingstatesubjects(Failing States ascatalystsofmilitarystrifeandaction); ius ad bellumas a publicstatemonopolydissolvesaswellastheprotectivesocialcontract. The upkeepofdomesticorder & protectionagainst outside interferenceasjustificationofpoliticalrulegiveswaytonewaimsandactors:domestic/intrasocietalconservationof power andinfluencebyOrganizedInterests, Clans, Warlords, Mafia Gangs etc. securingplunder & booty, quick extraordinaryprofits, shadoweconomytradingroutes, rare ressources, personal prestige & dependencies, etc. Strugglebetweenarmedethnicgroups & militias; private armies;rebel, irregular & partisanunits;maraudinggangs, indepen-dentlyoperatingsnipers, private militarycompanies & soldiersoffortune Primacyof (ethnonational) groupinterests Abrogationofcentralpoliticalcontrolof war andits rational overallstrategicdirection Abrogationoftheprincipleofcommand & obedience

8. A possibleinterpretation:Carl Schmitt‘sTheoryofthe Partisan (1963) [??] Characteristicsofpartisans: • Partisans do not wear an official uniform nor national emblems • Partisans show a highly intensive andoverindividualmotivation [becausetheyfight at a political front, regardthemselves in theserviceof a political, social, orreligioussalvationistidea – theyare a partisanof a specificcause] • Partisans command maximal mobility, tacticalsurprise, quick changeofattack & retreatenhancedbytechnologyandmotorization „Toyota warfare“ flexible communicationand professional socialmediastrategies • Schmitt‘sfourthcharacteristicisquestionable: thetelluriancharacterofthepartisanasdefenderofhishomegroundonly – but he admitshimselfthatfollowing Lenin, Stalin, and Mao partisans turn into offensive, world-aggressive revolutionariesuniting not theworkers, but theinsurgentsof all countries in global irregularwarfare…

9. War turns hybrid (I) • Actions ofgovernmentalandnongovernmentalactorsblendingthethreatwithorthe open or covert useof a wholespectrumof traditional militaryandunconventionalactors, meansandinstrumentsofforcemainly on thetacticallevel: • e.g.: Partisans & Mercenaries, Terrorists & OrganizedCrime, high technologyand BC weaponsofmassdestruction, improvised explosive devices, cyberattacks, disturbancesofenergyproductionandgriddistribution, economicwarfare, propaganda-, desinformation-, anddemoralisationcampaigns, • Aimsof hybrid warfare in particular: criticalinfra-structure & weakpointsaswellaspopulations on three planes: a) immediate conflictzone, b) thehome front, c) the international community • e.g.: airports & airroutes, seaports & searoutes, masstransport, energyproduction & transport, news & communicationnetworks, crowds in publicspacesand at specialevents (sports, open airconcerts, fairs, Octoberfests, andthe like)

10. War turns hybrid (II) Consequencesof hybrid warfare: Masspanic, escape & refugeattempts, massive disturbances/ breakdown ofpublicorder; multifacettedinfringementsof human securityand human rights Principle: The alarmingordeterrentthreatof hybrid warfare lies in themeasureofdamagetobeexpected Even smaller, geographically limited securitydisturbancesmayset in motion regional/global temporally, politically, economically, financiallyincisive follow-upprocesses Normative boundaries: none in international law Counter measures: must behighlyadaptable, intelligent, andresilient, overcomingthreetypicaldeficits: 1) information/recognition/knowledge, 2) coordinationofaction, 3) ressources

11. Little greenmen…

12. Maskirovka • Waleri Wassiljewitsch Gerassimow [General oftheArmy, at present Chief oftheRussian General Staff] • The Value of Science in Prediction, in: Military Industrial Courier, February 2013, dealswiththeuseofpolitical, economic, informationtechnological, humanitarian, andother non-military measuresasmethodsofwagingconflict • Foggingthedividebetweenpeaceand war • Growingroleofnonmilitarymeanstoreachpolitical, strategic, and at timestacticalaims. In manycases, theyhaveexceededthe power oftheforceofweapons in theireffectiveness . • The open useofforces, oftenundertheguiseofpeacekeepingandcrisisregulation – isresortedtoonly at a certainstage, primarilyfortheachievementof final success in theconflict.

13. The newfaceof war – orisittheold ??

14. Basic Problem The United Nations, formed in theaftermathof World War II to promote worldpeaceandstability, recognizethesovereignequalityof all itsmemberstatesbyemphasizing in its Charter theprohibitionoftheuseofforcebetweenitsmembersandtheimportanceofsovereignty… • Art.2(4) All membersshallrefrain in their inter-national relationsfromthethreatoruseofforceagainstthe territorial integrityorpoliticalinde-pendenceofanystate … • Art. 2(7) "Nothingcontained in thepresent Charter shallauthorizethe United Nationstointervene in matterswhichareessentiallywithinthedomesticjurisdictionofanystate."

15. Basic Problem II • Prohibition of the use of interstate force ex Art. 2(4) UN-Charta coupled with • Prohibition to intervene in domestic affairs ex Art 2(7) UN-Charta • Necessary boundary condition of an inter-national system of deterrence based on mutual assured destruction and hardened second-strike capabilities • He who shoots first dies second

16. Caveat • The principleofnoninterventiondoes not rule out theapplicationofenforcementmeasures in caseof a threattopeace, a breachofpeace, oractsofaggression - cf. Ch. VII UNCh – if so resolvedbythe Security Council • The GenocideConventionof 1948 also overrodethenoninterventionprincipletolay down thecommitmentoftheworldcommunitytopreventandpunishgenozide – itsapplicationhowever was a Cold War problem… in the same lineasthe 1948 Universal Declarationof Human Rights & the 1966 Conventions on Civil & Political, andEconomic, Social, and Cultural rights…

17. Basic Problem III Along with the emergence of non-intervention as a universal norm, a UN-initiated parallel development was in conflict with this principle: the development of human rights as a global issue. Article 1 of the Charter emphasises promoting respect for human rights and justice as one of the funda-mental missions of the organisation. Article 55 states that the UN shall promote and respect the human rights and basic freedoms, and sub-sequent UN initiatives have strengthened these claims. Humanitarian intervention, as the most assertive form of promoting human rights at a global level, was and is clearly incompatible with norms such as non-intervention and state sovereignty.

18. Basic Problem IVa • No Government has the right to hide behind national sovereignty in order to violate the rights or fundamental freedoms of its people. • Kofi Annan, 07.04.1999, with reference to the Kosovo Conflict

19. Basic Problem IVb TwoconceptsofSovereignty, Kofi Annan, The Economist 18.09.1999 State sovereignty, in itsmostbasic sense, isbeingredefined – not least bytheforcesofglobalisationand international cooperation. States arenowwidelyunderstoodtobeinstruments at theserviceoftheirpeoples, and not vice versa. …At the same time individual sovereignty … hasbeenenhancedby a renewedandspreadingconsciousnessofindividalrights…

20. So whatdoes all thisleadto ? • The classic definition of humanitarian intervention [by J.L.Holzgrefe (2003:18)]: • „…the threat or use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the state within whose territory force is applied…” • Holzgrefe, J.L. (2003): The humanitarian intervention debate, in: Holzgrefe, J.L./ Keohane, Robert O. (Hrsg.): Humanitarian Intervention. Ethical, Legal, and Political Dilemmas. Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., S.15 – 52.

21. …andas a furtherconsequence… Resolution ofthe UN worldsummit, Sept. 2005: „ Each individual State hastheresponsibilitytoprotectitspopulationsfromgenocide, war crimes, ethniccleansingandcrimesagainsthumanity. This responsibilityentailsthepreventionof such crimes, includingtheirincitement, throughappropriateandneces-sarymeans.[…Andif a statefails in thatresponsibility, the initiative turnsovertothe international community…] Weacceptthatresponsibilityand will act in accordancewithit…“

22. Why do nationsintervenein thedomesticaffairsofothers ? Legitimate Grounds for Intervention Realism Rationalism Idealism Political International Responsibility Expediency, Legal to protect National appropriateness Just War Doctrine Interest (Grotius ff) Revived

23. Somehistoricalexamples… • The Swedesreputedlyenteredthe 30 Years‘ War forreligious & humanitarianreasons – yetby 1648 they also haddefeatedDenmark & became a Baltic Great Power… • The Powers intervenedaroundtheMediterraneanand on the Balkans at varioustimesduringthe 19th century – in Greece (1827), Sicily (1856), Syria (1860), Krete (1866), Bosnia (1875), Bulgaria (1877), Mace-donia (1887) – andthe US in Cuba 1898 – ostensiblyforhumanitariananddemocraticreasons, but nearlyalways also againstthe Ottoman Empire… • Indian intervention in East Pakistan/Bangladesh 1971 • Tanzanianintervention in Uganda 1979 • Vietnamese intervention in KampucheaDecember 78

24. …andsomemorerecentones… • Nagorno-Karabakh 1988 - 1994 • Transnistria 1990 – 1992 • South Ossetia 2008 • Abchazia 2008 • Libya 2011 • [nodoubttobecontinued] • General characteristic: in all thesecaseshumani-tarianinterventionproducedfrozenconflicts(withtheexceptionofLibya, whereitresulted in still ongoing inter-religiousand inter-tribalwarfare) manifest in somesortofmilitarybalancebetweentheconflictingparties, a ceasefire, but nopoliticalsolution

25. Conclusio An analysisofthevastmajorityofhistorically manifest humanitarianinterventionsproducestwotrends: • „… first, the presence of a large degree of national interest whenever states have launched a supposedly humanitarian intervention; • and second, a marked unwillingness amongst states to intervene when national interests are not at stake, regardless of the humanitarian suffering taking place …“. Thus, in my interpretation the whole humanitarian inter-vention/R2P debate conceals a nasty consequence: the legitimation/exculpation/camouflage of traditional acts of power politics under a false flag – that of humanitarian intervention. • Hehir, Aidan (2013): Humanitarian Intervention. An Introduction. 2nd ed. Basingstoke:Palgrave Macmillan, p.198

26. Thank You for yourpatience…