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Scenarios and Vision for the E uropean T erritory in 20 50

Scenarios and Vision for the E uropean T erritory in 20 50. Andreu Ulied, Phillipe Doucet, Roberta Capello, Klaus Speakermann, Jacek Szlachta, Oriol Biosca ESPON MC Meeting, Aalborg, June, 2012. www.et2050.eu. ET2050 Consortium. POLIMI Roberto Camagni Roberta Capello Ugo Fratesi

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Scenarios and Vision for the E uropean T erritory in 20 50

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  1. Scenarios and Vision for the European Territory in 2050 Andreu Ulied, Phillipe Doucet, Roberta Capello, Klaus Speakermann, Jacek Szlachta, Oriol Biosca ESPON MC Meeting, Aalborg, June, 2012 www.et2050.eu

  2. ET2050 Consortium POLIMI Roberto Camagni Roberta Capello Ugo Fratesi IOM Marek Kupiszewski Dorota Kupiszewska RIKS Jaspers de Vliet Hedwig van Delden Nordregio Alexandre Dubois University of Thessaly (UTH)Harry Coccosis WSEJacek Szlachta ISISCarlo Sessa ERSILIA Jaume Jorba MCRIT, LP Andreu Ulied Oriol Biosca Rafael Rodrigo TERSYN Jacques Robert IGEAT Phillipe Doucet Moritz Lennert Valérie Biot Jean-Michel Decroly RKKIvan Illes Katalin Süle S&WMichael Wegener Klaus Speakermann ESPON CU Sara Ferrara Marjan van Herwijnen Sounding Board Patrick Salez Karl Peter Schon

  3. ET2050 Objective Supporting policy makers in formulating a VISION long-term integrated and coherent, for the development of the EU territory from 2010 up to 2050.

  4. ET2050 Methodology Scientifically-driven (what may happen in the future?) Politically-driven (what we would like to happen?)

  5. ET2050 Methodology Scientifically-driven (what may happen in the future?) Politically-driven (what we would like to happen?)  

  6. ET2050 Methodology Scientifically-driven (what may happen in the future?) Politically-driven (what we would like to happen?) e.g. tow s e.g. borders

  7. Works carried out towards Baseline (First Interim Report) • Analysis of Present State(16 reports) • By Sectors(demography, economy, energy, transport, land-uses, environment, governance) • By Territories(9 macro-zones covering EU+NC) • By European Policies(Cohesion, Agricultural, Transport, Environment…) • CriticalBifurcationsahead(aprox. 25) • Definition ofKey Directions (aprox. 15 Trends + 15 Policies) • Comparison of Baseline Scenarios(aprox. 100 future-oriented studies) • Foresight exercise(indicators at World/EU scale (1950-2050, 10+50 indicators) • Forecast exercise (indicators at NUTS3) • Sectoral models (MULTPOLES, MASST, MOSAIC-TT, METRONAMICA) and Integrated model (SASI) • Analysis of results and adjustment of Baseline Scenario

  8. Critical Bifurcations “Europe in a cross-roads”

  9. Critical Bifurcation Federalisme (Superstate) Structural Reforms / Voluntarist Scenario Limited Federalisme Limited Reforms / Likely Scenario (Most Win) Euro-crisis Wellfare (in average) Break-up Worse-case Scenario for ST (All Lost) 1992 2012 2020 2050

  10. Critical Bifurcation Federalisme (Superstate) Structural Reforms / Voluntarist Scenario Limited Federalisme Limited Reforms / Likely Scenario (Most Win) Baseline BAU (no Reforms) / Consensus Scenario Euro-crisis Wellfare (in average) Break-up Worse-case Scenario (All Lost) 1992 2012 2020 2050

  11. 5 Critical Bifurcations Overall level of agreement and disagreement

  12. Building Blocks for the Baseline Scenario

  13. A metamodel to foresight indicators aggregated at European level 2030-2050

  14. Baseline Reference World Indicators • Population: 9.200 M(Europe from 15% in 1950 to 7% today and 6% in 2050) • Urban population: 69% (Europe 89% in 2050) • GDP: € 135.000 billion(Europe from 39% in 1950 to 30% today and 18% in 2050) • Trade: € 154.000 billion (Europe from 17% in 1950 to 15% today and 9% in 2050) • Maritime transport: € 145.000 billion ton·km(average 3,7% annual growth, EU 2%) • Air transport: € 32.000 billion RPK(average 5,0% annual growth, EU 3,5%) • Tourism: 3.250 million visitors(Europe from 90% in 1950, 45% today and 27% 2050) • Energy Consumption: 24.300 MTOE(Europe 28% in 1950, 17% today, 9% in 2050) • CO2 emissions: 64.000 Mton(Europe from 18% in 1950, 15% today, and 5% in 2050)

  15. Baseline Reference World Indicators

  16. Baseline Key Directions to 2050 • Ageing Population: 540 Minh(>65 from 16% to 27%, stable migration 1,5 M/year) • Relative Economic Decline: €24.000billion(from 2,3% growth 1970-2010 to 1,4%) • Growing inequities: 10% with higher GDP/capita captures more GDP growth • Insufficient Technologic Innovation: R&D budget around 2% of GDP • More diversified energy sources: 26% RES (Oil price from € 67 / barrel to € 138) • Climate Change: 35% GHG reduction since 1990 (80% reduction target in force) • Subverted proximities: 8.600 Bpaxkm within EU (0,7%), 7.000 Btnkm (1,6%) Gateways • Increasing Urbanisation: 90% urban pop. (50 cities>1 Minh), periurbanisation • Towards a Multiple-Speed Europe: limited territorial governance structures, EU 1% • Limited public expenditure (50% 2010, 40% 2050), Public Debt (70% to 50%) • Not significant progress in relation to the Territorial Agenda main goals

  17. Baseline Key Directions to 2050 (population) Europe population % aged 65 or more

  18. Baseline Key Directions to 2050 (economy) Retirement age European GDP

  19. Baseline Key Directions to 2050 (energy&environment) Energy Consumption % aged 65 or more CO2 Emissions

  20. Baseline Key Directions to 2050 (transport) Passenger transport Freight transport

  21. Baseline Key Directions to 2050 (urbanisation) % Urban Population Num. Cities > 1 million

  22. Baseline Key Directions to 2050 (public finances) Government expenditure European Debt

  23. Europe 2030 Reflexion Group “The challenges we face today are different to those of the past and call for different responses. Whether we look at relative demographic and economic decline, climate change or energy shortages the challenges can only be properly understood and tackled when situated in a regional and global context… …the choice for the EU is clear: reform or decline”.

  24. Baseline ESPON 3.2 Demography Population Ageing Stable total European population Increasing, globally controlled external migration  ET2050: slight decrease Economy Moderate GDP increase  ET2050: low at 1’4% Slowly increasing total activity rate Slowly growing R&D expenditure  ET2050: stable at 2% Decreasing public expenditure Energy Steady increase of energy prices Stable or decreasing European consumption Increasing use of renewables Transport Continued growth of traffic  ET2050: urban decoupling, higher trade Increase of infrastructure, below needs  ET2050: PPP, better management

  25. Baseline ESPON 3.2 Climate Change Moderate overall climate change Increase in extreme local events Moderateemission levels due to new technologies ET2050: steep decrease but 80% targets not met Spatial development Further diversification of functions of rural areas; stronger dependence upon the residential economy and new forms of tourism ET2050 Increasing urbanisation and periurbanisation  ET2050 IIncreasing polarisation Governance Increasingco-operation in cross-border regions ET2050: low cooperation Increase in multi-level cross-sectoral approaches  ET2050: corporate governance Enlargements: Western Balkans (2020), Turkey (2030)  ET2050: only Balkans  ET2050 Multiple-speed Europe (variable geometry, very limited federalism)  ET2050 high impact of EU policies –Structural and Cohesion Funds Technology  ET2050No technologic radical shift (gradual improvement)

  26. 1) European national economies will not be able to adjust to structural transformations in the short term The current economic crisis will still last for a number of years, increasing the gap between more and less developed regions in Europe, and reducing the level of trade between European countries while increasing the trade of each Member State with the rest of the World.

  27. 2) Europe will become decarbonised only in the very long term Decarbonisation will be a slow process lasting for a number of decades. Renewable sources and more efficiency on the distribution and use of energy will reduce the energy-intensity and carbon-intensity of the economy, but fossil fuels will still be the most important energy source in the coming decades and the energetic dependency of European countries will still increase. Continuous increases of energy prices are expected.

  28. 3) Growing disparities in Europe Disparities will grow in Europe. Social inequalities at local or regional level will become larger. Public support to less developed regions and neighbourhoods will become scarcer and will produce limited, sometimes even contradictory, effects.

  29. 4) Increasing urbanization in Europe Territorial patterns will be heterogeneous and diverse in a general tendency towards more relaxed land regulations, especially in less developed regions. Increasing land occupation and increasingly mixed urban and rural uses.

  30. 5) Towards a multiple speed Europe There will not be a deep reform of European governance structures towards federalism, but limited adjustments. There will be a general move towards different levels of political integration between countries in a multiple speed Europe.

  31. Overall level of agreement and disagreement

  32. “Too seek Europe, is to make it! Europe exists through its search for the infinit -and this is what I call adventure” Zygmunt Bauman, “An Adventure called Europe”

  33. Explorative Scenarios

  34. ESPON3.2 (mid 2000s) e.g. flows e.g. region s

  35. ESPON 3.2 e.g. region s

  36. Europe 2030 (CPRM 2002)

  37. Europe 2030 (CPRM 2002) e.g. flows

  38. France 2020 (DATAR 2002) e.g. flows e.g. tow s e.g. cities e.g. region s

  39. Territoires 2040 (DATAR 2011) e.g. flows e.g. region s e.g. cities

  40. Netherlands 2040 (SPB 2010) e.g. tow s e.g. region s e.g. cities e.g. flows

  41. Urban development scenarios 2025 (PLUREL 2008) e.g. flows e.g. cities e.g. region s e.g. tow s e.g. borders

  42. Example of strategic scenariosGlobal Scenarios 2050(PASHMINA, 2010) e.g. flows e.g. cities e.g. flows e.g. cities e.g. tow s e.g. region s e.g. tow s e.g. region s e.g. borders

  43. Review of Scenarios

  44. Scenarios classified according to Smart and Inclusive aims

  45. Scenarios classified according to Smart and Sustainable aims

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