Checks & Balances

1. Checks & Balances Pleasantville High School US History 11R Mr. Brunelli

2. The Basics

3. Checks & Balances DEMOCRACIES = COMMON “INTERNAL” CHECKS (FEDERALIST 51) CHECKS AND BALANCES THROUGH THE SEPARATION OF POWERS = RARE “EXTERNAL” CHECKS (FEDERALIST 10) (ELECTIONS & INTEREST GROUPS = COMMON

4. Checks & Balances MOST FUSE EXECUTIVE AND LEGISLATIVE IN A PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM IN FACT – OUTSIDE THE UNITED STATES – INSTABILITY, COUP D’ETATS, & BAD GOVERNMENT CHARACTERIZE PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACIES

5. Greeks & Government PHILOSOPHER-KINGS INTELLIGENCE “BRAIN” JUDICIARY ARISTOTLE PLATO’S REPUBLIC “DIVISION OF LABOR” MONARCHY -- TYRANNY “RULE BY ONE” ARISTOCRACY -- OLIGARACHY “RULE BY THE FEW” MONTESQUIEU’S SEPARATION OF POWERS GUARDIANS COURAGE “HEART” EXECUTIVE COMMONERS DESIRE “STOMACH” LEGISLATIVE DEMOCRACY -- MOB RULE “RULE BY THE MANY”

6. Democratic Dilemmas • BEFORE CONSTITUTION . . . • FEW DEMOCRACIES = SMALL OR UNSUCCESSFUL • ATHENS – CITY-STATE, LOST TO AUTOCRATIC SPARTA • ROMAN REPUBLIC – BECAME AN EMPIRE AS IT GREW • VENICE – CITY-STATE, FELL 1796 (AUSTRIA, TURKS) • GENEVA – CITY-STATE, FELL 1798 (FRANCE) • POLAND – INDECISIVE LEADERSHIP  WEAKLY DEFENDED -- PARTITIONED 1772, 1793, 1795) • IROQUOIS CONFEDERACY – MILITARISTIC: “BEAVER WARS” AGAINST FRANCE, SHAWNEE, & ALGONQUIN • CEASED TO EXIST OR CEASED TO BE DEMOCRATIC • LARGE DEMOCRACIES = NO ACCOUNTABILITY • SMALL DEMOCRACIES = TOO VULNERABLE

7. Tyrannies • REVOLUTION = AGAINST EXECUTIVE – KINGS & ROYAL GOVERNORS – • “TYRANNY OF THE MINORITY” •  MOST STATES = STRONG LEGISLATURES & WEAK EXECUTIVES & COURTS • MADISON WORRIED ABOUT THE “TYRANNY OF THE MAJORITY” • DEMAGOGUERY = EASIER IN A SMALL STATE THAN IN AN “EXTENDED REPUBLIC” • Ex. RHODE ISLAND  DORR’S REBELLION (1841) • Ex. NY, PA & MA  PARTY POLITICS (HAMILTON-BURR)

8. MR. MADISON’S SOLUTION MADISON ARGUED “EXTENDED” REPUBLICS WOULD STOP TYRANNIES OF THE MAJORITY (FACTION) AND MINORITY (LOSS OF LIBERTY) EXTENDED REPUBLIC = MORE GROUPS & INTERESTS  NO STABLE MAJORITY • ARROW’S “IMPOSSIBILITY” THEOREM • CONDORCET PARADOX SINCE “NO ONE SHOULD BE A JUDGE IN THEIR OWN CAUSE,” GROUPS WOULD BE FORCED TO COMPROMISE • BICAMERAL LEGISLATURE – SENATE & HOUSE • TWO-STEP RATIFICATION – CONGRESS & STATES/PEOPLE • CYCLING MAJORITIES – NO STABLE MAJORITY NATIONAL GOV’T = NOT ONLY THE STRONGEST, BUT ALSO THE MOST DEMOCRATIC

9. MADISONIAN MISTAKES • RISE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: • MARBURY V. MADISON – BY “WINNING” THIS CASE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT, MADISON ALLOWS JOHN MARSHALL TO CREATE JUDICIAL REVIEW • STRENGTHENED JUDICIAL BRANCH • RISE OF POLITICAL PARTIES: • TWO PARTY POLITICS  NO CYCLING MAJORITIES • PENDULUM vs. CYCLE DYNAMIC – RED v. BLUE STATES • SAME AS BALANCE OF POWER v. ALLIANCES IN WWI 7 COUNTRIES, B.O.P. = 840 (7*6*5*4) CHANCES 7 COUNTRIES, 2 ALLIANCES = 2 CHANCES • MADISON = 1ST PARTY “CHAIRMAN” FOR JEFFERSON • RISE OF THE “IMPERIAL” PRESIDENCY: • SIZE AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH INCREASED  WEAKENED LEGISLATIVE BRANCH • LOUISIANA PURCHASE + WAR OF 1812

10. WHY AMERICAN DEMOCRACY WORKS • STRONG JUDICIARY • THE EXTRA-CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE POWER OF JUDICIAL REVIEW AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IS A MAJOR COUNTERWEIGHT • MOST PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACIES NEVER DEVELOPED STRONG JUDICIARIES (EX. LATIN AMERICA) • DIVERSITY & EQUALITY • DIVERSITY OF GROUPS AND INTERESTS STRENGTHENS THE EXTERNAL CHECKS ON GOVERNMENT • HISTORICALLY, INEQUALITY HAS BEEN LOW & OPPORTUNITY HIGH • THE ADVANTAGE OF APATHY • LOW VOTER TURNOUT MITIGATES THE “WINNER TAKE ALL” SYSTEM • BUSH v. GORE (2000) OR COUP D’ETAT