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Information Operations in Counterinsurgency

Agenda. IO GoalsIO Fundamentals in COINIO VacuumSuccess vs. FailureIO PlanningIO in the ITO. The desired effects of IO are to destroy, degrade, disrupt, deny, deceive, exploit, and influence enemy actions and enhance the legitimacy of the host nation government.. IO Goals. - Divide, disorgani

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Information Operations in Counterinsurgency

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    1. Information Operations in Counterinsurgency

    2. Agenda IO Goals IO Fundamentals in COIN IO Vacuum Success vs. Failure IO Planning IO in the ITO

    3. The desired effects of IO are to destroy, degrade, disrupt, deny, deceive, exploit, and influence enemy actions and enhance the legitimacy of the host nation government.

    4. - Divide, disorganize, and induce defection of insurgents - Reduce/eliminate civilian support of insurgents - Dissuade civilians from insurgent activities - Win the active support of non-committed civilians - Preserve and strengthen the support of friendly civilians - Win popular approval (from the civilians) of the local presence of friendly military forces - Obtain national unity or disunity (within the civilian population) as desired Multiple AIF groups have multiple goals and only overlap on certain aspects. Drive the wedge between groups, religion vs. secularism, foreign fighters are criminals, killing Iraqi Even tacit support of the insurgents allows them freedom of movement. If I cannot feed my family, I might as well earn some money by attacking Americans Much of the population has a don’t ask, don’t tell or it doesn’t matter to me…we need to make it matter to them Address patriotism, democracy, freedom of speech, self-governance, and freedom Continue to provide work projects, put the “Iraqi face” on the projects. Get the children, get the parent. Emphasize national Iraqi pride, segregate the former regime elements that want a return to the tyrannical past. Foreign fighters.Multiple AIF groups have multiple goals and only overlap on certain aspects. Drive the wedge between groups, religion vs. secularism, foreign fighters are criminals, killing Iraqi Even tacit support of the insurgents allows them freedom of movement. If I cannot feed my family, I might as well earn some money by attacking Americans Much of the population has a don’t ask, don’t tell or it doesn’t matter to me…we need to make it matter to them Address patriotism, democracy, freedom of speech, self-governance, and freedom Continue to provide work projects, put the “Iraqi face” on the projects. Get the children, get the parent. Emphasize national Iraqi pride, segregate the former regime elements that want a return to the tyrannical past. Foreign fighters.

    6. Fundamentals of IO in COIN Prepare for IO before deployment Involve every soldier Anticipate and respond with speed, accuracy, and truth Establish and sustain an integrated team approach Intelligence supports IO IO supports intelligence

    7. IO is tied to every aspect of COIN FID CMO Force Protection Population Security Kinetic INTEL Plan for Contingencies Fundamentals of IO in COIN FID: Billboards depicting the “strong Iraqi Soldier,” protecting his family, tribe, and community. Assisting in educating the populace on voting. CMO: Credit for projects going to the Iraqi government and Army Force Protection: Provide education/information on Escalation of Force to the public so they are not caught by surprise. STAY AWAY FROM THE FOB FRONT GATE. PULL OVER FOR MILITARY CONVOYS. Logistics: Convoy behavior. Population Security: The IA and CF are here to keep you safe, and follow through. Provide anonymous tip phone lines, drop boxes. Kinetic: Always have a plan for JOE and TED to talk to the locals. Emplace translators with the cordon. Train the IA to effect the breach and actions on the OBJ. INTEL: Use the enemy’s IO campaign to “track-back.” If a rumor or product starts at a definable location, exploit that knowledge to shut down or capture the source.FID: Billboards depicting the “strong Iraqi Soldier,” protecting his family, tribe, and community. Assisting in educating the populace on voting. CMO: Credit for projects going to the Iraqi government and Army Force Protection: Provide education/information on Escalation of Force to the public so they are not caught by surprise. STAY AWAY FROM THE FOB FRONT GATE. PULL OVER FOR MILITARY CONVOYS. Logistics: Convoy behavior. Population Security: The IA and CF are here to keep you safe, and follow through. Provide anonymous tip phone lines, drop boxes. Kinetic: Always have a plan for JOE and TED to talk to the locals. Emplace translators with the cordon. Train the IA to effect the breach and actions on the OBJ. INTEL: Use the enemy’s IO campaign to “track-back.” If a rumor or product starts at a definable location, exploit that knowledge to shut down or capture the source.

    8. Work the checklist by operation…gauge how balanced our efforts are across the COIN functions A. Orient all on the parts of the worksheet Operation Functions…Subfunctions Short-Range, Mid Range, Long-Range B. First: Identify the mission 1. Assess what type of effect you expect mission to have 2. Ask yourself how an adjustment of the plan might help address another COIN function 3. Don’t sheet…focus on 1st order of effect…don’t stretch it Confirm effects after the mission…transfer info to Master Sheet TRANSITION: NOW LETS LOOK AT ANOTHER MISSIONWork the checklist by operation…gauge how balanced our efforts are across the COIN functions A. Orient all on the parts of the worksheet Operation Functions…Subfunctions Short-Range, Mid Range, Long-Range B. First: Identify the mission 1. Assess what type of effect you expect mission to have 2. Ask yourself how an adjustment of the plan might help address another COIN function 3. Don’t sheet…focus on 1st order of effect…don’t stretch it Confirm effects after the mission…transfer info to Master Sheet TRANSITION: NOW LETS LOOK AT ANOTHER MISSION

    9. Work the checklist by operation…gauge how balanced our efforts are across the COIN functions A. Orient all on the parts of the worksheet Operation Functions…Subfunctions Short-Range, Mid Range, Long-Range B. First: Identify the mission 1. Assess what type of effect you expect mission to have 2. Ask yourself how an adjustment of the plan might help address another COIN function 3. Don’t sheet…focus on 1st order of effect…don’t stretch it Confirm effects after the mission…transfer info to Master Sheet TRANSITION: NOW LETS LOOK AT ANOTHER MISSION Work the checklist by operation…gauge how balanced our efforts are across the COIN functions A. Orient all on the parts of the worksheet Operation Functions…Subfunctions Short-Range, Mid Range, Long-Range B. First: Identify the mission 1. Assess what type of effect you expect mission to have 2. Ask yourself how an adjustment of the plan might help address another COIN function 3. Don’t sheet…focus on 1st order of effect…don’t stretch it Confirm effects after the mission…transfer info to Master Sheet TRANSITION: NOW LETS LOOK AT ANOTHER MISSION

    10. IO Vacuum

    11. IO Vacuum

    12. IO Vacuum

    13. IO Vacuum

    14. Political vs. Military Mobilization Insurgent/Extremists failure to achieve classic “military objectives” should not be interpreted as a failure to accomplish the “mission.” Tet Offensive in Vietnam Intifada I “Final Offensive” in El Salvador Spectacular Attacks in Iraq Of note, these examples shared characteristics of a possible outcome in Iraq: All were failures militarily All were victories psychologically and politically The psychological and political goals were ultimately more important than military objectives served psychological and political purposes rather than conventional military objectivesserved psychological and political purposes rather than conventional military objectives

    15. Impact of Attacks and IO Factor Media coverage and public outcry following spectacular and widespread attacks will stimulate insurgents’ efforts  The impacts of a insurgent spectacular attacks: Greatly magnifies the group’s effort International and domestic press coverage Damage government credibility Impact public and political support in the US and Coalition countries Reduce CF and morale  Islamic extremist media releases stated the Abu Ghurayb attack would be followed by more against US instillations.Islamic extremist media releases stated the Abu Ghurayb attack would be followed by more against US instillations.

    16. IO Plan - IO understands the difference between Insurgency Phases and Strategies - Methods of IO based on Nature of Insurgencies - What is the objective? - Who is the target? Sunni / Shi’a / Kurd 4th Generation of Warfare (American public) - How does IO affect Center of Gravity? Insurgent strategy = How they accomplish the goal Nature of insurgency = What the goal is The CoG in the insurgency is the population therefore the demographics of the AOR should be PIR/IR. The CoG should define the IO plan and execution. The CDR and staff should tailor the message to the target audience. Team house in Tikrit Tactical Application How to deal with civilians, leaders, and Iraqi military Iraqis eating in coalition mess halls Iraqi LNO with Div, Bde, Bn and in Embassy and Al Faw palace, etc. Insurgent strategy = How they accomplish the goal Nature of insurgency = What the goal is The CoG in the insurgency is the population therefore the demographics of the AOR should be PIR/IR. The CoG should define the IO plan and execution. The CDR and staff should tailor the message to the target audience. Team house in Tikrit Tactical Application How to deal with civilians, leaders, and Iraqi military Iraqis eating in coalition mess halls Iraqi LNO with Div, Bde, Bn and in Embassy and Al Faw palace, etc.

    17. Information Operations Officer Designated IO Officer assists the staff in integrating IO into each COA. The IO officer addresses how each IO element supports each COA and its associated time lines, critical events, and decision points. The IO officer revises IO concepts of support as needed during war gaming. FM 5-0, Planning and Orders Production, JAN 05

    20. Divisive IO Political, social, economic, and ideological differences among insurgent elements Leadership rivalries within insurgent movement Insurgents as criminals, inept, anti-Islamic Danger of betrayal from among the insurgents Harsh living conditions of insurgents Selfish motivation of opportunists supporting the insurgents Foreign domination of the movement DIVISIVE Al Qaida vs. FRE, Sadr vs. AMZ, killing peaceful civilians, inept, criminal, anti-Islamic, insurgents do not allow members to leave voluntarily, living on the run—in hiding, criminals working hand-in-hand with insurgents, black marketers taking advantage of security gaps, influence from Jordan, Saudi, Iran DIVISIVE Al Qaida vs. FRE, Sadr vs. AMZ, killing peaceful civilians, inept, criminal, anti-Islamic, insurgents do not allow members to leave voluntarily, living on the run—in hiding, criminals working hand-in-hand with insurgents, black marketers taking advantage of security gaps, influence from Jordan, Saudi, Iran

    21. IO That Counters Insurgent IO Proactive campaign, projected by the host nation, themselves designed to neutralize the psychological impact of future attacks Acknowledge the possibility/likelihood of future spectacular attacks The three pillars of MNF/ITG/ISF IO should be insurgents, especially Islamic extremist are: Criminal attacks against host nation Foreign ties and leadership Ineptitude Ridicule can be very powerful, particularly against insurgent recruitment Proactively portray future attacks as: “The last ditch efforts of a desperate, defeated insurgency” Highlight the death and destruction to civilians (Muslim on Muslim) Violations of the Muslim’s Lesser Jihad (“…fighting to protect Islam from attack or oppression.  In such fighting, no woman, child, or innocent civilian is to be harmed…”) and “Whosoever killed a person…it shall be as if he killed all mankind; and whoso saved a life, it shall be as if he had saved the life of all mankind.” Qur’an 5:32 Ineptitude of Insurgent/Extremist’s tactics and leadership Insurgent groups are made up of criminals and foreign terrorists who are shameful and without honor as they carry out rapes and murders of innocent Arabs ISF ability to defeat, delay, and destroy the enemy; ISF honor and valor Proactively portray future attacks as: “The last ditch efforts of a desperate, defeated insurgency” Highlight the death and destruction to civilians (Muslim on Muslim) Violations of the Muslim’s Lesser Jihad (“…fighting to protect Islam from attack or oppression.  In such fighting, no woman, child, or innocent civilian is to be harmed…”) and “Whosoever killed a person…it shall be as if he killed all mankind; and whoso saved a life, it shall be as if he had saved the life of all mankind.” Qur’an 5:32 Ineptitude of Insurgent/Extremist’s tactics and leadership Insurgent groups are made up of criminals and foreign terrorists who are shameful and without honor as they carry out rapes and murders of innocent Arabs ISF ability to defeat, delay, and destroy the enemy; ISF honor and valor

    22. Psychological Operations “Few insurgencies have been won or lost by large, decisive military battles. More commonly, insurgencies are won by a combination of military and political means. Much of the political leverage involved in such settlements is derived from effective psychological operations, which have structured the environment necessary for a political solution.” -DA Pam 500-104

    23. Targets of Psychological Operations PSYOP can assist counterinsurgency by reaching the following targets: - Insurgents - Civilian Populace (US & Iraqi) - Military Force - Neutral Elements - External Hostile Powers - Local Government Insurgents To create dissension, disorganization, low morale, subversion, and defection within insurgent forces No single way exists to influence foreign targets deliberately. Planning stems from the viewpoint of those affected by a conflict The HN government needs national programs designed to influence and win insurgents over to its side. Countering hostile propaganda Civilian Populace To gain, preserve, and strengthen civilian support for the HN government and its counterinsurgency programs Discrediting the insurgent forces to neutral groups Discrediting the insurgent forces groups sympathetic to the insurgents Projecting a favorable image of the HN government and the United States Passing instructions to the HN populace Military Force To strengthen military support, with emphasis on building and maintaining the morale of these forces The loyalty, discipline, and motivation of the forces are critical factors in combating an insurgency Establishing HN command support of positive populace control and protection from insurgent activities Providing close and continuous PSYOP support to CMO Neutral Elements To gain the support of uncommitted foreign groups inside and outside the HN Effective ways of gaining support are to reveal the subversive activities and to bring international pressure to bear on any external hostile power sponsoring the insurgency External Hostile Powers To convince them the insurgency will fail Local Government To establish and maintain credibility. Developing HN PSYOP capabilities Informing the international community of HN and US intent and goodwill Insurgents To create dissension, disorganization, low morale, subversion, and defection within insurgent forces No single way exists to influence foreign targets deliberately. Planning stems from the viewpoint of those affected by a conflict The HN government needs national programs designed to influence and win insurgents over to its side. Countering hostile propaganda Civilian Populace To gain, preserve, and strengthen civilian support for the HN government and its counterinsurgency programs Discrediting the insurgent forces to neutral groups Discrediting the insurgent forces groups sympathetic to the insurgents Projecting a favorable image of the HN government and the United States Passing instructions to the HN populace Military Force To strengthen military support, with emphasis on building and maintaining the morale of these forces The loyalty, discipline, and motivation of the forces are critical factors in combating an insurgency Establishing HN command support of positive populace control and protection from insurgent activities Providing close and continuous PSYOP support to CMO Neutral Elements To gain the support of uncommitted foreign groups inside and outside the HN Effective ways of gaining support are to reveal the subversive activities and to bring international pressure to bear on any external hostile power sponsoring the insurgency External Hostile Powers To convince them the insurgency will fail Local Government To establish and maintain credibility. Developing HN PSYOP capabilities Informing the international community of HN and US intent and goodwill

    24. Conduct of Troops During Operations Rules of Conduct: There shall be no confiscation whatever from the poor peasantry. If you borrow anything, return it. Replace all articles you damage. Pay fairly for everything that you purchase. Be honest in all transactions with the peasants. Be courteous and polite to the people and help them when you can. — Mao Tse-tung, 1928

    25. Utilizing IO means Timely Integrating with all phases of combat operations Host nation to spread message Decentralized to lowest levels Understanding host nation culture/customs Conduct of Troops During Operations TV – satellite Radio News flyers DVDs/VCDs Rumors – Using Iraqis Dismounted patrols Assisting Iraqi civilians (accidents) assess situation Horns on Vehicles IO – broadcast (billboard, radio, etc) traffic rules when US convoys are on the road. Include local leaders in CA operations Put the Iraqi face on missions SOI engagements with village leaders TV – satellite Radio News flyers DVDs/VCDs Rumors – Using Iraqis Dismounted patrols Assisting Iraqi civilians (accidents) assess situation Horns on Vehicles IO – broadcast (billboard, radio, etc) traffic rules when US convoys are on the road. Include local leaders in CA operations Put the Iraqi face on missions SOI engagements with village leaders

    26. Essential Tasks Success or failure depends on coordinated and thought out IO plan Recognize that COIN is both physical and psychological IO effort begins before the attacks occur Pre-Screen IO products (via host nation or interpreters) IO effort propagated at ALL levels –train your soldiers for “street” IO Train host nation counterparts to become the main IO effort Well-synchronized offensive IO can cripple insurgent armed forces and insurgent political decision making capabilities Much of the concern regarding screening of IO products is to assure they do not backfire here or abroad. This does not necessarily outweigh the message getting out late or reaching the target audience after insurgent/extremist propaganda and biased press reporting. This would help push time-sensitive messages out through credible Arab channels. in cooperation with ISF counterparts, to coordinate and synchronize their day-to-day actions better  Decentralized and projected forward to local Iraqi IO assets who work in cooperation with Special Forces FOB/AOBs, and regional BDEs and BNs. Much of the concern regarding screening of IO products is to assure they do not backfire here or abroad. This does not necessarily outweigh the message getting out late or reaching the target audience after insurgent/extremist propaganda and biased press reporting. This would help push time-sensitive messages out through credible Arab channels. in cooperation with ISF counterparts, to coordinate and synchronize their day-to-day actions better  Decentralized and projected forward to local Iraqi IO assets who work in cooperation with Special Forces FOB/AOBs, and regional BDEs and BNs.

    27. Questions?

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