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The Counterinsurgency Campaign in Iraq. The Counterinsurgency Campaign in Iraq. Like other counterinsurgencies . . . Post-invasion Iraq is a political contest that manifests itself in violence The Iraqi population must be the focus of civil-military effort Political progress is essential
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The Counterinsurgency Campaign in Iraq • Like other counterinsurgencies . . . • Post-invasion Iraq is a political contest that manifests itself in violence • The Iraqi population must be the focus of civil-military effort • Political progress is essential • Presence is key to achieving security in a decentralized, intelligence driven fight • Time is a key variable . . .. . . Time cannot be manipulated in the same fashion as in maneuver warfare • Patience is required • To win the Coalition and the Iraqi government and forces must . . . • Protect and control the population • Deny insurgents sanctuary • Meet popular expectations
The Counterinsurgency Campaign in Iraq • The Coalition’s campaign is inherently a counterinsurgency campaign • Civil and military elements • Build Iraqi capability, fight the insurgency, transition the lead • Focus on the Iraqi population while protecting other centers of gravity • Simultaneous implementation (it cannot be sequential) • Each component has its own timing based on resources, realities on the ground and external influences Security Governance Economic Development Communicating
The Counterinsurgency Campaign in Iraq • Requirements • Protect the population • Control the population • Deny insurgents sanctuary • Meet popular expectations • Metrics • Character of insurgent violence • Information from the population • Popular response to insurgent propaganda • Ability of insurgents to control their casualties
The Counterinsurgency Campaign in Iraq • Since fall 2004 insurgent and terrorist groups have failed to meaningfully: • Regain safehaven after the loss of Fallujah • Stop or impact the 30 January election • Impact formation of the Transitional National Assembly • Impact formation of the Iraqi Transitional Government • Undermine development of Iraqi Security Forces • Create a wider insurgent movement within Iraq • Expand external support for the insurgency • Foment sectarian violence • Stop the drafting and passing of the constitution • Political progress, growing government legitimacy and increasingly capable Iraqi forces are the greatest long term threats to the insurgency • Patience, sustained security investment and increased investment in Iraqi government and economic capacity will enable progress