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Competition vs. Cooperation. Patterns, Perceptions and Problems of RTD in European Integration. 6cp: Crossing borders, 29.10.2003. Asymmetrical relationship. adaptation of rules of the game decision-making science push and demand pull participation in FP: formal/effective
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Competition vs. Cooperation Patterns, Perceptions and Problems of RTD in European Integration 6cp: Crossing borders, 29.10.2003 Interdisciplinary Center of Social Research, Hannover;University of Helsinki
Asymmetrical relationship • adaptation of rules of the game • decision-making • science push and demand pull • participation in FP: formal/effective • disparities and cohesion Hilger: competition vs. cooperation
Competition • ERA rationale: compete world-wide • within EU, amongst CEEC • peer competition in negotiations did speed up process • catching-up as objective • winners and loosers belong to the game Hilger: competition vs. cooperation
Catching-up • disparities within EU15 / amongst CEEC / between EU-CEEC • generation and transfer of knowledge • economic growth through RTD needs absorption capabilities • FP complementary to structural funds: skills and infrastructure (Sharp 1998) • ‘laggers-behind’ lack absorptive capacity (Clarysee/Muldur 2001) Hilger: competition vs. cooperation
Performance 1 Hilger: competition vs. cooperation
Performance 2 Hilger: competition vs. cooperation
Patterns of FP participation • 17% of FP5-contracts with CEE-partnership • performance below EU average • Commission introduced special measures • peer orientation up to one fourth • rarely coordinators from CEEC • entering consortia by invitation Hilger: competition vs. cooperation
Cooperation • reasons to cooperate: • access to complementarity • risk sharing and critical mass • application of results • recruitment of staff • strategic and subjective preferences • incremental definition of common goal • norm of reciprocity among equals Hilger: competition vs. cooperation
Results 1: choice of partner Hilger: competition vs. cooperation
Results 2: goals Hilger: competition vs. cooperation
Results 3: roles and benefits • almost 2/3 equal actors • Lower-Saxony: contacts, publications, financing • CEE-partners: financing, knowledge/skills, administration, subjective stabilisation and recognition Hilger: competition vs. cooperation
Results 4: experiences • methodological and theoretical level about equal - equipment worse • ‘no difference to EU-15’: 58% • ‘cooperate again’: 86% • ‘wished mobility’: incoming CEEC 78% - outgoing CEEC 58% Hilger: competition vs. cooperation
Problems on micro-level • payment, infrastructure, costs • careers, recognition, disrupted hierarchies • administrative and managerial experience • tacit knowledge • personal and organisational goals Hilger: competition vs. cooperation
Problems on macro-level • environment of RTD: industrial demand • knowledge- and brain-drain • GERD hardly rising • shrinking legitimization for special treatment Hilger: competition vs. cooperation
Conclusions: Where to influence? • objective of researchers is not macro-political: provide for visibility • encounters are crucial • don’t forget bilateral cooperation • be present at Brussels • excellence-dilemma: selected islands of excellence Hilger: competition vs. cooperation