1 / 13

Terrorist Access to Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS)

Terrorist Access to Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS). James Bevan, Small Arms Survey, Geneva. Key Points. Avenues of loss to NSAs/terrorist groups Spotlight on State/NSA interface The broader context of stockpile (in)security Measures: bringing SALW control back in to the debate.

fedora
Download Presentation

Terrorist Access to Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS)

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Terrorist Access to Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) James Bevan, Small Arms Survey, Geneva

  2. Key Points • Avenues of loss to NSAs/terrorist groups • Spotlight on State/NSA interface • The broader context of stockpile (in)security • Measures: bringing SALW control back in to the debate

  3. Seized and lost MANPADS 2004-2006

  4. STATE NSA 1) State transfers to NSAs 2) Loss from state collapse 3) Loss from state stocks NON-STATE 4) Theft from manufacturer The State/NSA interface

  5. Well planned, well executed

  6. POOR SUPPLIER CONTROLS • Transfers to ‘problem’ states • Insufficient oversight • Potential for re-transfer UNDER-DEVELOPMENT • Demand-side theft incentive • Poverty and poor pay • Informal economic networks LOSS FROM STATE STOCKS SECURITY SECTOR ISSUES • Poor stock oversight • Corruption • Poor bureaucracy Loss factors

  7. Countermeasures It could cost nearly $40 billion over 20 years to deploy defense technology on the 6,800 US passengers jets. By comparison, the federal government currently spends roughly $4.4 billion a year on all transportation security (RAND, 2005)

  8. TRANSFER CONTROLS ? POOR SUPPLIER CONTROLS • Inadequate existing security • Insufficient oversight • Transfers to states with poor stock security UNDER-DEVELOPMENT • Demand-side theft incentive • Poverty and poor pay • Informal economic networks SURPLUS DESTRUCTION LOSS FROM STATE STOCKS SECURITY SECTOR ISSUES • Poor stock oversight • Corruption • Poor bureaucracy Existing measures/initiatives

  9. Items on the current agenda:Transfer to NSAs Covers only a small part of the overall proliferation of MANPADS to NSAs Restricting transfers to NSAs does not preclude re-transfer to NSAs

  10. Items on the current agenda:Destruction of stocks Tackles the symptom not the cause Continued transfer of MANPADS to states with inadequate resources to control stocks

  11. Wish list: Transfer conditional on capacity of recipient to police stocks Supplier state-monitored mechanisms to prevent unauthorized re-transfer

  12. State-state Eritrea State-state Bulgaria Yemen NSA NSA Theft from state The threat from re-transfer:MANPADS used in the Mombassa Attack

  13. MANPADS and the wider SALW debate The reasons for MANPADS loss/theft are largely the same as for small arms Local development and security dynamics are often the key precipitators of loss/theft Poor control over small arms stocks/insecurity/under-development are strong indicators of insecure stocks The capacity of recipient states to maintain control over stocks should inform transfer decisions

More Related