Access zones and Training

1. Access zones and Training Steve Hutchins BE-ASR IEFC workshop 7/3/2012

2. We use the access zones to limit access to an area to control activities. Works in the machines must be planned and coordinated to avoid hazardous co-activities. Access authorisation ensures the correct training has been followed by intervening personnel.

4. Most access zones were created by the PS and SL divisions: BE has inherited them, the “owner” decides on training courses, PPE needed and the access manager. This ownership is under review by the sector DSOs.

5. Due to the “matrix” nature of facility management the responsibility for safety is shared between the sector DSOs, BE for operational aspects and EN for infrastructure. The transitions require close cooperation between BE-OP and EN-MEF, as there is no single handover process. (See EDMS 1151087 J.Pedersen / M.Tavlet)

6. The requirements for PPE (R=recommended, M= mandatory) are based on real hazards; they vary between machines and with respect to activities taking place. They will be reviewed and adapted for LS1. Are these requirements clearly understood by staff and contractors?

7. PPE: In a “chantier” there are many hazards due to the construction work, these require work coordination and a significant amount of protective equipment. After reception of the building the owner makes it safer by installing collective protection means, to avoid the need for individual equipment and create better working conditions. At CERN the second phase has been done, but we do have areas where PPE is still needed. The extent of these areas has been discussed between DSOs, HSE, and Safety Coordinators, and it was agreed that it is simpler and clearer for people if PPE are defined once for all in a given facility, and not try to adapt the obligation to all specific hazards that may be present in a small specific area, related to a specific activity. This later possibility would be too complicated to manage and to follow.

8. Required training: L1-4, Trec and Mask are checked by the access control system, but electrical training is not, extension to all facilities will have a cost…

9. The electrical training certification: For CERN staff and users, the online SIR course is sufficient for access (validity 3 years). If working on electrical equipment, a class –based course is needed. For French contractors a “habilitationelectrique” is needed: validity 3 years, 2 day classroom course. For Swiss contractors a certification by the employer is sufficient. For other nationalities more effort is needed... Each access manager has to check this individually. Currently this applies to the LHC and SPS but we will need an improved method if all areas are to have this training requirement. Proposal: a single entry point for electrical certification in the database.

10. Levels 1-4 training: Level 4 is valid 3 years, levels 1-3 are currently valid for life. HSE are planning improved levels 1-3 in time for LS1. Evacuation training is needed before LS1: this should address the specific situations in the PS, SPS and LHC. It should be noted that the validity of LHC access is set to 3 years by the access manger, in other zones it has been open ended. This is needed as the electrical certification is not in the database. This is a source of annoyance for staff and an extra workload for access managers, the implementation of electrical certification needs to be addressed before extending it to all facilities.

11. PS access includes these other areas: the hazards are similar but the training and PPE are not; need for evaluation. In the new access system it will be possible to filter by access point: this may be a more elegant solution than multiplying the number of zones.

12. HiRadMat is not an access zone as there is no separate access point: experimenters have to have SPS access rights, which is not ideal. This type of case can be more easily controlled in the future access systems.

13. Work preparation: In the recent Christmas break, work and dose planning was introduced for all major interventions, although aimed at optimization of radiological dose this required a structured planning of interventions. This drive will continue during 2012: intervention plans should be developed for urgent interventions too. Safety issues are often identified in the planning stage, when there is time to develop correct working methods to deal with the identified hazards. Work Coordination: Shut down coordination in the PS and SPS complexes has not required the level of complexity seen in the LHC, yet the need for better co-activity coordination has already been identified. The main tool required is an access system able to operate with the IMPACT application: but this will not be available in LS1 for the PS and SPS. An important work organisation operation has been the “Visited’Inspection Commune” (VIC) these have become a regular item in LHC works but are less used in the PS and SPS due to limited manpower in the coordinator team.

14. Conclusions: • Electrical training : there is a need for a single entry of electrical training status in the access database, with time limits on the validity. • Zone validity: if all trainings are limited duration and checked by the system, long term access rights can be granted: this will reduce the workload of access managers and stress in the workforce. • New level 1-3 courses by HSE: is it possible to also have a PS and SPS level 4 in time for LS1? • Continued effort in work preparation planning during 2012 will improve safety aspects too. • More manpower will be needed in the work coordinator team. • Evacuation training.