The End of Democratic Government in Thailand

1. The End of Democratic Government in Thailand The Military Coup of 2006

3. I. Developing Democracy in a Developing Nation • A. Overthrow of the Absolute Monarchy in 1932 • 1. Replaced with unelected parliament • 2. Evolved into a military dictatorship • under Japan • B. Return of the Monarchy in 1947 • C. Coup in 1948 • D. Democratic Coup in 1973 • E. Military Counter-coup in 1976 • F. Military overthrow of the first democratically- elected government in 1991 • G. Restoration of Democracy in 1992 • H. Constitution of 1997 • I. Military Coup on September 19, 2006 • II. Sources of the Coup of 2006 • A. Opposition to Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra • 1. Overwhelming election victory in 2005 • 2. Question of Corruption? • (Slide 2) • B. The "Two Democracies" Thesis • (Slide 3- Anek) • (Slide 4)

4. ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ • Table 2: Representation of Thai Political Parties in Constituency and Proportional Electoral Systems, 2001 and 2005 • ________________________________________________________________________ • 2001 • Constituency Districts Party List • Party % Votes %Seats Votes-Seats % Votes %Seats Votes-Seats • Thai Rak Thai 36.64 50.00 -13.36 40.64 48.00 -7.36 • Prajadhipatthai 25.81 24.25 1.56 26.58 31.00 -4.42 • Chart Thai 8.55 8.75 -0.25 5.32 6.00 -0.68 • Kwam Wang Mai 9.57 7.00 2.57 7.02 8.00 -0.92 • Chart Pattana 8.85 5.50 3.35 6.14 7.00 -0.87 • Seritam 4.07 3.50 0.57 2.82 0.00 2.82 • Rasadorn 3.39 0.50 2.89 1.25 0.00 1.25 • Tinthai 1.20 0.25 0.95 2.11 0.00 2.11 • Kisangkorn 0.08 0.25 -0.17 0.16 0.00 0.16 • Others 1.83 0.00 1.83 7.90 0.00 7.97 • Index of Disproportionality: Constituency = 10.29 Party List = 8.75 • -------------------- • 2005 • Constituency Districts Party List • Party % Votes %Seats Votes-Seats % Votes %Seats Votes-Seats • Thai Rak Thai 55.49 77.50 -22.01 61.17 67.00 -5.83 • Prajadhipatthai 24.95 17.50 7.45 23.22 26.00 -2.78 • Chart Thai 10.53 4.50 6.03 6.64 7.00 -0.36 • Mahachon 7.51 0.50 7.01 4.34 0.00 4.34 • Other 1.51 0.00 1.51 4.67 0.00 4.63 • Index of Disproportionality: Constituency = 17.72 Party List = 6.40

5. The difference between urban and rural constituencies (according to the elite “urban view”) is that: • Voting in farming areas is not guided by political principles, policy issues, or what is perceived to be in the national interest, all of which is (regarded as) the only legitimate rationale for citizens casting their ballots in a democratic election. The ideal candidates for rural voters are those who visit them often, address their immediate grievances effectively, and bring numerous public works to their communities.[1] • The ability of rural constituencies to acquire substantial power in parliaments under these conditions often led to doubts among the middle class, the mass media, and even academics as to the efficacy of democratic processes. For these groups, “democracy turns out to be the rule of the corrupt and incompetent.” This creates a dilemma, for although the middle class opposes authoritarian rule, in principle, they hold rural constituencies in contempt, regarding them as “parochial in outlook, boorish in manner, and too uneducated to be competent lawmakers or cabinet members.”[2] • [1] Laothamatas, op.cit., 208. • [2]Ibid, 208.

6. ________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ • Table 10: Cleavages between Rural and Urban Populations in 2005 Polls, ANOVA Analysis • ________________________________________________________________________ • Mean • IndicatorsN Bangkok Non-BKK F-Value Sig. of F • It is better to live in an • orderly society than to • allow people so much • freedom that it disrupts • development. 1985 7.86 7.26 8.952 .003 • Even if a government is • democratically elected, if • it is corrupt, the military • should come in to set • things right. 1980 5.92 6.18 1.211 .271 • _______________________________________________________________________

7. Table 6: Impacts of Status Indicators on Support for Democracy: Regression Analysis • 2001 • Regression Coefficient t-value Sig. of t • Education -.002 -.190 .849 • Income -.026 -2.422 .016 • Occupational Status -.008 -.676 .499 • SES* -.018 -1.003 .316 • 2005 • Education . .012 1.336 .182 • Income .000 .133 .894 • Occupational Status .002 .287 .774 • SES* .010 .775 .439 • *Factor scores of education, income, and occupational status on a single natural factor with all loadings <.70. • ________________________________________________________________________

8. C. Socioeconomic Status and Support for Democracy • (Slide 5) • D. A Royalist Coup: Events preceding the Coup • 1. Businessman Sonthi Limthongkul • 2. Academics and Civil-society movements • 3. Gen. Prem Tinsulanonda lectures military • 4. General Songthi visits the palace • 5. Coup Occurs • 6. King Endorses the Coup • III. The Way Ahead • A. Growing Opposition to the Coup • B. Populist versus Elite-guided Democracy • C. A New Constitution and Elections in 2007