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Social and political Aspects of Tsunamis

Social and political Aspects of Tsunamis. Presentation, Geography 269 March 11, 2013 Jessica Marter -Kenyon, Jonathan Sim , & Alana Yurkanin. Tsunamis and vulnerability. What is vulnerability?. Inability to withstand the effects of a hostile environment. Consequences of vulnerability.

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Social and political Aspects of Tsunamis

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  1. Social and political Aspects of Tsunamis Presentation, Geography 269 March 11, 2013 Jessica Marter-Kenyon, Jonathan Sim, & Alana Yurkanin

  2. Tsunamis and vulnerability

  3. What is vulnerability? • Inability to withstand the effects of a hostile environment

  4. Consequences of vulnerability • Physical • Economic • Socio-political • Psychosocial

  5. Vulnerability over time

  6. Vulnerability by geography

  7. Vulnerability in LDCs

  8. Vulnerability in DCs

  9. What is Vulnerability? • Technical approach • Focused on physical ‘things’ and processes • An ‘acute’ conception • “presence of on and off-shore protective barriers and flood defences, distance from the shore, depth of flood water, building construction standards, preparedness activities…” (Papathoma and Dominey-Howes, 2003, p. 733) • Focused on initial risk and vulnerability • Highly measurable and addressable • BUT: simplistic?

  10. What is Vulnerability? • Social approach • Directly human-focused • Views vulnerability as chronic • Not just about initial exposure, but also ability to prepare and recover • Why do people, experiencing the same level of exposure, suffer from varying consequences? • Not one event but a series of multiple, interrelated events • Related to underlying social, economic and political (structural) systems and interactions • BUT: Complex, difficult to quantify

  11. Models of social vulnerability:Pressure and Release (PAR)

  12. Policy Implications:Mainstream/ technical approach • Disaster as an aberration, as an acute condition • A focus on: • Physical event as the trigger • Human response and consequences

  13. Policy Implications:Social approach • Disaster as a chronic problem • Link recovery and reconstruction to sustainable development • Vulnerability mapping that includes social aspects

  14. Political Aftermath of 2004 Tsunami A Quick Look: Banda Aceh

  15. Republic of Indonesia Banda Aceh • First & worst hit of countries in region, last to receive aid • Strong government & bureaucracy, history of disasters • Impact of tsunami initially overwhelmed state capacity • International aid important role for recovery • Capital & largest city of province • Closest major city to epicenter • 31,000 dead

  16. Providing Aid to Banda Aceh • Provincial government declared totally crippled • Politicians based in Banda Aceh killed in tsunami • Administrative control moved to Jakarta, 1132 miles away • Bottlenecks created by lack of infrastructure & red tape • Aid for 200,000 people held at Jakarta to clear customs • Aid piling up at airports due to lack of transport trucks • Aid trickled through primarily by boat & air • One functioning airfield outside Banda Aceh • Cargo plane landing at 2:30am hit a water buffalo  Blocked runway for a day

  17. International Aid • Important role: $13.6 billion to region • Challenges of aid allocation • Difficult to assess, involves multiple groups • Affected by current government policies • Affected by social organization of area • Empower or disempowergroups • “Humanitarian action cannot operate independently of the context in which it takes place” • Seen as a negative in some areas • Without cultural sensitivity •  Immodestly dressed aid workers • Inappropriate donations •  Pork products & Bibles 88.2% Muslim

  18. Banda Aceh: Civil War • Indonesian gov’t vs. Rebels (Free Aceh Movement) • 15,000 people killed over 30 year conflict • Military crackdown: ban on journalists, aid workers • 15,000 troops in region to fight rebels: many killed in tsunami • One day after tsunami, rebels declare a ceasefire (and later peace treaty) • Gov’t lifts ban on foreign journalists and aid workers • Greatly improved effectiveness of humanitarian aid • Alternative: Separatists in Sri Lanka (Tamil Tigers) • Perceived social and political injustice in aid distribution • Further exacerbated recovery efforts

  19. Political Changes • Prior to 2004 tsunami, early warning systems not well developed • Emergency communication systems failed • Coastal populations & tourists not educated • 2005: UN ESCAP establishes Trust Fund • Tsunami Early Warning Arrangements in Indian Ocean & Southeast Asia • Based on voluntary donations (Thailand: $10M, Sweden: $2.6M, etc.) • Reached consensus on building distributed, interconnected system • 2008: Indonesia gets Tsunami Early Warning System up and running • 2012: Thailand Warning System ready, “best in Southeast Asia” • 2007: Indonesia gets new disaster management law (Law 24/2007) • 1. Instead of just emergency, now includes all risk management, esp. prevention • 2. Gov’t must provide protection against disaster threat as a basic human right • 3. Responsibility no longer lies just with gov’t, shared with all elements of society  Movement towards decentralization of government

  20. Response to Tsunami Disasters Hawaii in the Wake of the 1946 and 1960 Tsunamis

  21. 1946 Image retrieved from: http://www.pbs.org/wnet/nature/episodes/violent-hawaii/deadly-tsunamis/1862/

  22. 1946 Image retrieved from: http://archives.starbulletin.com/2001/03/31/news/story3.html

  23. 1960 Image retrieved from: http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/c1187/

  24. 1960 Images retrieved from: http://pubs.usgs.gov/circ/c1187/

  25. Why was Hawaii unprepared in 1946? • Recorded tsunamis in Hawaiian newspapers in 19th century • Relationship between earthquakes and tsunamis unclear • Warnings issued in 1920s and 1930s by the Hawaiian Volcano Observatory (Jaggar) based on the occurrence of earthquakes • False alarms • Need an earthquake of at least 7 on the Richter scale to produce a tsunami in Hawaii • 1946 no warning issued for a tsunami

  26. Defending Against the Waves After the 1946 tsunami: • Developed the Tsunami Warning System: • long-wave measuring stations in Pacific • no false alarms • Tsunami travel-time chart • Updated seismograph instruments • Communication system • breakwaters to reduce impacts from the waves? • Buildings on stilts • Hilo hotels expect ground floor and basement inundation • Walls between columns expandable • Reinforced concrete structures • Retreat downtown area • parkway

  27. Defending Against the Waves • After the 1960 tsunami: • Hawaiian Redevelopment Agency • Oceanside buffer-zone • Landfill plateau 26 feet above sea level • Rebuild in higher areas with quality materials • Federal/state funded urban renewal • Loans for business start-up • Tsunami warning system a success – but public education a failure • New alarm system • Education initiatives

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