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Armageddon averted or just postponed?

Armageddon averted or just postponed?. Prospects for the Six Party Talks in Beijing Tim Beal Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand Political Economy Research Centre, Sheffield Thursday 14 December 2006. OVERVIEW I. Six Party Talks Background, Breakthrough, Breakdown

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Armageddon averted or just postponed?

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  1. Armageddon averted or just postponed? Prospects for the Six Party Talks in Beijing Tim Beal Victoria University of Wellington, New Zealand Political Economy Research Centre, Sheffield Thursday 14 December 2006

  2. OVERVIEW I • Six Party Talks • Background, Breakthrough, Breakdown • Characteristics of the contestation • Positions of the contestants • Russia, Japan, China, ROK, DPRK, • US PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  3. OVERVIEW II • The year of suspension • Counterfeiting, drugs, human rights>>>financial sanctions • Armageddon – averted, postponed or something else? • Prospects PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  4. Six Party Talks - background • Where does it begin? • Japanese period, Liberation and Division, Korean War…Agreed Framework • Agreed Framework • Origins, course and collapse PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  5. Origins - nuclear issue • DPRK two main nuclear objectives • Electricity • Energy security …nuclear fuel cycle • Military Security (assumed but denied) • Same as every other nuclear-capable country • Parallels with India particularly topical and relevant PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  6. Need for electricity often overlooked • Key constraint on economic recovery • ROK (Japan…) large dependence on nuclear energy • UK reactivating nuclear energy programme PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  7. 1993/4 crisis>>Agreed Framework • Jimmy Carter meets Kim Il Sung • Agreement forced upon Clinton PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  8. Agreed Framework • I Both sides will cooperate to replace the DPRK’s graphite-moderated reactors and related facilities with light-water reactor (LWR) power plants. • Due 2003 – five years behind schedule, now cancelled • US-led Korean Peninsula Energy Organization (KEDO) PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  9. KEDO • Initiated and controlled by US, paid for mainly by ROK and Japan • Now formally disbanded • ROK having to pick up final bills • US to provide annual supplies of heavy fuel oil as compensation for energy forgone PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  10. Agreed Framework • II The two sides will move toward full normalization of political and economic relations. • Little progress except late 2000; frozen by Bush • III Both sides will work together for peace and security on a nuclearfree Korean peninsula PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  11. nuclearfree Korean peninsula • US to give formal assurances against the threat of nuclear weapons • Bush Nuclear Posture Review threatened preemptive nuclear strike • DPRK implement N-S denuclearization agreement • Enriched uranium would breech that • IV. Both sides will work together to strengthen the international nuclear non proliferation regime. PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  12. Sunshine to clouds • Kim Dae-jung’s ‘sunshine policy’ • Engagement with North was necessary to prevent war • Collapse of DPRK would disastrous for ROK • Defuse tensions, move to peaceful reunification • Pressure on Clinton >>Perry Report >>US –DPRK modus vivendi • NK missile moratorium PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  13. Pyongyang Summit 2000 • June – highly successful summit • October –Secretary Albright visits Pyongyang, comes back with invitation to Clinton • Clinton packs his bags but Gore loses election PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  14. Kim Dae-jung’s final years • Bush makes clear he is abandoning Clinton’s policies, Korea and elsewhere • ABC policy • March 2001 Kim Dae-jung goes to Washington, is rebuffed • North-South relations go up and down PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  15. January 2002 • Nuclear Posture Review • Violates NS- nuclear accord; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) • Axis of Evil speech • State of the Union speech links Iraq, Iran and DPRK PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  16. Roh Moo-Hyun • Human rights lawyer, commercial school education • Roh’s victory 2002 due to large degree to Anti-Americanism • Less deferential to Americans than Kim Dae-jung • Careful not to annoy US • Adamant that US must negotiate • US says it will talk but not negotiate PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  17. Collapse of Agreed Framework • US never fully implemented AF, effectively destroyed it late 2002 • Charged DPRK with having enriched uranium programme PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  18. Enriched uranium issue • Not new • Going back to Gilman • 3 Nov 99: Representative Benjamin A. Gilman (Rep), Chairman of the House International Relations Committee, released a congressional report today on DPRK threat to the US and its allies PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  19. Gilman report • First, the American people need to know that there is significant evidence that North Korea is continuing its activities to develop nuclear weapons. • Remarkably, North Korea's efforts to acquire uranium technologies, that is, a second path to nuclear weapons, and their efforts to weaponize their nuclear material do not violate the 1994 Agreed Framework. That is because the Clinton Administration did not succeed in negotiating a deal with North Korea that would ban such efforts. It is inexplicable and inexcusable PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  20. Pollack- the summit trigger • Jonathan Pollack (US) Naval War College Review, Summer 2003 argued • US had new evidence of NK heavily enriched uranium (HEU) weapons programme • Crisis triggered by Japan’s surprise announcement of Pyongyang Summit • Preparations had been kept secret from the Americans • Tokyo-Pyongyang rapprochement would sideline US, weaken its NK policy • Ass Sec Jim Kelly sent to Pyongyang PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  21. Kelly’s Pyongyang visit October 2002 • Kelly came back from Pyongyang claiming • He had accused NK of having HEU programme • They admitted this • Pyongyang soon denied both charges, but crisis had been set in motion • US suspended deliveries of oil, abrogating AF; Pyongyang reactivated reactors. US refused to negotiate, >>10 February 2005 NK suspends participation in Six Party talks, says has nuclear deterrent PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  22. Selig Harrison • Article in Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2005 • US feared warming of relations between North and South, as well as Japan-NK • Said it was likely that there had been a programme to enrich uranium for feedstock for light water reactors but no evidence of weapons programme • Post-Iraq loss of credibility PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  23. Misinformation • Widespread feeling that there was a repeat of Iraq misinformation campaign • Chinese, in particular, made it clear that they do no believe US • Repeat in early 2005 with US charges that NK had exported nuclear material to Libya • 20 March article in Washington Post “US Misled allies about nuclear export” PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  24. Enriched uranium • Violation not of AF, but of N-S nuclear accord • SK has admitted infringing accord • Technology originated in West Europe in search for nuclear independence from US>>Pakistan >>Iran • Energy security as much as weapons • Small and dispersed; DPRK can never prove it is not enriching PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  25. SIX PARTY TALKS • Brokered by China • 3 Party April 2003 • 1: 27-29 August 2003 • 2: 25-28 Feb 2004 • 3: June 2004 • 4: July- August and September 2005 PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  26. Six Party Talks 2005>> • Breakthrough • Joint Statement 19 September 2005 • Breakdown • 19/20 September 2005 PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  27. BREAKTHROUGH • Joint Statement took everyone by surprise • No indication earlier of any shifting of positions • JS • Very ambiguous • Two interesting omissions PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  28. Omissions • Heavy enriched uranium • Had been the alleged reasons for US tearing up Agreed Framework • Cheney • Architect of US Korea policy • Had personally intervened at previous rounds PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  29. NY Times account • U.S.-Korean Deal on Arms Leaves Key Points Open • September 20, 2005 • By JOSEPH KAHN and DAVID E. SANGER • Chinese applied pressure on DPRK, but more on US PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  30. Chinese pressure • As this unfolded over the weekend, the Chinese increased pressure on the United States to sign - or take responsibility for a breakdown in the talks. •  "At one point they told us that we were totally isolated on this and that they would go to the press," and explain that the United States sank the accord, the senior administration official said. PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  31. Why did US sign? • Cheney absent • Rice • Each country, she suggested, would issue separate statements describing their understanding of the deal, with a specificity that is not in the agreement itself • Did that, in Washington and Beijing, DPRK reacted, >>BREAKDOWN PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  32. CHARACTERISTICS of Six Party Framework • 1 US salience • 2: Asymmetry • 3: Global interconnections – the network effect PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  33. US Salience • 1: US is salient • US is by far the most important country for each of the others • Not reciprocated • Except perhaps China • All of them want good relations with US • Not least DPRK PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  34. US position the default • They do things against their own interests – eg ROK sending troops to Iraq – to keep US happy • China plays a waiting game • They do not oppose US head-on in UN, but work to water down resolutions • Eg over invasion of Iraq, condemnation of NK missile and nuclear test • Focus in analysis should be on US, not DPRK • DPRK policy options limited, US much more complex PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  35. 2: Asymmetry • Six parties are very disparate • Population, wealth, military power, political system, culture, sovereignty, etc. etc. PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  36. Sovereignty and power I • US is the superpower • No serious threat from any other power • Question of projecting power • Iraq shows limits • Russia, China and Japan • Equal in military spending • But Japan not ‘normal country’ • Has US bases. large element of US military control PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  37. Sovereignty and power II • ROK • Much bigger and richer than DPRK, much larger military spending, advanced equipment…. • But US has ‘wartime control’, and bases • DPRK • Weakest and smallest • Limited project of power; defense paramount • No foreign bases, military exercises • IS DPRK-China mutual defence treaty operable? PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  38. Asymmetry: DPRK and US PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  39. DPRK • Negotiations with US key to future • Mistakes could be fatal • Only US can attack, or allow attack • Options limited • Determined and focussed PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  40. US • DPRK itself not important, no threat • It is implications of DPRK for global and regional strategies which is important • Wide range of problems and issues around the world (Iraq, Iran, Islamic nationalism… • Open society, traditionally confident in invulnerability and mission • Partisanship (eg ABC>>LWR) • Many options, no urgency PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  41. 3 Global interconnections and network • No country is an island • Even NK has relationships around the world • US, in particular, a global power • Korean policy must be seen in wider context PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  42. For each of the Six Parties • Its relationship with one of the others has ramifications for its relationship with all • The actions of any one of the others impacts on its relationship with all • We can conceptualise a dual layer network • Between each of the Six with each other • Between each of the Six with their global relationships • Networks can be hard (political, military, economic) or soft (cultural, influence..) PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  43. Tyranny of geographical convenience I • Media talks of ‘NK nuclear issue’ • Misleading • Nuclear issue only arises because of other parties • Especially US • Were it not for US threat it is highly unlikely that NK would have attempted to develop a nuclear deterrent PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  44. Geographical convenience II • Tendency to label events in geographical terms • Usually the weaker/less warlike party • We talk of ‘the Iraq War’ • As if we had nothing to do with it • French, Americans talked of ‘Vietnam War’ • Vietnamese talk of the French War and the American War PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  45. Too many American wars new ROK Foreign Minister) Song Min-soon.... Last month, he caused a diplomatic stir with Washington when he described the United States as a warmonger. ``Perhaps the United States as a nation has fought the most wars in the history of humankind, given the number of years of its establishment and existence." Korea Times, Seoul, 17 November 2006 http://times.hankooki.com/lpage/200611/kt2006111717334310440.htm PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  46. Characteristics>>positions • 1 Salience of US • 2 Asymmetry • 3 Network • Now look at positions and policies of the Six PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  47. POSITIONS • Russia, China, ROK fairly similar • Oppose DPRK nuclear weapons • Facilitate Japanese remilitarisation and nuclearisation • Could provoke US to war • War would have horrendous consequences for Korean peninsula and region • China fear that hawks might use opportunity to attack PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  48. Russia, China, ROK • Want stability, peace • Different attitudes towards unification but all want economic cooperation and growth • All oppose collapse of DPRK PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  49. Japan • Currently a ‘spoiler’ – bringing abductee issue to SPT • Abductee issue good for domestic consumption • Tension with DPRK>>remilitarisation • Aimed at China • Worried about Korean reunification PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

  50. US response to JS • Intensified use of psychowar weapons • ‘Human rights’, allegations about counterfeiting, drugs • Seldom any hard evidence • Even by US charges, scale of offences small, not proportional to effect on SPT • Deliberate attempt to derail Six Party Talks? PERC Sheffield 14 Dec 2006

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