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Learning from Adverse Incidents. Hazel Baird Head of Governance & Patient Safety Northern HSC Trust. To err is human ……….. Institute of Medicine 2000. Approximately 1 in 10 patients experience avoidable Harm or suffering due to mistakes in hospitals. Do we think?.
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Learning from Adverse Incidents Hazel Baird Head of Governance & Patient Safety Northern HSC Trust
To err is human ……….. Institute of Medicine 2000
Approximately 1 in 10 patients experience avoidable Harm or suffering due to mistakes in hospitals
Do we think? • If a professional is highly trained and tries hard enough he/she will not make mistakes • Errors and mistakes equate with personal failure and incompetence
The perfection myth If we try hard enough we will not make mistakes If we punish people when they make mistakes they will make fewer of them The punishment myth
In reality …… 95% of errors that cause harm involve conscientious competent individuals trying hard to achieve the best outcome for those in their care Only 5% of harm is caused by incompetence or poorly intended care
“The organising principle is that the cause (of preventable harm) is not bad people but bad systems” Lucian L Leape Clinica.chinica acta. Vol 404 June 2009
Leape further suggests that in our healthcare systems: • The focus should be on systems not individuals when errors occur • There should be greater transparency and less secrecy • Care should be patient centred and • There should be a greater dependence on teamwork not individual performance • Patients (carers) should be more fully engaged in their care
Open and fair culture Staff must feel safe to report incidents and safety issues To achieve this, the incident investigation must be • Fair and equitable • Focused on learning and change • Focused on identifying contributory and root causes
RCA example of 5 whys? • Nurse didn’t complete obs sheet why? • There were 3 obs sheets why? she completes one • Pilot new obs sheet 2 years ago why? original obs sheet one for post-surgery • Obs policy working group why? hadn’t met for 6 months • Work pressures and obs policy wasn’t priority why? • Development of obs policy not written into anyone’s objectives
The basic premise of the systems approach to reducing error is that humans are fallible and errors are to be expected “Therefore measures to reduce errors need to build defences within the systems in which humans work” James Reason Human Error-Models&Management
Case History • Mrs Brown 88 years admitted to hospital from pnh with history of pyrexia, vomiting and falls • Past history of stroke, chf and ischaemic heart disease poor short term memory • Rx i.v. antibiotics and i.v. fluids • 4 days later at 4am found face down on floor at side of bed. floor wet urine sustained head injury that led to her death 3 weeks later • 1 month later Mrs Green admitted to another hospital in the trust. Sustained a fall and died from head injury
Investigation Methodology • A time line was created • Notes examined • Problem identification – questions to be addressed • Staff interviewed • Policy position explored • Falls and bed rail literature reviewed
Questions to address • Was Mrs Brown’s risk of falling recognised, managed and communicated between wards? • Was professional record keeping of an acceptable standard? • Were Mrs Brown’s needs appropriately communicated between wards? • Did movement between wards adversely affect Mrs Brown’s care? • What is the trust’s policy position on the assessment and management of patients at risk of falls? • How does the trust’s falls rate benchmark against other hospitals? • What resources are available to staff to try to prevent falls in hospitals or reduce injury from falls?
Recommendations • Patient movement between wards needs to be reviewed, this is particularly important for elderly, confused patients. Clinicians should be asked to consider the merits of moving an elderly patient for telemetry, versus the overall care issues it creates for them. • Transfer checklists are a useful tool to ensure essential information is communicated between wards, but a field for ‘risk of falling – special measures needed’ should be considered. All forms should be signed.
Recommendations, contd.. • Recording formats for patient notes should ideally be standardised, so that there is clear continuity of recording between wards and across the Trust. Problems experienced by the review team may also have been experienced by ward staff. • The use of multi-professional progress notes and care planning documentation needs to be reviewed and if they continue to be used, there should be explicit guidance and standards developed for their use.
Recommendations, contd.. • A simple audit of standards for professional record-keeping should be implemented six to twelve-monthly, as resources permit. • A Trust-wide policy on prevention of falls in hospital and the safe use of bed rails should be developed. These policies will address risk assessment and care planning and will need robust implementation plans.
Recommendations, contd.. • The risk management department and service should discuss improvements in recording outcomes from falls. • The Trust should discuss with DHSSPS colleagues the benefits of regional benchmarking and possibly national benchmarking through NRLS.
To maximise learning; you need • A good investigation team • A well structured report • Clear conclusions and recommendations with associated action plan • The report and ‘learning’ shared in department, directorates, organisation other organisations in a constructive way • To evidence the delivery of the action plan and • Audit compliance issues to provide assurance
“ The names of the patients whose lives we save can never be known. Our contribution will be what did not happen to them. And, though they are unknown, we will know that mothers and fathers are at graduations and weddings they would have missed, and that grandchildren will know grandparents they might never have known, and holidays will be taken and work completed, and books read, and symphonies heard, and gardens tended that, without our work, would have been only beds of weeds” Donald Berwick, President of the Institute for Healthcare Improvement