Election Campaigns

1. Election Campaigns An Introduction to Information Manipulation

2. I. Overview of Polling

3. A. Origins of Polls and Paid Advertisements (1924-1948) • Literary Digest poll • Begun as publicity stunt in 1920, proves remarkably accurate (within 1% in 1932) • Fails miserably in 1936: Predicts landslide for Landon (55 to 41) when real outcome is landslide for Roosevelt (61 to 37) – 20% error! • Why did it fail? Non-representative sample (automobile registrations and telephone books) and voluntary response (2.3 million out of 10 million) • Why did it work for so long? Remarkable consensus and stability in electorate…

4. 2. Gallup and Scientific Polling • Gallup predicts Roosevelt victory with smaller sample (about 2000 vs. 2.3 million) • Gallup also correctly predicts the Literary Digest prediction before the postcards are counted! • Method = quota polling (trying to ensure sample matches proportions in population) • Major failure in 1948: Quota polling replaced with random sampling (still used today)

5. B. Polling • Interpreting Polls • Sample size – Generally less important than random selection/representativeness. Larger sample = smaller… • Margin of error – Given laws of probability and assumptions about respondents (normal distribution), likely range of true value • Confidence level – Typically 95% confidence that true value is within margin of error.

6. Example: Obama Job Approval

7. Example: Bush job approval

8. 2. Which polls can be trusted?

10. Error vs. Bias: Compare Clinton • Fox over-estimated Bush popularity, Zogby underestimated Bush popularity • Was this political bias? Estimates of Clinton popularity 

11. 3. Tracking Polls • Same question asked many times, often with overlapping samples. • Generally considered less reliable (smaller samples, high volatility)

12. 4. Push Polls: “Polls” in Name Only • Method: Voter gets a call, ostensibly from a polling company, asking which candidate the voter supports. If the voter supports the “wrong” candidate, then the pollster asks whether voter would still support candidate if they knew… (insert rumor or allegation here) • Response irrelevant: Voter exposed to charges

13. 5. Using Polls • Account for “House Effects” • Look at sample selection (random vs. self-selection) • Look at question wording • Use “polls of polls” where available • Examine stability from prior polls

14. C. Issue Ownership • Parties or candidates often “own” particular issues – i.e. debating the issue only benefits them by increasing its salience

15. 2. Commonly “Owned” Issues • Republicans: • Crime • Defense / National Security • Taxes • Democrats: • Environment • Unemployment • Social Security • Most economic issues owned by incumbent in good times, challenger in bad times

16. II. Modern Campaign Strategy A. Strategy = Overall plan for victory. Determines: • Who: the voters you need to win • Why: the reasons they will vote for you • What: the unifying message to address them • How: acquiring resources to campaign

17. 1. Who? District Analysis • Demographics: see film, keeping in mind all of the work we did on party ID/political behavior • Party Lean: Often based on previous elections, since polls of districts can be scarce. • Polling: Used to identify winnable areas/groups (cross-tabulations key)

18. 2. Why and What: The Message a. The Message (from the film). One to a few words – simplicity enables repetition in many different forms. Reinforce your message and construct a negative one about your opponent. b. Four dueling messages (if both advertise and both “go negative”). Potential application to 2012: • A’s message about A (Obama on Obama: “Forward”) • A’s message about B (Obama on Romney: “Job Killer”) • B’s message about B (Romney on Romney: “Believe in America”) • B’s message about A (Romney on Obama: “Failure”)

19. c. Targeting the Message • Microtargeting: Communicating different messages to different voters. Hillygus and Shields link this to pre-TV campaigns and argue it made a resurgence in the 1990s with direct mail. • Question: Has the Internet made this harder (because message can be retransmitted by others) or easier (because users self-select into narrow forums)? • Method: Personal visits matter more than ads (H&S)

20. 3. Fundraising: It’s hard for a beginner • Major donor approach: Need to establish credibility; hard money goes to winners • Issue organizations: Need credibility AND compatible policy positions (danger of extremism compared to electorate) • Direct mail and Telemarketing: Administrative costs eat up much of the money • Grassroots: Takes a great deal of candidate time and attention. Possible selling point in ads.

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22. B. Putting It All Together: Political Consultants • 1948: Truman hires PR firm to manage his flagging campaign. Combination of ads, whistle-stop campaign, publicity stunts (TV coverage), and consistent message (“do-nothing Congress”) lead to victory • Other campaigns emulate Truman’s success, adding more sophisticated techniques over time

23. C. Building the Machine • Campaign manager (scheduling, coordination) • Consultants (strategy, polling and research) • Media relations • Foot Soldiers: Mass of employees or volunteers to spread the message, create signs, make phone calls, solicit donations, etc.

24. III. Campaign Tactics • Opposition research • Small campaigns: Read through minutes or Congressional record, news appearances, public records (FOIA) • Large campaigns: Permanent surveillance, interviews with past acquaintances • Most important skill: Convincing the media to use the information

25. B. Media Relations • Spin Control – Instantaneous response to attacks (before uncontested attack gets on the air). Slow response = no response since story fades from view over time.

26. 2. Debates • Debating acknowledges equality – Leading candidates usually refuse • Debates are rarely debates – candidates write the rules, fear off-script moments

27. Do Debates Matter? • Not to partisans or people with strong opinions • Nonpartisans and less-informed voters are affected

28. 3. Public Events • Key to successful speeches is media coverage • Incumbents have edge because they can issue policy changes • Candidates now filter crowds (i.e. only Bush supporters allowed to attend his speeches)

29. 4. Investigative Journalism: Don’t Count On It • Most notable investigative reports are “seeded” by campaigns (e.g. Dukakis undermines Biden in 1988 primaries) • Media focus: Horse-Race stories • 45% of campaign news stories focus on horse-race/strategy • 29% focus on campaign issues • Less than 1% analyze and critique campaign ads

30. 5. “Oppo” and Manipulating the Media • Most opposition research done prior to campaign: need for steady dribble of damage (so scandals don’t crowd each other out – each piece of information must get full airing in media) • If tide turns in media, respond with new leak before public realizes old one was false (causes old one – including any corrections -- to leave front page)

31. D. Advertising • Central goal: Reinforce the message about the candidate and the opponent

32. 2. Secondary Goals • Name recognition – Very important for all except general election for President • Alter issue salience – Prime voters to think about a particular issue controlled by one side

33. Issue Salience: California 1994

34. 2. Secondary Goals • Name recognition – Very important for all except general election for President • Alter issue salience – Prime voters to think about a particular issue controlled by one side • Mobilization – Make supporters think that getting to the polls matters. • Suppression – Make likely opponents think that no candidate represents them

35. 3. Tools of the Trade • Repetition – Within ads as well as between them • Syntax – Long sentences for nuance, fragments for blunt messages • “Loaded Words” – See handout

36. 5. Targeting Ads: Match Voters to Issues • Local Issues: Emphasize “us vs. them” mentality. Examples: Sub Base in Connecticut and Coal in West Virginia. • Language: Target linguistic minorities. Examples: Spanish, Cantonese • Prospective Voters: Evaluate candidates based upon expected future behavior. Target with hope/fear. • Retrospective voters: Reward/punish candidates based on past performance. Target with evidence of success/failure (no alternative necessary).

37. E. Get out the Vote (GOTV) • Most important in midterm elections and primaries • Still important in Presidential elections – Republican GOTV efforts probably won Ohio in 2004

38. 3. GOTV Strategies • RNC strategy (used since 2002): 72-hour program • Phone calls, polling data and personal visits identify would-be GOP voters and their top issues early in the cycle. • Information is then fed into a database, allowing party leaders to flood them with pro-Republican messages through e-mail, regular mail and local volunteers. • On Election Day, they receive a phone call or a visit to remind them to vote. • Post-election interviews with targets to evaluate performance • Key difference with earlier efforts = national database of likely Republican voters. Allows much better targeting and more efficient spending.

39. b. Democratic Strategies • The DNC’s 50-State Strategy: Spread resources throughout entire country to rebuild party in Red states. • DCCC Plan: Target swing states by mobilizing single-issue groups and unions. • Democratic efforts generally less successful in 2004 and California special election in 2006. Little coordination or information-sharing between efforts.

40. F. Primaries: Same tactics, different voting groups Unique feature: Incentive to interfere in other party’s primary  cause disunion or simply support weaker candidate (must be secret) Example: Muskie in 1972 Just before New Hampshire primary, conservative paper’s editorial accuses Democratic front-runner Muskie of using an ethnic slur against French-Americans, a large voting bloc in NH. Evidence = letter from a Florida man (actually a hoax planted by Nixon White House). Muskie reacts emotionally (tears or melted snow?), and is defeated by ultra-liberal McGovern.

41. IV. Do Campaigns Matter? • Hillygus and Shields say yes – but • Surveys can be misleading – how well do pre-election commitments reflect actual voting? • My conclusion – H&S are far better at explaining why campaigns adopt certain strategies than proving that these strategies substantially alter the outcome of the election. Size of effects is the key unknown. • Can we predict election outcomes without knowing anything about the campaigns? Need to try in order to establish maximum size of campaign effects.