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Visiting human errors in IR systems from decision making perspective. Yan Zhang, School of Information and Library Science, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Email: yanz@email.unc.edu. Introduction. Purposes . Research method.
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Visiting human errors in IR systems from decision making perspective Yan Zhang, School of Information and Library Science, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill Email: yanz@email.unc.edu Introduction Purposes Research method • Explore the potential of decision making theories in explaining human IR errors. • Propose a tentative knowledge structure for classifying human IR errors. • Inform the design of IR systems that are able to predict human errors and to prevent the errors proactively. • Collect human errors in using IR systems, particularly OPACs, commercial databases, and the web, reported in the published literature. • Inspect each error to see whether it can be explained by certain decision making theories. Errors are failures of some planned sequence of mental or physical activities to achieve its intended outcome. People’s interaction with IR systems is a constant decision making process. Knowledge of biases and heuristics inherent in human reasoning as suggested by decision making theories provides us a useful tool to explore the underlying cognitive processes of human errors in using IR systems. In this pilot study, the potential of decision-making theories in explaining human IR errors is explored. Preliminary results Knowledge structure Decision making theories and IR errors Examples Decision making theory Type of IR errors Underlying mechanisms Solvability Usability problems Perceptual errors • Using AND to resolve 0-hit. Conjunction fallacy: p(A&B) <= p(A), p(B) Easy to address, but hard to predict. Errors that do not occur systematically; slips. Random errors Gaps in mental models References Borgman, C.L. (1987). The study of user behavior on information retrieval systems. ACM SIGCUE Outlook, 19(3-4), 35-48. Reason, J. (1990). Human Error. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1983). Extensional versus intuitive reasoning: the conjunction fallacy in probability judgment. Psychological Review, 90, 293-315.