APEC Earthquake Response Cooperative Program on Energy Supply Systems

1. APECEarthquake Response Cooperative Program on Energy Supply Systems Australian Experience Mr Allan Gillespie FTSE Hon FIE Aust Chairman, Electricity Supply Association of Australia

2. Introduction • Risk of Earthquakes not well recognised • Earthquake Design Standards not always employed • Emergency Response Structure addresses cyclones, floods, storms, bushfires • Electricity supply used as the example

3. Australian Earthquake Activity • Australia is seismically active • Earthquakes pose a substantial risk • Newcastle earthquake 1989 –5.6 RM • Largest earthquake that can occur is estimated at 7 RM • 1988 Tennant CK earthquake was 6.9RM was> 1994 Northridge in USA

5. Effect on Power Systems • Substations are the most vulnerable • Overhead transmission and distribution lines will withstand forces • Conductor clashing occurs (Spacers are used in bushfire prone areas) • Cable termination damage • Since 1990 all new Distribution systems are insulated or underground

6. Substation Design • Buildings generally ok but external plant at risk • Seismic specifications are used for Substation plant & equipment • ESAA Seismic design Application Guide available but not in general use

7. Commonwealth Role • National Emergency Management Cttee • Emergency Management Organisation • Counter Disaster taskforce • Disaster response Plans

8. State/Territory Organisations • Peak Committee • Emergency/disaster controller • SES • Police • Fire Services • Communications • Utilities

9. SES • A National Network • Mostly Volunteers • Provides coordinating role at local levels • Provides a resource of trained rescuers to support full-time emergency services • Covers all emergencies

10. Electricity Supply Organisations • Little experience with earthquakes • Considerable experience with other natural disasters –Cyclones, storms, bushfires, flooding • Each organisation has limited resources and for major events depends on other organisations • Common emergency radio communication channels

11. Electricity Supply Organisations Coordination and Planning • Emergency Management Plan filed with State/Territory Counter Disaster Organisation • Representation on State/Territory Counter Disaster Committee • Key executive nominated as controller • Provision made for large influx of personnel • Simulation trials

12. Electricity OrganisationsDamage Assessment • Generally not well done • Tendency to underestimate damage in early stages • Over last decade approach has been to initially over resource • Office staff used to assess damage • Telephone call system analysis of damage with automated response messages

13. Conclusion • Australia does not have a specific structure or mechanism to respond to major earthquake damage • Australia has been slow to adopt design standards and guidelines to limit damage

14. Conclusion • Electricity Utilities have not been active in utilising design standards for new facilities or upgrading old facilities • There is an effective emergency response structure operating nationally capable of dealing with earthquakes