Seabasing Capability Based Assessment

1. Seabasing Capability Based Assessment Seabasing Symposium 29-30 Sep 2009 MCB Quantico, Va Bruce Byrum OPNAV N81M 703-695-2699

2. Aerial Port of Debarkation Aerial Port of Embarkation Joint Task Force Objective Sea Port of Debarkation Sea Port of Embarkation APOD APOE JTF OBJ SPOD SPOE Seabasing Capability Based Assessment Seabasing Symposium 29-30 Sep 2009 MCB Quantico, Va Bruce Byrum OPNAV N81M 703-695-2699

3. Seabasing – Joint Integrating Concept Forward Deployed & Prepositioned Naval Forces Rapid ResponseWith PersistentJoint Force • USA • Operational Maneuver From Strategic Distances • Decisive and Simultaneous Distributed Operations • Mounted Vertical Maneuver • Army Strategic Flotillas • USMC • Sustained Operations Ashore • Operational Maneuver from the Sea • Ship to Objective Maneuver • Distributed Operations Seabasing… A Joint Integrating Concept • USN • Maritime Access/ Protection • Persistent Forward Presence • Sustained Operations from the Sea • Global Fleet Station • Deep Precision Strike andOperational Reach • USAF • Global Strike • Air Superiority • Expeditionary Air and Space • Linking Air, Space, and Ground • Multinational • Partners • Global Maritime Partnership • Leverage Strategic Partners • Coalitions & Allies Naval Capabilities Enabling Joint Force Response

4. JCD Capability Based Assessment Process JROC Directed/ Approved JIC • Seabasing JIC • Approved Aug 2005 • FNA Approved • Nov 2006 FAA/FNA (FCB) Joint Seabasing Analysis & Wargaming (JSAW) • Seabasing JCD • Approved by JROC • Dec 2007 JROC Validate No Action No Yes, with Risk FSA (Sponsor) FSA (Sponsor) DCR ICD Program Improvement Science & Technology Experimentation Continued Analysis

5. Approved FSAs, Sponsors, and Capability Gaps FSA 1: Distributed BA/Net-Centric/C2 (SIT) FSA 2: Operational Speed (JFCOM) FSA 3: Seabasing Persistence (USN) FSA 4: Global Access (USN) Forcible Entry Limited capability for over-the-horizon forcible entry Joint Sustainment Joint sea-based supply throughput at extended distances Joint Sea Base Limited capability to serve as a base for joint forces Sync/Execution Limited C2 capacity and C2/wpns systems interoperability Protect Against Conventional Weapons Enemy threats Collaborative Planning Limited capacity for enroute planning and simulation/rehearsal Operational Mvmt & Mnvr Rapid employment of non-amphibious joint and MNF’s At Sea Assembly Limited capability to rapidly receive and cross-deck Littoral Fires 24/7 coordinated joint and multi-national fires w/ lethal and non-lethal effects Force Health Protection Medical capabilities Movement & Sustainment Rapid movement and sustainment of joint combat power ashore Situational Awareness C2 limitations across full range of sea-based platforms Personnel Recovery Personnel recovery at extended distances Mission Partners Leveraging multi-national and interagency partners Information Transport Data throughput JCD organizes the 17 FNA capability gaps into 4 FSAs arranged according to broad functional areas Logistical Info Fusion Joint logistics common operating picture Enterprise Services Collaborative data support

6. Seabasing CBA Leadership Transition Force Support Functional Capability Board Navy – Director, Expeditionary Warfare (OPNAV N85) JCS J-8 Studies Analysis and Wargaming Division (SAGD) JROCM 237-08 10 Dec 2008 Seabasing Executive Oversight Committee (SEOC) Seabasing Working Group FAA FNA Seabasing Integration Team (SIT) JCD FSA # 1 – BA/C2/NC Functional Capability Boards Joint Seabasing Analysis and Wargaming (JSAW) FSA #2 – JFCOM J-9 supported by TRANSCOM FSA #3 and #4 – OPNAV N85, OPNAV N42 and MCCDC CID

7. Seabasing Executive Oversight Committee (SEOC) USN - Director, Expeditionary Warfare, OPNAV N85 USAF - Deputy Director of Operational Capability Requirements AF/A5R USMC – Deputy CG, Marine Corps Combat Development Command USTRANSCOM – Deputy Director, Strategy, Policy, Programs and Logistics USA – USJFCOM – Deputy Director J9

8. Seabasing CBA Methodology Seabasing Executive Oversight Committee Navy Lead Shared Joint Oversight Seabasing Integration Team (SIT) Services COCOMs Joint Staff FCBs OSD Joint Seabasing Analysis and Wargaming (JSAW) FSA Recommendations FSA 1 (Net Centric/C2) – SIT ICD Responses to JSAW Study Questions/ Objectives DCR FSA 2 (Op Speed) – JFCOM M&S Analysis Futures & POR Baseline Comparison Future Experimentation Seabasing Models Suite FSA 3 (Persistence) – USN Program Modification Baseline Database FSA 4 (Global Access) – USN Further Analysis Joint Seabasing Scenario/CONOPS Joint Experimentation and Exercises Other Service/Joint Studies & Analysis Results of other CBAs Service/Joint Future Concepts & Capabilities Data Oversight Working Group (DOWG) Model Management and Study Workgroup (MMSW) Joint Scenario Development Team (JSDT)

9. Integrating FSA Efforts JFCOM FSA #2 FSA #1 Joint Working Group C2 - Synchronized Execution FSA #3 FSA #3 Joint Sustainment Joint Sea Base At Sea Assembly C2 - Collaborative Planning Movement & Sustainment Operational Movement & Maneuver JFCOM USN Afloat C4ISR BA – Situational Awareness FSA #4 C2 – Leveraging Mission Partners Forcible Entry FSA #3 SOCOM Seabasing Support CBA USN USN Force Health NC – Information Transport FSA #3 FSA #4 Personnel Recovery NC – Logical Information Fusion USN USN Littoral Fires FSA #4 NC – Enterprise Services Protect Against Conventional Weapons USN Shallow Water

10. FSA #2 “Operational Speed” GAP #4 “Operational Movement and Maneuver” GAP #10 “Movement and Sustainment” GAP #11 “Sea Based Sustainment” Force Closure Connector Interface and Capabilities Ship Services Vertical Mounted Maneuver Ship-to-ship Interface, Selective Offload, SS Seabasing Throughput SOF Support C-130 Payloads

11. Example FSA #2 Gap and Sub-gap Alignment Gap # 4 Conduct Operational Maneuver: 1. The joint force does not have a platform(s) capable of closing an immediately employable (minimal RSOI) combat-configured force (Bn TF(+) through Heavy Brigade Combat Team (BCT)) within 10-14 days from strategic distances (10,000 nm) through austere ports (minimum water depth 15-20 feet). 2. This gap includes the inability of these platforms to offload 250-500 STONS per hour within the first 24 hours of flowing forces ashore. 3. The joint sea base has no capability for vertical lift of 20-30 STONS from the sea base to operational distances (210-500nm) to support maneuver and/or sustainment of selected joint forces. 4. This gap includes both the vertical lift platform lifting capacity and the ability of sea-based platforms to host it. 5. There is limited ability to support a clandestine insertion and recovery of a team-sized SOF force over extended ranges beyond 360 nm. 6. To support deep insertion over land, current air connectors do not have the range and/or payload to insert and recover SOF without in-flight refueling.

12. FSA #3 – Seabasing Persistence Joint Sea Base Personnel Recovery Force Health At Sea Assembly FSA #4 – Global Access Littoral Fires Joint Forcible Entry Maritime Force Protection IAMD MCM

13. Seabasing CBA Transition FSA Plan Timeline Transition KMP/files CBA Leadership Transition JSAW Ends Final Report CBA SEOC SEOC SEOC SIT SIT Aug 09 Sep 09 Oct 09 Nov 09 Dec 09 Jan 10 Feb 10 Mar 10 Apr 10 May 10 Develop/StaffFSA plans Develop Analytic Agenda FY 10 FSA Littoral Fires FSA POA&M Brief Commence FSAs FSA Personnel Recovery

14. Aerial Port of Debarkation Aerial Port of Embarkation Joint Task Force Objective Sea Port of Debarkation Sea Port of Embarkation APOD APOE JTF OBJ SPOD SPOE Questions?

15. Back Up

16. FSA #2 Gap and Sub-gap Alignment Gap # 10 Movement and Sustainment: • Current inter/intra-theater air and surface connectors that close forces to the JOA are not compatible with sea base platforms and thus the capability to close and sustain the requisite joint forces in the objective of 10 to 14 days is not currently achievable. • The lack of skin-to-skin transfer or platform to platform interfaces to support at-sea transfer of required supplies and medium and heavy equipment between the current family of ships through SS4 is a shortfall. • Legacy family of break-bulk ships that support joint forces are not selectively offloaded and require a deep water port for discharge. • Ship-to-ship interfaces have limited capability in the open ocean at high sea states, and flight decks on break-bulk ships, if available, are small and certified for day fair weather operations only. • There are limited platforms of sufficient design to handle operations (receive, unload, load, refuel, etc) of an aircraft capable of C-130 payload equivalents, and cannot receive and unload/load these large payloads within a 30–45 minute period at SS4. • Current operating policies (crew day and operating hours) for air/surface connectors and flight decks and surface interfaces as well as the number of connectors, flight deck operating spots and surface interfaces will limit continuous 24/7 vertical lift flight operations in adverse weather and continuous 24/7 surface operations through SS4. • Throughput capability of current family of ships and connectors falls significantly short of joint Seabasing throughput needs. (Combined with sub-gap #1)

17. Functional Solution Analysis. The sponsor of an FSA is normally a Service or agency, but it may be a combatant command or CSA when they have the authority to acquire the solutions. The sponsor leads the FSA with support from the combatant commands and oversight by the FCBs. It is a joint assessment of potential DOTMLPF and policy approaches to solving, or at least mitigating, one or more of the capability gaps identified in the FNA. The approaches identified should include the broadest possible range of joint possibilities for addressing the capability gaps. For each approach, the range of potential sustainment alternatives must be identified and evaluated as part of determining which approaches are viable. The results of the FSA will influence the future direction of integrated architectures and provide input to capability roadmaps. • Approaches proposed by an FSA must meet three criteria: • (1) they are strategically responsive and deliver approaches when and where they are needed; • (2) they are feasible with respect to policy, sustainment, personnel limitations, and technological risk; and • (3) they are realizable -- the Department of Defense could actually resource and implement the approaches within the timeframe required.

18. FSA will use the following order for considering approaches: • (1) changes to the existing doctrine, organization, and education; • (2) changes to policy guidance, including force posture; • (3) changes to personnel, including staffing, skill levels, and unit composition; • (4) product improvements to existing materiel and facilities; • (5) adopting interagency or foreign-supplied materiel approaches; • (6) potential international cooperative developments; • (7) new materiel starts • FSA is free to assess alternatives, including potential doctrinal changes (which will likely result in organizational and educational changes) and those concepts described in the JOpsC. • A JCD creates multiple FSAs; the lead FCB will staff the approaches presented in the FSAs through the JCB and JROC as part of their portfolio management responsibilities.

19. Future Force Capabilities Doctrine and Concepts Overarching Organization Capabilities IAW Tier II JCAs Including Institutional Capabilities Global Force Laydown Training Initiatives Materiel Leadership and Education Personnel Facilities Policy