Weclome to the H&S Group Meeting in Brussels 13 March 2013

1. Weclome to the H&S Group Meeting in Brussels 13 March 2013

2. Federation of European Explosives ManufacturersMeeting of the H&S Working Group on13 March 2013in Brussels, Hotel Manos

3. Meeting of the H&S Working Group • List of Participants • Maurice Delaloye, SSE, Switzerland • Janusz Drzyzga, Nitroerg, Poland • Jose Castresana, Maxam, Spain • Pablo Ramos, Maxam, Spain • Martin Klein, DynaEnergetics, Germany • Jaroslav Konarik, Austin Detonators, Czech Rep. • Walter Panchyrz, Orica, Germany • Jean-Paul Reynaud, Titanobel, France • Matti Vähäpassi, Forcit, Finland • David White, EPC, U.K. • 13. In attendance: Hans H. Meyer, FEEM, Belgium • Apologies: • Thierry Rousse, EPC, France • Claire Vieillard, Davey Bickford, France • Marin Dorobantu, Weatherford, Romania

4. 1.) Compliance with European Competition Law As an Association, FEEM operates in strict compliance with European competition laws. Respect for these laws is a core value applying to all FEEM activities. All members of this Committee have been informed by the Secretary General about prohibited discussion topics which apply not only during meetings but also to social gatherings before and after meetings. By signing the participation form, the delegates declare their adherence to the Competition Compliance Programme and agree to comply with Competition Law.

5. Compliance with European Competition Law(cont.) Very clearly: You are not allowed to discuss or exchange information which is not in conformity with competition legislation, including e.g. on: • Prices • Production details • Transportation rates • Market procedures

6. (Draft) Agenda for 13th March 2013 • Compliance with the European and National Competition Laws and Regulations • Agenda and Approval • Minutes of the last meeting on 25 Sept. 2013 in Prague and approval • 4. General Secretary’s Report: • Track & Trace Situation • Which notified body is responsible for allowing the manufacturer to • CE-mark the product? • Can CE-certificates be withdrawn by Notified Bodies? • Marking of various explosives in compliance with Directives 2008/43 & • 2012/4/EU • What should be on an “associated label”? • Labelling of SPUs • Manufacturer’s Name on Unique Identification • Marking of an explosive article incorporating other explosive articles

7. (Draft) Agenda for 13th March 2013 • Coffee Break at 10h30 • Lead compounds situation(Jose Castresana) • Study on current practices in the security vetting of personnel in the whole supply chain of explosives • Are detonator manufacturers becoming complacent? • Microreactors to produce explosive materials • Any other business • Laboratory Nitration – somehow different! (Walter Panchyrz) • Unusual production related occurrences • New FEEM web-site • Subjects for discussion at the next meeting • Date, place and time of next meeting

8. (Draft) Agenda for 13th March 2013 Do I find your approval to the Agenda?

9. Meeting of the H&S Working Group Item 3 Approval of the Minutes of the Meeting in Prague on 26 September 2012.

10. Approval of the Minutes Do I find your agreement to these Minutes?

11. Item 4 Secretary General’s Report

12. Track & Trace Situation FEEM Guidance Note A modified FEEM Guidance Note of the Coding Structure has been discussed yesterday at the Transport Working Group together with an associated XML file structure and a summarized List of International UN/ECE codes available for Logistics Use which are relevant for FEEM use in Advanced Shipping Notification Files.

13. Item 4 (Secretary General’s Report) Directives 93/15 & 2008/43 News since the last meeting

14. Which notified body is responsible for allowing the manufacturer to CE-mark the product? The affixing of the CE marking is primarily the manufacturer’s responsibility. However, when the CE marking appears on products with an identification number of a notified body, the notified body also assumes responsibility. The CE marking must be affixed at the end of the production phase. The CE marking shall only be followed by the identification number of the notified body if the notified body is involved in the production phase. Thus, the identification number of a notified body involved in conformity assessment according to module B (CE type-examination)does not follow the CE marking. It is therefore the notified body that carries out module C, D, E or F (and whose identification number figures on the product together with the CE marking) that assumes responsibility.

15. Can certificates [for the different modules] be withdrawn by Notified Bodies, if yes, at which occasions and how? • There are several aspects that need to be taken into account when considering the validity and the possibility of withdrawing certificates: • notified bodies are obliged to maintain themselves updated as far as the • development of the state of the art is concerned; • notified bodies allow manufacturers to make use of the certificates not • only for the date when the certificate was issued; • the manufacturer has the obligation to inform the notified body of all • modifications where such changes may affect conformity with the • essential requirements and where therefore a further approval is needed. • This obligation is also part of the ongoing licence agreement between • notified body and manufacturer; • according to national civil law certification bodies usually have an • obligation of due diligence vis-à-vis the validity of issued certificates.

16. Can certificates be withdrawn by Notified Bodies, if yes, at which occasions and how? (cont.) In all cases it needs to be stressed that when a Notified Body finds that requirements of the Directive have not been met or are no longer met, it has to restrict, suspend or withdraw certificates, approvals or other relevant conformity assessment results, taking into account the principle of proportionality and the risk involved, unless compliance is ensured through the implementation of appropriate corrective measures.

17. Marking of various explosives in compliance with Directives 2008/43 and 2012/4/EU 17

18. Marking of various explosives in compliance with Directives 2008/43 and 2012/4/EU 18

19. Associated Labels What should be on an “associated label”? If a box contains 50 primers does the associated label have to state the unique identifications for all 50 or can the label simply state something like “Contains 50 primers”? There is no need that the label contains all numbers of the items in the box. The matrix/bar code should suffice. The related information is available in the systems / database of the producer / distributor and is transferred to the buyer via XML file. If police stopped a truck and wanted to check a specific item number in connection with the box, they should be able to scan the box themselves or obtain information on the number and unique identifications of the items in the box from the manufacturer or distributor. There should be no need to print all item numbers on the box or the delivery documents. 19

20. Labelling of SPUs If the primers are less than 8.5 mm in diameter and therefore the SPU needs to be labelled, do all 50 unique identifications have to be marked on the SPU? No! 20

21. Manufacturer’s Name on Unique Identification Does the manufacturer’s name need to be in full or can it be abbreviated (eg RHEMCO instead of Rhinoceros and Hippopotamus Explosives Manufacturing Co) to assist the marking of smaller items? This has benefits and in any event the Member State will be able to identify the manufacturer from their records using the 3 digit site code. This is a matter for the competent authorities in the Member State issuing the code to judge on a case-by-case basis. If the abbreviated name is a commonly known and recognisable trade name, this should be acceptable; if the abbreviation makes it impossible to identify the manufacturer it would not be advisable. 21

22. Marking of an explosive article incorporating other explosive articles In the offshore oil and gas industry, companies manufacture jet-perforating guns (JPG) that consist of a number of shaped charges, detonating cord and detonators manufactured by a third party. These items will be marked in accordance with the Directive however when they are incorporated into the JPG (essentially a long pipe with holes cut in it for the shaped charges) none of their Ids will be visible. Our view is that a single new Identification is marked on the finished JPG and relevant records are kept to detail the incorporation of the smaller items within the JPG. Is this a correct interpretation?

23. Marking of an explosive article incorporating other explosive articles (cont.) On the assumption that the provisions of the second subparagraph of Article 3(1) of the Directive do not provide an exemption (taking into account also the obligations of Article 4 to which that refers), which would seem the case here, in principle that would be a correct interpretation. The finished JPG would fall within the definition of explosive under Directive 93/15/EEC and would need to be marked to enable a full tracing record. If the JPG is created 'on-site', marking the JPG as a separate item may not be necessary provided it is not transported elsewhere.

24. Coffee Break for 30 Minutes

25. Lead Compound Situation(Jose Castresana) In accordance with article 59 (10) of the REACH Regulation, the European Commission has included the following substances in the Candidate List: Dinitrate (233-245-9) (10099-74-8) Lead Monoxide (215-267-0) (1317-36-8) Orange Lead (lead tetroxide) (215-235-6) (1314-41-6) The date of inclusion was 19.12.2012 and the documentary support for inclusion is available at the Web of ECHA: http://echa.europa.eu/candidate-list-table

26. Study on current practices in the security vetting of personnel in the whole supply chain of explosives and CBRN materials FEEM has circulated on 4 February to its members a questionnaire concerning an overview of existing national policies and practices in the area of personnel security vetting and pre-employment background checks in the European Union Member States and to explore areas where possible policy initiatives at EU level would have added value in enhancing security. This is a project which will define future policy and it is strongly recommend that you respond to it as it is an opportunity to influence Commission policy which may impact on the future of businesses in the Explosives industries. This is one of the 50 recommendations to enhance the security of explosives and may lead to a new EU-Directive.

27. Study on current practices in the security vetting of personnel in the whole supply chain of explosives and CBRN materials These are some of the questions e.g.: • Does the industry you represent require that personnel who have access to all processes associated with explosives and high risk CBRN materials are subjected to pre-employment background checks / government security vetting level? (This includes, for example, IT, Health & Safety, regulators etc). • Does your country have a national pre-employment background checking /government security vetting process which applies to all personnel involved with explosives and/or high-risk CBRN materials?

28. Study on current practices in the security vetting of personnel in the whole supply chain of explosives and CBRN materials (cont.) 3. Does your organisation make pre-employment background checks of personnel who have access to all processes associated with explosives and high risk CBRN materials? Etc., etc.

29. Are Detonator Manufacturers Becoming Complacent? There has been a dramatic increase in 2012 in the frequency of incidents associated with the manufacture of detonators in general. There were three fatalities and two serious injuries. The Incident Reports suggest that Basis of Safety (BoS) and Good Explosives Practices (GEP) are being neglected in factory systems. These are fundamental principles for the safe manufacturing of detonators and their components.

30. Are Detonator Manufacturers Becoming Complacent?(cont.) Basis of Safety (BoS) is an understanding of those simple, fundamental safety and technical principles that do two things: • Prevent unintentional explosions, ignitions, and fume-offs specific to the explosives industry. • If there is an explosion, fire or fume-off, manage the consequences to minimize the impact on people, assets and the environment. It is developed from identified process hazards and the lessons of past events in order to provide better process controls.

31. Are Detonator Manufacturers Becoming Complacent?(cont.) Good Explosives Practices (GEP) is a generic term used to describe methods of working with explosives that incorporates the BoS for that process. They ensure that explosives hazards are understood and practical measures applied to reduce: • Likelihood of initiation; and • Potential consequences of an initiation if it occurs

32. Are Detonator Manufacturers Becoming Complacent?(cont.) It is strongly recommended that for all explosives operations, schedules are in place for robust auditing of practices and processes against comprehensive BoS and GEP standards. All BoS / GEP systems emphasize the importance of incident prevention by controlling sources of Friction, Impact, Static and Heat. These are the primary issues to be controlled to prevent an event occurring. Thereafter, the focus is mitigation (making the impact less severe), to minimize the consequences of an event. The review of incidents reported in 2012 would suggest that the following aspects of BoS / GEP may have been contributing factors:

33. Are Detonator Manufacturers Becoming Complacent?(cont.) Quantity: In a number of cases the qunatity of explosive involved either exceeded that authorized or was lethal in quantity. GEP always requires the quantity to be kept to a practical minimum. Exposure: Some incidents involved exposure of operators to explosive being processed and/or exposure of additional people who became collateral damage. GEP always requires the minimum exposure of personnel to any operation involving explosives.

34. Are Detonator Manufacturers Becoming Complacent?(cont.) Impact / Friction: A number of incidents invoved the use of tools made from inappropriate materials. For sensitive materials, i.e. primary and secondary explosives and pyrotechnics, at least one surface of either a tools or receptacle should be a soft material; usually plastic or rubber. Electrostatic Discharge (ESD): ESD has been referred to as “our invisible enemy”: the importance of good anti-static measures both in detonator design and in the production environment can never be overstated.

35. Microreactors to produce explosive materials Researchers at the Fraunhofer Institute for Chemical Technology ICT in Pfinztal have developed a method for safer production of nitroglycerine: a microreactor process, tailored to this specific reaction. What makes the process safer are the tiny quantities involved. If the quantities are smaller, less heat is generated. And because the surface is very expansive compared to the volume involved, the system is very easy to cool. Another benefit: the tiny reactor produces the explosive material considerably faster than in agitating vessels. Unlike a large agitating vessel filled before the slow reaction proceeds, the microreactor works continuously: the base materials flow through tiny channels into the reaction chamber in “assembly-line fashion“. There, they react with one another for several seconds before flowing through other channels into a second microreactor for processing – meaning purification.

37. 9.Any other business?

38. 9. Any other business? Walter Panchyrz: Laboratory Nitration – somehow different

39. 9. Any other business? (cont.) Unusual production related occurrences

40. 9. Any other business? (cont.) • New FEEM homepage • FEEM has started into 2013 with a new, up-dated web site. It is professional, has got a modern design and web architecture and looks very nice. It is easy to operate and to navigate. • You find the site under www. • feem-europe.com • feem-europe.eu • feem-europe.org • feem.info

41. 10. Subjects for discussion at the next meeting?

42. 8. Date & Place of the next meeting: • Hotel Gellért • Szent Gellért tér 1. • in • 1111 Budapest, Hungary • Tuesday, 17 September 2013 Dinner at 19h00 • Wednesday, 18 September: Meeting from 09h00 to 13h00