„Revolution in Military Affairs“ Why computer professionals should be concerned

1. „Revolution in Military Affairs“ Why computer professionals should be concerned Hans–Jörg Kreowski and Dietrich Meyer–Ebrecht Forum InformatikerInnen für Frieden und gesellschaftliche Verantwortung (FIfF)

2. Joint Vision for the US Forces • 1996: Joint Vision 2010 • 2000: Joint Vision 2020

3. Synopsis • A quick walk trough the history of military IT application • Dual–use reversed into its contrary • Armed robots and robot arms • Security research: a proliferating grey area • Intrinsic perils of ICT–based warfare • Message to the concerned computer professionals

4. Computers and weapon technology: A quick walk through history • The early computers I • Z series by Konrad Zuse since 1934, partly with military funding • employment at Henschel aircraft factory • special device for missile control

5. The early computers II • „bombe“ by Alan Turing since 1939 • at Government Code and Cypher School in Bletchley Park • for decoding ENIGMA-encrypted signals

6. The early computers III • ENIAC by Eckert and Mauchly • since 1943 • (for ballistic tables) • STRETCH by IBM and • LARC by Remington Rand • (for H-bomb development) • WHIRLWIND by Forrester since 1944 • leading to SAGE computers in the 1950s • (Semi-Automatic Ground Environment • air defence system)

7. Starting in the 1950s, • the military complex relies more and more on • large, expensive and unrealible computer programs • Semi Automatic Ground Environment (SAGE) air defence system • NORth American Defence (NORAD) system • Ballistic Missile Early Warning System (BMEWS) • Anti Ballistic Missile (ABM) system • ….and others Joseph Weizenbaum warned of the danger that roots in the inpenetrability of such systems

8. The (military) software crisis I • establishment of software engineering • by a series of NATO conferences starting in 1969 • ADA (standard programming language for NATO) • developed in the 1970s • VHSIC (Very High Speed Intergrated Circuits) in the 1980 • STARS (Software Technology for Adaptable Reliable Software) • since 1983 • SCI (Strategic Computing Initiative) since 1983 • SDI (Strategic Defence Initiative) „star wars“ since 1983

9. Strategic Computing Initiative 1983 500 Mill. US $

10. Scorpion (DARPA, GMD 2001)

11. The (military) software crisis II • establishment of software engineering • by a series of NATO conferences starting in 1969 • ADA (standard programming language for NATO) • developed in the 1970s • VHSIC (Very High Speed Intergrated Circuits) in the 1980s • STARS (Software Technology for Adaptable Reliable Software) • since 1983 • SCI (Strategic Computing Initiative) since 1983 • SDI (Strategic Defence Initiative) „star wars“ since 1983

14. The (military) software crisis III • establishment of software engineering • by a series of NATO conferences starting in 1969 • ADA (standard programming language for NATO) • developed in the 1970s • VHSIC (Very High Speed Integrated Circuits) in the 1980s • STARS (Software Technology for Adaptable Reliable Software) • since 1983 • SCI (Strategic Computing Initiative) since 1983 • SDI (Strategic Defence Initiative) „star wars“ since 1983 • … commercial and civil ICT coming up strongly

15. Dual–use reversed into its contrary • Computers: a genuine military technology? • Society blindfolded by IT's dual–use nature • Military applications build up on civil technologies • We paid for the maturing of technologies by our private expenditures

16. Armed robots and robot arms: Technologies to beget nightmares

17. U.S.A. plan toreplace a large partoftheirweaponry byunmannedcombatvehicles (air, ground, andsea)

18. Armed unmanned air vehicles (killer drones) Predator(length 8 m) 2 Hellfiremissiles(US Air Force) Reaper(length 11 m), 8 Hellfiremissiles (US Air Force)

19. Armed unmanned ground vehicles and surface and underwater vehicles Talon SWORD US Army, Foster-Miller Protector (USA, Lockheed-Martin/BAE/Rafael) Swordfish (USA)

20. Scientific impact, computer science and information • and communication technology in particular • embedded systems • digital control • communication networks • image processing • sensors and actuators • big data • artificial intelligence • and much more

21. Killer drones and such • in German academia • Professor Wünsche, University of the Armed Forces Munich • (cf. Plug&Pray) • Professor Paulus, University of Koblenz • Professor Beyerer, • Fraunhofer Institute of Optronics, System Technology • and Image Exploitation together with • Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT) • NATO competitions for underwater robots • with students teams

22. Launching missiles of killer drones • still by human soldiers • (from Nevada and Germany(?)) • thousands of attacks in • Afghanistan, Pakistan, Jemen and in Iraque • targeted killings and signature strikes • many deaths of civilians • undeclared wars

23. Totally autonomous robot arms coming soon • decisions about life and death by machines • robots will kill on their own whenever launched • can they know and respect the laws of war? • can they distinguish between combatants and civilians? • can they save cultural goods? • can they work ethically correct?

24. Ron Arkin Georgia Institute of Technology Maschine ethics is not only possible, but also desirable Robots never panic Robots can judge orders and refuse them if they are not appropriate (artificial conscience)

25. Our view • Unmanned vehicles and • autonomous weapons • with „programmed conscience“ • will not work correctly • They will not observe the laws of war • They should be banned like • biological and chemical weapons • (cf. campaign by the • International Committee for • Robot Arms Control) • What about civil robots? • ROBOCUP? Rescue robots?

26. "Security research": blurring reality Policy fosters merge between military and civil R&D • Introduce euphemisms • Establish appropriate structurese.g. VVS: 5 FhG–institutes + 3 FGAN institutes • Create BudgetsBMBF: part of "high–tech strategy" (6.000 mio €)EU: Security Research Programme (1.400 mio €) Universities benefit from trickle down effect The ‘revolution’ – going undercover …

27. "Security research": blurring reality Policy fosters merge between military and civil R&D • Introduce euphemisms • Establish appropriate structurese.g. VVS: 5 FhG–institutes + 3 FGAN institutes • Create BudgetsBMBF: part of "high–tech strategy" (6.000 Mill. €)EU: Security Research Programme (1.400 Mill. €) Universities benefit from trickle down effect The silent conversion …

28. Perils of ICT–based weapon systems I Recent trends in military affairs (quite dependent on ICT) accelerate the arms race • fighting terrorism (in particular with killer drones) • merging civil and military security • seemingly smart weapons (like unmanned vehicles) • cyberwarfare • high-tech weapons vs. suicide bombers Political, industrial and military complex keeps all options for all kinds of war (rather than for defense only)

29. Perils of ICT–based weapon systems II Hiding real warfare behind computer screens • control centers are far away from the battle fields • cyberattacks (may cause a lot of damage and save the own soldiers, but are hard to attribute) • similarly, autonomous armed robots War is meant to become a normal, acceptable and permanent reality

30. Perils of ICT–based weapon systems III War is meant to become a normal, acceptable, attractive and permanent reality • misleading advertisements • campaignWir. Dienen. Deutschland. • postal stamp

31. Our message • Stop sleepwalking into a technology-driven ‘defense’ policy • Employ your expert knowledge to enhance public awareness • Engage yourself • Try to recognize your potential involvement in weapon development • Initiate a debate on ethics among those responsible for R&D policy and political decisions • Consider to foster a rigorous ban of all weapon systems which shirk public control (e.g. ICRAC) • Support computer professionals, who decline to take their part in military R&D

32. Join FIfF …

33. Annual FIfF Conference 2013 Cyberpeace October 25 – 27, 2013 Siegen no fees open for everybody • fiff.de/2013

34. Thanks!