The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction by Marc Finaud, Faculty Member, GCSP

1. The Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction by Marc Finaud, Faculty Member, GCSP Security Policy Training Course Diplomatic Academy, Sofia, Bulgaria 2 March, 2005

2. Contents • Definitions • The Non-Proliferation Regime • WMD Arsenals and Programs • The Terrorist Risk • Current Trends • Acronyms • Sources

3. DEFINITIONS No generic definition of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), only enumeration in UN documents (since 1948 Report of the UN Commission on Conventional Armaments) and each weapon defined in relevant treaties: • Atomic/Nuclear Weapons (NW) • Bacteriological/Biological Weapons (BW) • Chemical Weapons (CW)  ABC/NBC • Radiological Weapons (RW) •  BCRN

4. 1. DEFINITIONS (cont’d) A) Nuclear Weapons • Device with explosive energy, derived mainly from: - fission (splitting the nucleus of an atom, usually highly enriched uranium or plutonium, releasing energy and additional neutrons that bombard nuclei and sustain a chain reaction), or - a combination of fission and fusion processes (a fission explosion creates the high temperatures necessary to join light isotopes of hydrogen, usually deuterium and tritium, which similarly liberate energy and neutrons), • Causing catastrophic damage due to high temperatures and ground shocks produced by the initial blast and the lasting residual radiation. • Fission bombs (Hiroshima-Nagasaki) are the easiest to make and provide the catalyst for more complex thermonuclear explosions. Most modern nuclear weapons use a combination of the two processes, called boosting, to maintain high yields in smaller bombs.

5. 1. DEFINITIONS (Cont’d) B) Bacteriological/Biological Weapons • Intentional dissemination of infectious diseases and conditions that would otherwise appear only naturally or not at all, • Using as agents: - bacteria (such as anthrax), - viruses (such as smallpox), - rickettsiae (such as Q fever), - chlamydia, - fungi, - and toxins (such as ricin). • Using as criteria: infectivity, virulence, toxicity, pathogenicity, incubation period, transmissibility, lethality, and stability. • Using natural replication of living organisms after dissemination to increase potential impact. Any country possessing a pharmaceutical or food storage infrastructure already has an inherent stabilization and storage system for biological agents. Aerosol delivery is optimal, while explosive delivery is also effective, but to a lesser extent owing to the possibility for organism inactivation because of heat from the blast.

6. 1. DEFINITIONS (Cont’d) C) Chemical Weapons • use toxic properties, not explosive properties, of chemical substances to produce physical or physiological effects on an enemy; • use as agents: - chlorine and phosgene (World War I) to cause respiratory damage and asphyxiation, - blistering agents as mustard gas and lewisite (Iran–Iraq War), to cause painful burns and resource-debilitating casualties, - nerve gases, or anti-cholinesterase agents to cause a loss of muscle control, respiratory failure, and eventually death; effective when inhaled or absorbed through the skin; classified as: * G-agents (sarin), * V-agents (VX), - mental and physical incapacitants (such as BZ) - binary systems (toxic when mixed); • delivered through bombs, rockets, artillery shells, spray tanks, and missile warheads, using an explosion to expel an internal agent laterally.

7. 1. DEFINITIONS (Cont’d) D) Radiological Weapons • Use conventional explosives such as dynamite and C–4 to disperse radioactive materials (pellets, powder or gas) over large areas; • Apart from explosion, victims would receive life-threatening levels of radiation exposure; radiation would make rescue operations difficult and contaminate large areas for years; • A source of radioactive material, such as a nuclear reactor or spent-fuel storage depots, could be targeted with large explosive devices to disperse very high levels of radioactivity into the atmosphere and the surrounding area.

8. 2. THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME A - International Agreements B – Export Control Regimes C – Other Initiatives

9. 2. THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME A) International Agreements • Nuclear Weapons Bilateral Treaties: • USA-USSR/RF: 1972 ABM, 1972 SALT-I, 1974 TTBT, 1976 PNET, 1979 SALT-II, 1987 INF, 1991 START-I, 1992 Agreement on Destruction & Non-Proliferation of NW, 1993 START II, 1997-98 START-III, 2002 SORT. • India-Pakistan: 1999 Lahore Declaration and MOU; 2004 Talks (moratorium on nuclear tests; prior notification of flight tests; non-deployment of nuclear capable ballistic missiles; moratorium on ABM systems, CBMs; discussion on nuclear doctrines). • Brazil-Argentine: 1980 Agreement on the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, 1985 Joint Declarations on Nuclear Policy, 1990 Declaration on Common Nuclear Policy, 1991 Agreement on the Exclusively Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, 1991 Agreement with IAEA.

10. 2.THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME / A) International Agreements/ a) Nuclear Weapons (Cont’d) Multilateral Treaties • 1959 (EIF 1961) Antarctic Treaty: bans any military activity, incl. nuclear tests. 45 ratifications. • 1963 Partial Test Ban Treaty : bans all nuclear tests except underground and assistance to other states’ testing. 124 ratifications. • 1967 Outer Space Treaty: bans placing any WMD in earth orbit, stationing WMD in OS or on any celestial body. 98 ratifications. • 1968 (EIF 1970) Treaty on Nuclear Non-Proliferation (NPT): states having tested NW before 1967 agree not to transfer them, to cooperate with all on peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and negotiate on nuclear disarmament; states without NW agree not to acquire them and conclude safeguards agreement with IAEA. 189 ratifications (not India, Pakistan, Israel). • 1971 (EIF 1972) Seabed Treaty: bans deployment and testing of any WMD on the seabed & ocean floor beyond territorial waters. 92 ratifications. • 1979 (EIF 1984) Moon Treaty: bans positioning of WMD on Moon, its orbit and other celestial bodies. 11 ratifications. • 1996 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT): bans all nuclear tests. Verification regime (CTBTO). 120 ratifications (not USA, China, India, Pakistan, Israel, Iran, required for EIF).

11. 2.THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME / A) International Agreements/ a) Nuclear Weapons (Cont’d) Regional Agreements (Nuclear-Weapon Free Zones) • 1967 Tlatelolco (Latin America): 33 ratifications + 5 NWS Party to Protocols • 1985 (EIF 1986) Rarotonga (Pacific): 13 ratifications + 4 NWS Party to Protocols (US not ratified) • 1995 (EIF 1997) Bangkok (South East Asia): 10 ratifications. No Protocols. • 1996 Pelindaba (Africa): 19 ratifications (28 required for EIF) + 3 NWS Party to Protocols (USA & Russia not ratified). • 2002 Central Asia: not yet signed, awaiting NWS endorsement.

13. 2.THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME / A) International Agreements (Cont’d) b) Bacteriological/Biological Weapons • 1925 (EIF 1928) Geneva Protocol: bans the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases and bacteriological methods of warfare. Not prohibited : use in internal conflicts, threat of use, production, R&D… 133 ratifications with many reservations (not applicable if other states breach). • 1972 (EIF 1975) BW Convention: bans development, production, stockpiling, acquisition & transfer of microbial or other biological agents or toxins and weapons for use of such agents & toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict. Destruction of existing stockpiles. Applies only to types and quantities not justified for peaceful purposes. No verification provisions. 152 ratifications. CBMs agreed. Verification Protocol negotiated but rejected by USA in 2001.

14. 2.THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME A) International Agreements (Cont’d) c) Chemical Weapons • 1925 (EIF 1928) Geneva Protocol: bans the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous and other gases and bacteriological methods of warfare. Not prohibited : use in internal conflicts, threat of use, production, R&D… 133 ratifications with many reservations (not applicable if other states breach). • 1990 USA/USSR Agreement on CW: stopping of production, reduction of stockpiles (500 t allowed), cooperation in destruction, support for a multilateral ban. • 1993 (EIF 1997) Paris Convention on CWC: bans development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, use & transfer of toxic chemicals & precursors for non-peaceful purposes as well as any equipment for such activities. Destruction of stockpiles & facilities. Intrusive verification system (OPCW). Cooperation for peaceful uses. 167 ratifications.

15. 2.THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME / A) International Agreements (Cont’d) d) Radiological Weapons • 1988 India-Pakistan Agreement on Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and Facilities. • 1979-1990 Unsuccessful Negotiations at the Conference on Disarmament (CD) on a Treaty banning the spread of radioactive materials other than from a nuclear explosion, for hostile purposes.

16. 2.THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME (Cont’d) B) Export Control Regimes a) Nuclear Weapons • The Zangger (or NPT Exporters) Committee: created 1971 (West+WP)=> 1974 Guidelines (“trigger-lists” of equipments requiring IAEA safeguards). 35 members (incl. Russia, China). • The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG): 1974 “London Club” (incl. France)=> 1976 London Guidelines for Nuclear Transfers (inc. technology). Revised 1992 to include dual-use transfers & requiring full-scope safeguards. “Restraint” of export of sensitive technologies (uranium enrichment, plutonium reprocessing, heavy water production). Requirement of physical security. No re-transfer. National enforcement & consultations. 44 members (incl. Russia, China). • The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export Controls for Conventional Arms & Dual-Use Goods and Technologies: created 1996 to replace COCOM. Guidelines, information exchanges on “countries of concern”. 33 members (NATO + Russia, Argentine, S. Korea).

17. 2.THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME B) Export Control Regimes (Cont’d) b) Chemical Weapons • The Australia Group:created 1984 to regulate export of 8 dual-use chemical precursors; 1991 “Warning List” includes 54 materials (chemicals, pathogens and toxins, dual-use equipment), shared with industry and scientific community. Coordination of national export controls and information sharing on suspicious activities. 38 States members + EU Commission.

18. 2.THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME B) Export Control Regimes (Cont’d) c) Biological Weapons • The Australia Group (AG):1991 “Warning List” includes 54 materials (chemicals, pathogens and toxins, dual-use equipment), shared with industry and scientific community. Coordination of national export controls and information sharing on suspicious activities. 38 States members + EU.

19. 2.THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME B) Export Control Regimes (Cont’d) d) Missiles • The Missile Technology Control Regime: created 1987 (G7) => Guidelines for Sensitive Missile-Relevant Transfers: export of equipment & technology of systems capable of delivering NW (300km-range, 500kg-payload); 1992 extended to BW & CW whatever range & payload. Cat. I: denial; Cat. II: case-by-case. Lists of “projects of concern”. Denial by one member reinforced by others (“no undercut rule”). 33 members (incl. NATO + former WP) + unilateral “adherents” (incl. Israel, China?). • The International Code of Conduct (ICOC) or The Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC): adopted 2002. Politically-binding document for restraint in development, testing, use and spread of ballistic missiles. Increases transparency and introduces confidence-building measures (annual reporting on missile programmes, notification of ballistic missile and space launches). 111 subscribers (not China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Israel, N.Korea).

20. 2. THE NON-PROLIFERATION REGIME C) Other Initiatives • UN Security Council 1992 Declaration (“Proliferation of WMD is a threat to int’l peace & security”). 2004 Resolution 1540 (terrorist risk, strengthening of national legislation, cooperation). • The Global Control System (GCS): 2000 Russian initiative (transparency of missile launches, incentives for renouncing ICBMs and access to SLVs). 71 participants (incl. N.Korea). No meeting since 2001. • The Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI): US initiative before 2003 G8 Evian Summit, joined by 11 members, supported by some 60. Aims at deterring shipments of WMD-related and dual-use equipment or materials to countries and non-state actors of proliferation concern. Sept. 2003 Paris Principles of Interdiction, in conformity with int’l law. Exchange of information, joint exercises. Several shipments intercepted (to Libya, N.Korea). • EU3 (D-F-UK)/Iran: negotiations on the Iranian nuclear program.

21. 3. WMD ARSENALS AND PROGRAMS • Nuclear Weapons 5 “official” NWS according to NPT (estimates)

23. 3. WMD ARSENALS AND PROGRAMS • Nuclear Weapons (Cont’d) 4 “non-official” NWS according to NPT (estimates)

24. 3. WMD ARSENALS AND PROGRAMS (Cont’d) B) Biological Weapons

26. 3. WMD ARSENALS AND PROGRAMS (Cont’d) C) Chemical Weapons As of 2004, there were 167 member states of the OPCW of which: • 6 declared stockpiles: the United States, Russia, India, Albania, Libya, and “one (not made public) State Party", possibly South Korea. • Iraq's chemical weapons were destroyed under a UN program. • 12 declared chemical weapons production facilities (Bosnia and Herzegovina, China, France, India, Iran, Japan, Libya, Russia, Serbia and Montenegro, United Kingdom, United States and possibly South Korea). By the end of 2004, 47 of 64 declared facilities had been destroyed or converted to civilian uses. • The total world declared stockpile of chemical weapons was about 61,325 tons in 2004. At total of 71,373 tons have been declared to OPCW of which about 10,048 tons had been destroyed. • Several countries not members are suspected of having chemical weapons, (Israel, Egypt, Syria, North Korea) or programs (Pakistan, Myanmar, Taiwan, Vietnam). • Some member states (including Sudan and China) have been accused of failing to disclose their stockpiles or are suspected of conducting programs (Algeria, Cuba, Ethiopia).

28. .

29. 3. WMD ARSENALS AND PROGRAMS (Cont’d) • C) Missiles

32. W = Weapons or agents (known or suspected) R = Research program (known or suspected) * = Awaiting destruction

33. 4. THE TERRORIST RISK • Nuclear Weapons Low likelihood of use of nuclear explosive device by terrorist group (uneasy to obtain, divert or manufacture, expensive, uneasy to deliver, easy to detect). But even low risk could lead to massive casualties and damage. More probable: use of radioactive materials (radiological weapon) or attack on nuclear facility. Even if casualties and damage limited, high risk of terror, panic, disruption of economic life.

34. Nuclear Materials Trafficking IAEA Data Base (since 1 Jan. 1993): • 182 incidents involving nuclear material, • 335 incidents involving other radioactive material

35. 4. THE TERRORIST RISK(Cont’d) B) Biological Weapons • Terrorist attempts to acquire biological agents have fallen short of successful weaponization. • Only two significant biological attacks by terrorists : • Japanese religious sect Aum Shinrikyo tried to produce and weaponize botulinum toxin and anthrax. The group’s extensive efforts failed, and the cult resorted to using the chemical agent sarin for attacks in a Tokyo subway in 1994 and 1995. • First successful terrorist incident in 1984 in Dalles, Oregon, when a religious cult, Rajneesh, disseminated salmonella bacteria in ten restaurants, infecting 750 people, but with no fatalities. • In October 2001, letters containing anthrax sent to members of US Congress and the media, which killed 5 and infected 18 others. This limited attack caused mass disruption and cost billions of dollars in decontamination and prevention expenses.

36. 4. THE TERRORIST RISK(Cont’d) C) Chemical Weapons Five levels of risk for terrorist use: • Threatened use, with no real capability (many cases of “hoaxes”) • Unsuccessful attempts to acquire CW (1970’s: Weathermen, Animal Liberation Front, Neo-Nazi groups) • Actual possession of CW (1980’s: Covenant, Sword, and Arm of the Lord group, various Palestinian groups) • Unsuccessful attempts to use CW (Ricin found in London?) • The successful use of CW (1990’s: Aum Shinrikyo sarin attacks in Tokyo) • Advantages • Inexpensive • Easy availability • Long “shelf life” • High level of control and containment • Effect (death or disability) is immediate • Destroys infrastructure • Low risk of detection • Lack of a “signature” allows anonymity

37. 4. THE TERRORIST RISK (Cont’d) • Required quantities for lethal effect • WeaponGrams • Aerial explosives 320 million • Fragmentation cluster bombs 32 million • Hydrocyanic acid 32 million • Mustard gas 3.2 million • Sarin nerve gas 800,000 • Radiological weapon 5,000 • Type A botulinal toxin 80 • Anthrax spores 8 • Attack on a water supply • Potassium cyanide 18,000 • Nerve agent VX 100 • Typhoid culture 1

38. 5. CURRENT TRENDS A) Nuclear Proliferation • Less opposition West/Third World: 1992 UNSC Declaration + Resolution 1540 => legitimacy of non-proliferation. • Decline in arsenals of NWS (end to “vertical proliferation”?). Issue of qualitative developments (US “mini-nuke”) and fragility of testing moratoria without CTBT. • Risks related to regional conflicts (Middle East, South Asia, Korean Peninsula) => incentive for renewed efforts to address them. • Risks related to non-state actors (nuclear trafficking) and commercial/criminal networks (Abdul Kadeer Khan)

39. 5. CURRENT TRENDS B) Biological Proliferation • Difficult to get complete picture of countries or groups with biological weapons or programs. Official assessments rarely distinguish between suspected, capability, developing, and weapon. States with such capabilities or programs often lumped together in lists with countries with CW programs or capabilities. • Attempts to negotiate intrusive verification protocol to the BWC failed (US does not deem it effective, protects biotech industry) => voluntary transparency & cooperation measures, CBMs + stricter export control regime may raise cost of proliferation but not totally prevent it.

40. 5. CURRENT TRENDS C) Chemical Proliferation • OPCW is efficient but: • destruction deadlines (2007) will not be met (Russia), • challenge inspections not used yet: risk of loosing legitimacy. • Still programs of concern: • by OPCW members (Iran, India, China, Sudan, Pakistan) • by non-OPCW members (North Korea, Israel, Syria, Egypt) • Russia: issue of “novichoks” (circumvention of CWC?)

41. 5. CURRENT TRENDS D) Missile Proliferation • Decreasing ICBM (>5,500 km-range) arsenals: 1987 USSR: 9,378 warheads on 2,380 ICBMs => 2002 Russia 5,000 warheads on 1,022 missiles (- 57 percent less missiles capable of striking continental USA). • IRBM (3,000-5,500km-range) arsenals largely eliminated: INF Treaty scrapped from US-Russian arsenals. France deactivated and destroyed its 18 land-based and 32 submarine-based IRBMs, while China retains some 20 IRBMs. If North Korea launched its Taepo Dong II, it would add a few missiles to this category. • More MRBM (1,000-3,000 km-range) programs: also eliminated for US & RF (INF). But China has 80–100 MRBMs. North Korea tested its Taepo Dong I (1,320-km) and deployed No Dong (1,300-km ). Iran tested Shahab III (1,300-km). Israel deployed 50 Jericho II (1,500-km). India produces Agni II (2,000-km) and works on Agni III (3,500-km). Pakistan tested Ghauri (1,300-km) and Ghauri II (2,000-km). • Aging SCUD inventories: short-range Scuds from USSR in decline. North Korea now primary supplier of Scud-type missiles. • Fewer, poorer programs: number of countries developing long-range ballistic missiles reduced. Also smaller, poorer, and less technologically advanced countries. • US Anti-Ballistic Missile Defence: controversial, expensive, probably ineffective, risk of pushing China to develop ICBMs quantitatively & qualitatively. • Proliferation of MANPADs (man-portable air defence systems): threat to civil aviation from non-state actors.

43. 7. SOURCES • John Cirincione, Deadly Arsenals, Tracking Weapons of Mass Destruction, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2002 • Jozef Goldblat, Arms Control, A Guide to Negotiations and Agreements, Peace Research Institute, Oslo, 2001 • www.opcw.org • www.iaea.org • http://www.cdi.org/nuclear/database/nukestab.html • http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/agni.asp • http://www.bioterrorism.slu.edu/bt/products/ahec_chem/ppt/17 • http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/jir021128_1_n.shtml

44. 6. ACRONYMS • ABC Atomic, Biological, Chemical • ABM Anti-Ballistic Missile • BCRN Biological Chemical Radiological Nuclear (Defence) • BW Biological Weapon • BWC Biological Weapons Convention • CBM Confidence-Building Measure • CD Conference on Disarmament • COCOM Coordination Committee • CTBT Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty • CTBTO Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organisation • CW Chemical Weapon • CWC Chemical Weapons Convention • EIF Entry into Force • EU European Union • GCS Global Control System • HCOC The Hague Code of Conduct • HEU Highly Enriched Uranium • IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency • ICBM Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile • ICOC International Code of Conduct • IRBM Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile • LEU Low Enriched Uranium

45. 6. ACRONYMS (Cont’d) • MANPADS Man-Portable Air Defence System • MOU Memorandum of Understanding • MRBM Medium-Range Ballistic Missile • MTCR Missile Technology Control Regime • NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation • NBC Nuclear, Biological Chemical • NPT Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty • NW Nuclear Weapon • NWS Nuclear Weapon State • OPCW Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons • OS Outer Space • PNET Peaceful Nuclear Explosion Treaty • PSI Proliferation Security Initiative • RF Russian Federation • SALT Strategic Arms Limitation Talks • SLV Space Launch Vehicle • SORT Strategic Offensive Reductions Talks • START Strategic Arms Reductions Talks • TTBT Threshold Test Ban Treaty • UN United Nations • UNSC United Nations Security Council • WMD Weapons of Mass Destruction • WP Warsaw Pact