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The Precarious Nature of Peace: Resolving the Issues, Enforcing the Settlement, and Renegotiating the Terms. Suzanne Werner, Emory Univeristy , 1998 Presented by Steve Richter, April 30, 2013. 1. Introduction and Basic Assumptions.
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The Precarious Nature of Peace:Resolving the Issues, Enforcing the Settlement, and Renegotiating the Terms Suzanne Werner, Emory Univeristy, 1998 Presented by Steve Richter, April 30, 2013
1. Introduction and Basic Assumptions • While the end of war can inaugurate durable peace and cooperative relationships between former adversaries, termination of conflict often creates only temporary peace. • Werner seeks to outline conditions conducive to a lasting peace.
1. Introduction and Basic Assumptions cont. • For conflict to recur, at least one adversary must reverse a prior decision. • A belligerent must challenge a previously accepted agreement. • Explanation must consider that warring parties previously agreed to stop fighting.
1. Introduction and Basic Assumptions cont. • Most conflict within international system takes place among a small number of states that fight repeatedly • States that fight again can only do so if they have previously agreed to stop fighting. • A decision to resume conflict is a, “decision to reverse a prior decision.”
2. Hypotheses for the Key to Instability and Resumption of Conflict • 1-Failure to resolve the issues of the dispute • Highlights importance of issue resolution • 2-Enforcing the settlement • Well-known problem of enforcement in anarchic environment • 3-Renegotiating the terms • Considers belligerents’ incentives to change agreement and possible dangers of renegotiation
2.1 Resolution of the Issues • While all conflict settlements require mutual agreement, some decisions arise out of duress or compulsion. • These agreements do not directly address political issues in contention or may come at the expense of the weaker party. • These agreements may settle conflict, but do not resolve it. In fact, they may exacerbate dispute and solidify grievances.
2.1 Resolution of the Issues:Hypotheses • Agreements imposed on one side by the other are unlikely to last. Risks of recurrent conflict are greater if peace settlement is imposed rather than negotiated. • Conditions that encourage or enable parties to focus on dispute and craft agreements encourage durable peace. • Agreement is more likely if issues in dispute are not fundamental to belligerents’ identity or existence. • Ability to realize decisive military victory influences propensity to address issues and reach agreement. Zartman, 1995
2.1 Resolution of the Issues:Weaknesses • Issue resolution is a better explanation for survival of peace rather than the end of peace. • Hypothesis is based on “idealist” assumption that parties can reach settlement that results in permanent peace. • Military stalemate may not yield agreement. • Hensel, 1994
2.2 Enforcement of the Settlement • Enforcement is difficult under anarchic system. • Peace may fail and hostilities can resume if original settlement fails to protect against defection by one or both parties. • While settlement may be preferred to war, belligerents may perceive gains by disregarding conditions or their implementation. • Peace settlements are fragile and often resemble prisoner’s dilemma.
2.2 Enforcement of the Settlement:Hypotheses • Agreements are particularly vulnerable during implementation of settlement terms. But once parties have implemented conditions, honoring agreement only requires maintenance of status quo. • Risks of recurrent conflict are less if war ends in an imposed settlement rather than negotiated settlement. • Settlements are more likely to endure if third parties provide explicit security guarantees. Risks of recurrent conflict are less if a third party provides security guarantees. • An explicit contract to dictate the nature and conditions of future relations will increase enforceability. Risks of recurrent conflict lessen if treaty exists to clarify conditions.
2.2 Enforcement of the Settlement:Weaknesses • Settlements are fundamentally flawed because they do not ensure compliance. • Settlements that do arise are biased sample of all possible agreements.
2.3 Incentives to Renegotiate • Conflict may recur as a consequence of of a belligerent’s attempt to renegotiate terms. • Assumes that initial conflict terminated when parties reached a mutual comprimise , “in the shadow of force.” • If either side anticipates that new conflict will yield better outcome than the last, incentives exist to renegotiate terms.
2.3 Incentives to Renegotiate:Hypotheses • Change in distribution of power likely undermines durability of peace by creating incentives to renegotiate. • Change in government likely undermines durability of peace by creating incentives to renegotiate and by impeding ability to do so peacefully. • The risks of recurrent conflict decrease as the expected costs of failing to reach a new bargain increase.
2.3 Incentives to Renegotiate:Weaknesses • Does not fully explain why attempts to renegotiate sometimes result in violence. • Werner believes the renegotiation argument avoids problem of the first two explanations though: it does not assume that problem rests in flaws of the dispute settlement. • Rather, it implies that original agreement was acceptable and became untenable due to changes subsequent to the settlement. • Werner notes that all three problems may concurrently affect ability to reach settlement.
3. Data Analysis Methods • Werner uses hazard model to evaluate hypotheses. • Hazard models relate the time that passes before some event occurs to one or more covariates that may be associated with that quantity of time. • Each peace dyad is based on annual assessment. • This results in one record per peace-dyad per one-year period. • Any year in which one member of a peace-dyad is not independent was omitted. • Affects states occupied by victors after war.
4. Operationalization • 4.1 Spatial and Temporal Domain • Werner identifies dyads previously at war between 1816 and 1992 by the Correlates of War data of Small and Singer, 1982 • Dyad previously at war becomes a peace-dyad if states were on opposing sides and militaries engaged in war. • States that did not participate in greater conflicts(WWI, WWII) at the same time or that did not confront each other directly are not included.
4. Operationalizationcont. • 4.2 Duration of Peace and Censored Cases • Peace terminates if a belligerent threatens or uses force against the other. Werner uses Correlates of War Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) data set (Jones, Bremer, Singer, 1996). • Peace terminates only if one belligerent actually uses force against the other. Werner uses MID data and hostility levels of 1-5 to code conflicts. • Peace is not merely use of force but occurrence of war. War defined as at least 1,000 battle deaths and have hostility level of 5. • Dyad is censored if dispute did not occur before end of 1992.
4. Operationalizationcont. • 4.3 Independent Variables • Issue Resolution: Argument anticipates that risk of of recurrent conflict is higher after imposed settlement and territorial issue, lower after mediation attempt, and uncertain after military stalemate. • Enforcement: Werner codes for imposed settlements, imposed regime change, and third-party guarantee to determine if risk decreases. • Renegotiation: Change in relative power and leadership change are measured.
5. Results • 5.1 Issue Resolution • Evidence provides weak support for this hypothesis. • Territory is only variable that significantly affects risk of recurrent conflict. Settlements of this issue are more likely to fail than others. • Variable is statistically significant only when peace terminates with the threat or use of force. • Imposed settlement, mediator, and stalemate variables are not statistically significant.
5. Results • 5.2 Enforcement • Only mixed support for variables emphasized by enforcement argument. • Implementation stage does not seem to be particularly dangerous; once agreement is implemented, peace seems to become institutionalized and unlikely to fail. But when peace ends, these dyads leave data set so hazard rate may only appear to decline. • Imposed settlements last longer than negotiated ones is somewhat supported. Deposing loser’s government strongly enhances durability of peace. • Remaining hypotheses not supported: No evidence that peace treaties reduce risk of recurrent conflict.
5. Results:Werner’s key to the source of conflict! • 5.3 Renegotiations • Changes in relative power significantly increase instability. (+ in each data set) • Changes in relative power not only encourage belligerents to challenge settlement, but also hamper efforts to renegotiate peacefully. • Unexpected and fundamental changes also increase risk of conflict, but anticipated changes do not have significant effect. • Expected costs have significant effect on risk. As the costs of the last war increase, the risk of new conflict decreases.
6. Discussion • Empirical results consistently support renegotiation hypothesis. • Problems: • Weak results for other hypotheses may be a consequence of data or research design. • Circumstances vs. direct effects • Possible bias from case selection. • Some variables may have multiple effects.
7. Conclusions • Maintenance of peace agreements between belligerents and successful renegotiation is fundamental to preventing conflict.
7. Conclusionscont. • Little evidence that settlements fail because issues are not resolved. • Territorial conflicts are not more likely to lead to another war, but are prone to additional low-level conflict. • Mixed evidence to support enforcement argument. • Peace not at greater risk after conflict compare to years later. • Evidence indicates that treaties and guarantors do not reduce risk and may even increase risk of failure of a settlement.
7. Conclusionscont. • Werner sees strongest evidence for renegotiation argument. • Changes in distribution of power consistently increase risk that peace breaks down. This includes violent leadership changes. • Settlements of costly wars are more likely to endure than settlements of less costly war. • Werner concludes that efforts to establish peace must persist as belligerents attempt renegotiation.