Management of Bioresources in Black Sea: Sustainable Solutions

1. Scientific research, management and economy of bioresources in Black Sea

2. Aims and Background • To describe the fisheries in the Black Sea and management instruments • To describe the major gaps in resource management and exploitation of the resources • To demonstrate the open access fisheries scenarios • To clarify problems and to propose solutions

3. Case study: Bulgarian waters • Material and method

5. The 2nd UNIDOKAP International Symposium on BIODIVERSITY, 28-30 November 2018,Samsun, TURKEY Spatial distribution of ISF (1) and prey number (2) • Distribution of sprat biomass - trawl surveys data CPUA (kg/km2): December 2016 scattered distribution CPUE (kg/h): May - June 2009 (close to the shore) (2) Spring (1) Autumn

7. Objective: • The present paper tends to describe the dynamics in open access fishery of four (sprat, whiting, red mullet and turbot) stocks with assessed stock biomass and fishing mortality coefficients.

8. Plan • Black Sea marine living resources • Management of MLR in Black Sea • Bioeconomy – global perspective • Fish = money – bioeconomy scenarios • Problems • Possible solutions

9. Intro: Bioeconomy – global perspective H.S. Gordon The economic theory of a common property resource the fishery J. Polit. Econ., 63 (1954), pp. 116–124 Reference paper in natural resource economics  input-demand based model to lay out the cause, the process, and the consequences of overexploitation of fisheries resources. 

10. Fisheries biology and economy • Fisheries dependant on effort,demands,common property resources, equilibrium; • open-access and hence faces a free entry-exit procedure • The entry/exit dynamics are linear to the profitability of the fishery, with increasing fishing mortality when economic rent (resource rent) is positive and decreasing fishing mortality when rent is negative.

11. Optimal allocation of renewable resources: • Completely specified in terms of the rights that accompany the property over the resource, the restrictions over those rights, and the penalties corresponding to their violation. • Exclusive, so that the person who has those rights will also be responsible for any resource, the and penalties corresponding to the use of the natural resource.

12. Transferable, in order to have those rights in the hands of those who have the capability to convey them to the highest use value. • Effectively enforced, because a non-policed right becomes an empty right.

13. Management of fisheries resourcesin Black Sea 15 April to 15 June prohibition in EU waters Minimum conservation size (45 cm) for turbot and a minimum mesh size (400 mm) for gillnets (GFCM) Turkey and Georgia – no TAC Ukraine/Russian Federation 70 000 t. Georgia 60 th.tons Anchovy quota Turkey- area closures, time closures, mesh size limits, minimum legal catch size

14. Property regimes, property rights and externalities • state property. • private property • common property (res communis) • In open access (res nullius)  - no property; • Stock externalities. Negative effects.

15. Crowding externalities Technological externalities Sequential externalities Incidental externalities Turbot by catch in sprat OTM

16. Ecologically based externalities • externality under competitive coexistence : Predator prey • externality by competitive release – fleet A diminish the dominant species, allow to fleet B to catch subordinated species • Trophic-based externalities

17. Experimental • Analysis of catch in Black Sea • Fishing effort • Bioeconomic modeling scenarios: • Bioeconomics of a Discrete Ricker Model with Delayed Recruitment • Quasi-Rent in Open Access Fisheries • The Backward-Bending Supply Function in Fisheries

18. RESULTS and DISCUSSION • Problems to discuss: • Lack of common management • Lack of management plans • Overexploitation and eutrophication • Unknown state of the resources • Lack of bio-economic analyses • Loss of revenue • Unsustainable development

20. The concept of "economic rent" is a subset of factor markets that helps explain why some factors of production receive more income than others. Economic rent applies not just to land but to any scarce resource. Increase of income from fishery = economic rent

21. Open access equilibrium • long-term fish catch supply  • backward-bending supply curve (blue) • equilibrium catch (green curve) X price function represented by the light blue demand curve = total revenue from fishery • The intersection of the red revenue curve and the magenta cost curve represents the open access equilibrium of this fishery. The connecting dashed line from this point to the green catch curve and the demand and supply curves in the upper figure gives the static solution of this parameter set.

22. Quasi-Rent in Open Access Fisheries Development of rent and effort = quasi-rent "Quasi-Rent in Open Access Fisheries" from the Wolfram Demonstrations Projecthttp://demonstrations.wolfram.com/QuasiRentInOpenAccessFisheries/ Contributed by: Arne Eide http://demonstrations.wolfram.com/QuasiRentInOpenAccessFisheries/ Arne Eide

24. Bioeconomics of a Discrete Ricker Model with Delayed Recruitment The natural equilibrium or stable focus (when fishing mortality is zero) is shown by the intersection of the two dashed lines.

27. Fisheries management plans • Evaluate the fishery in biological, ecological and economic sense.  • Identify and quantify the objectives and goals of management • Select the appropriate combination of performance variables, both biological and economic, and determine the control variables that allow achieving the desired levels in fishery performance criteria.

28. Determine alternative management strategies and their mechanisms of implementation, in order to make operative the control variables previously defined. • (a) carefully specify the fishery system and the context in which the model is intended to operate; • (b) elaborate a causal diagram with the recognized fishery subsystems and the corresponding interface variables; • (c) build a block diagram to quantitatively define model subsystems and interactions among them, as well as exogenous and policy variables and their impact upon the system. • Monitor the fishery to evaluate the impacts of alternative management strategies included in the management plan.  • Reevaluate periodically the fishery

29. Problems • the absence of resource ownership, or ill-defined property rights. • excessive entry •  inefficient spatial distribution of effort, resource degradation, and the dissipation of potential rents in fisheries. • Open access fishery - “too many boats chasing too few fish.” • equilibrium patterns of biomass and effort across the system to be dependent upon bioeconomic conditions

30. Possible solutions • Establish rights on the resources • Individual transferable quotas (ITQs) whereby fishermen hold a right to a share of a biologically determined total allowable catch (TAC).  • community development quotas and harvester cooperatives  - Better solution • Encourage aquaculture development • Capacity building - culture to use marine resources

31. Fish = Money • Fisheries – demand – revenue – employment • Ecology – stable – equilibrium – healthy environment

32. Conclusions • In the Black Sea, for the analyzed fish stocks the fishing mortality increasing for the period of last 10 years, as the open access to the fishery together with lack of comprehensive fisheries management in the whole basin impose a need for common governance system introduction. However, the problem of changing commercial marine living resources is not simply one of resource fluctuations, together with their associated socio-economic consequences. There are huge implications for marine ecology, biodiversity and the ability of the Sea to process the nutrient/pollutant loads which it receives.

33. Thank You!!!