Election Promises

1. ElectionPromises 9 October 2013

2. Sorry about last week How we got engaged Ryan proposed to Lisa on their balcony in LuangPrabang, Laos. They were on their whirlwind trip through Southeast Asia where they visited Vietnam, Laos, Malaysia, Macau and Hong Kong. The picture above is the view of the Petronias Towers from their hotel room in Kuala Lumpur on Valentine's Day. Ryan had the whole room decorated with rose petals and there was a gorgeous bouquet with champagne and chocolates. 

3. Rememberfrom last time • Linkagesbetweencitizens and parties • Programmatic, clientelist, and charismatic • Also, competence/valence, tradition, performance • Measuring party positions • Public opinion, political texts, roll call voting, expert surveys

4. Dimensions of Czech competition • Standard left-right in Western Europe • Left = state intervention in economy plus liberal stance on social issues • Right = free market plus conservative on social issues • Does CZ fit this conception? • Are there classical liberals: free market plus liberal on social issues? • Do social issues matter at all? • Where does EU fit? Far left and far right oppose? • Are issues the main factor in politics or valence? • Where have new parties located? Have they found new open space? • ANO, Usvit, SPOZ, HlavaVzhuru? • Where would you put a new party?

5. New material • Last time: How do parties link to voters? • This time: How can citizens control politicians? • Programmatic linkages are one way, but not only way

6. How can citizens control their government? • Mandate responsiveness: choose between alternative policy programs that parties fulfill • Equivalent to programmatic linkages • Electoral accountability: sanction/reward government according to performance • Removes bad leaders • Incentive to perform better • But, backward looking & crude • Policy responsiveness: protest and voice between elections so that policy follows public opinion • Closest to idea of “citizen rule” • But do citizens want good policies?

7. Mandate Responsiveness Electoral Accountability Elections Policy Making Elections Policy Responsiveness Public Preference Public Preference Public Preference Public Preference

8. Programm-aticness Parties present clear and distinct programs Issue voting Voters understand campaigns and choose based on them Promise Fulfillment Governing parties follow through on their promises Elements of mandate responsiveness

9. Do we want mandate responsiveness? • Advantages • Citizens can set policy – direct control • Governments have mandate/justification for actions • Forward-looking • Disadvantages • Requires voters to be informed • How to enforce? Need to punish parties for broken promises • Need few parties and few veto points (so that winning party can fulfill promise) • What if conditions change? Should parties still fulfill promises?

10. Where can it go wrong? • Parties don’t present clear and distinct programs • Citizens don’t know programs or choose based on them • Parties don’t fulfill their programs • Pursue own corrupt/personal interests • Institutions make it difficult • Parties make bad promises

11. Policy Switches in Latin America • Carlos Menem (Argentina) and Alberto Fujimori (Peru) campaign against neo-liberal reforms • Immediately after elections they introduce massive neo-liberal reforms – privatization, spending cuts, deregulation, etc. • Common in Latin America: 12 of 44 presidents do the same • Always in same direction: anti-reform campaign => reform policy • Is it a failure of democracy?

12. How to explain these switches? • Politicians can’t win with neo-liberal program (cf., Vargas Llosa) • But know that anti-reform policies will lead to economic disaster • Therefore lie in campaign and then switch when in office • Evidence • Switch immediately after elections • Presidents are punished for switching • But reform leads to more growth • Presidents also rewarded for growth • Prospective mandates fail, but retrospective accountability works

13. What is the problem? • Politicians do try to “represent” • Representation = do what is best for society • Responsiveness = do what people want • Voters oppose neo-liberal reform, uninformed about necessity • Are they stupid? • Should politicians teach them?

14. Switches in post-communist Europe • Fewer clear cases of switches • Hungarian Socialists in 1994 & Polish SLD in 1993? • Gyurcsany 2006: “I had to pretend for 18 months that we were governing. Instead we lied morning, noon, and night” • Any changes in opposite direction: reformist programs => anti-reformist policy? • What about Czech governments? • Klaus 1992: Reformist program => • Zeman 1998: Anti-reformist program => • CSSD 2002: • ODS 2006: Reformist program => • ODS 2010:

15. What is different in postcommunist Europe? • Citizens accept necessity of neo-liberal reform • Parties can win with reformist program and then carry out reform • Why? • Failure of communism • Transition associated with national freedom (in Latin America, reform associated with dictatorship) • European Union as prize

16. But how does mandate conception work more generally? • Does ideology of governing parties predict policy? • Not very well • Regressions of policy reform on measures of ideology • Many left parties pursue reform • Many right parties stay away from reform • A bachelor’s thesis project • Do manifestoes predict spending? • For example, more attention to healthcare => more spending on healthcare • In Western Europe, yes • But we don’t know in postcommunist Europe

17. An alternative method: Election promises • Do parties fulfill their election promises? • Find concrete promises in manifesto • Hardness: “We will” or “We promise” versus “We support” or “We are for” • Specificity: Definite outcome (raise minimum wage) versus General principle (help the poor) • Policy (lower taxes) versus Outcomes (increase economic growth)

18. Results from advanced democracies • High levels of promise fulfillment • Typically over 50% for governing parties • Often 70-80% • One review of 21 studies finds average of 67% • Is this a surprise? • Higher for parties with control over government • Strong economy helps • Status quo promise easier to fulfill than promise of change

19. Why do parties fulfill programs? • Policies are important to them • Party activists/contributors want them to fulfill program • Afraid of being punished for not fulfilling promises

20. Czech anecdotes • Klaus in 1996: Average incomes will reach 20,000 Kcs by 2000 • Zeman in 2002: Promises infrastructure projects at each campaign stop equal to 1/5 of budget • Sobotka in 2002: “The promises were not put in a realistic economic framework… We’d be fools to insist on what isn’t economically feasible and push the country into a bigger deficit just to fulfill our promises” • Skromach in 2002: “We got 30% of the vote in the last elections and we certainly fulfilled that much of our program.” • CSSD in 2006 • Changes webpage from 2002 to eliminate promises • Tries to pass legislation at end of term to improve fulfillment

21. Skromach again Taková malá dovolená bez mobilu, s kafíčkem, nafukovacím bazénkem a pár dobrými lidmi. Trochu mě zarazila debata v rádiu, že je snad nějaké divné nosit v sandálech ponožky, Prý snad nějaká národní podivnost. No nevím, ale bez ponožek si sandále neumím představit. A co Vy? Hezký večer.

22. Number of promises in CZ

23. CSSD – Program 2002 Matka Jana, 43 let, prodavačka: "Chci, aby se moc nezdražovalo." Máma Jana je pohledná, inteligentní žena. Většinu života musela počítat každou korunu. Řadu let strávila v domácnosti, protože výchova Evy a Pavla byla kvůli manželově pracovní vytíženosti hlavně na ní. Rodinnému rozpočtu navíc pomáhala příležitostným šitím a opravami oděvů na zakázku. I když to nikdy neměla lehké, nestěžuje si. Současná práce prodavačky ji docela baví. Prý se tak alespoň dostane mezi lidi. Co si Jana přeje? Užít si trochu života. Zajít si do salonu krásy, pořídit něco nového a hezkého do bytu. Koupit sobě, muži a dětem něco hezkého na sebe. Letět společně na dovolenou někam k moři. Zkrátka mít se i s celou rodinou dobře.

24. Promise fulfillment in the Czech Republic(preliminary results)

25. Tell me about your results • How many concrete promises did the party make? • Were the promises realistic? Did they cover main areas of policy? • How many did it fulfill? • Did it try to fulfill its promises or just ignore them? • Why did it succeed/not succeed? • Should this influence voters?

26. What sort of promises should parties make? • George H.W. Bush in 1988: “Read my lips: No new taxes” • Later he raises taxes and loses in 1992 to Bill Clinton • What should he have done? • What was the problem? A bad promise or bad fulfillment? • What should politicians promise? • Specific policies or outcomes? • Avoid populism? Avoid vagueness? • What should they do when conditions change? • Need to explain why they are changing? • In Latin America, they blame former government for misinformation

27. What do voters think of promises? • Widespread belief that politicians never fulfill their promises • Even in Sweden 2/3 of citizens think that parties usually break their promises • Are you surprised that governing parties usually fulfill promises? • Why do voters not trust promises? • Psychological biases: we remember promises that were broken? • We don’t trust politicians?

28. “The Myth of the Mandate” – Robert Dahl • If CSSD wins the election, do they have a mandate to implement their program? • Parties often claim that they have a mandate from voters • But what are voters voting for? Do they want all promises to be fulfilled? • Can public opinion tell us the answer? • Honeymoon Effect: often can fulfill program at beginning of electoral term

29. Bachelor’s Thesis Project • Continue working on promises of Czech or Slovak parties • Easy to publish in a good foreign journal • I will be glad to help