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The development of electronic trading at major international financial futures and options exchanges Susan V. Scott Department of Information Systems The London School of Economics Michael I. Barrett Faculty of Accounting and Business University of Alberta. SUPPORTED BY CEP & STICERD.
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The development of electronic trading at major international financial futures and options exchanges Susan V. ScottDepartment of Information SystemsThe London School of EconomicsMichael I. BarrettFaculty of Accounting and BusinessUniversity of Alberta SUPPORTED BY CEP & STICERD
Research approachSocial, economic and political contextQualitative methodExtensive fieldwork with key market participantsMIS: Technological choices not neutralLived experience
Theoretical foundationsUncertainty and riskGlobal times and timescapes
First phase of the research: 1998-2000Nature and implications of a competitive shift to electronic trading on the major international financial futures and options marketsNew skills, new products Emerging regulation of the e-infrastructureRevising settlement and clearing processes
Preliminary analysisAlliances as the perception of movementGovernance: political rearrangement of an industryStrategic risk positioningGlobal work times
“I was talking to a very senior person at an investment bank who was saying that they are buying what they call ‘defensive pieces of like-competitor’. They buy $20 million of this technology, then they buy $23 million of another electronic system over here, and it looks great. They are doing so good they can afford it. But the reason they are doing it this way is that they have to keep placing bets across different platforms. There is such uncertainty at every level of every market that no one knows what is going to happen. Therefore, by definition if you are going to survive, you have to have multiple bets.” (VP of Risk Management, Major financial institution 1999)
“When I first started trading in the pit we had the advantage because the information society wasn’t there. So what went on in the pit, was what went on. Who was doing what, what was doing what. Then what happened was there was shift and the pit started to lose the advantage because all the information [technology] got so good. The guys up in the offices were getting the information quicker. The guys in the pit couldn’t see anything. In fact, when a number came out or something happened, Yeltsin was sick, we would be last to know and we would get caught with positions.” (Former Chicago local, MD of an independent software company, London, 1998)