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I NTRODUCTION. I NTRODUCTION. ● Background and rationale for this training ● Typology of disasters and R AD /N UC incidents ● Characteristics of R AD /N UC disasters relevant to PSB response.
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INTRODUCTION ● Background and rationale for this training ● Typology of disasters and RAD/NUC incidents ● Characteristics of RAD/NUCdisasters relevant to PSB response
"The prospect of nuclear terrorism is the single biggest threat to US security…short-term, medium-term, and long-term. This is something that could change the security landscape of this country and around the world for years to come. Al-Qaeda and other terrorist organizations are seeking a nuclear device, a weapon of mass destruction that they have no compunction at using." Remarks of President Obama on Eve of Nuclear Security Summit, Washington, DC, 4/11/10. http://www.WhiteHouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-President-Obama-and-President-Zuma-South-Africa-bilateral-meeting
NATIONAL RESPONSE FRAMEWORK (NRF) ● A guide for the Nation’s all-hazards response Describes 15 Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) called up as needed and coordinated within Incident Command System Each ESF has a coordinator and support functions ● ESF-8: Public Health and Medical Services Coordinator is HHS 4 functions: Public health ♦ Medical ♦ Mental health (PSB) ♦ Mass fatalities ● ESF-6: Mass Care, Emergency Assistance, Housing, and Human Services – includes some PSB functions ● 15 National planning scenarios: #1 is nuclear detonation (IND); #11 is radiological dispersal device – PSB is a needed part of these http://www.fema.gov/NRF/pdf/emergency/nrf/nrf-core.pdf
ROUNDTABLE ON THE PSYCHOSOCIAL CHALLENGES POSED BY A RADIOLOGICAL TERRORISM INCIDENT CDC meeting held Dec 6-7, 2005 to explore: ● Planning for large numbers of people who may self-transport to healthcare facilities ● Preventing or mitigating contamination-related social stigma ● Maintaining public trust following a large-scale incident involving radioactive materials Aim: identify major gaps in handling these challenges and steps to help close those gaps Recommendation: better integrate psychosocial preparedness into the Nation’s planning, training, exercises, and incident management protocols http://www.bt.cdc.gov/radiation/pdf/rt-psychosocial.pdf
ROUNDTABLE: INCIDENT COMMAND AND PSB ● PSB response should be incorporated into agencies' emergency response processes and procedures, using National Incident Management System (NIMS) structure as a guide: NIMS establishes standardized processes, protocols, and procedures for emergency response Common language and approach allows national, state, and local jurisdictions and agencies to efficiently coordinate resources http://www.bt.cdc.gov/radiation/pdf/rt-psychosocial.pdf
"ALL HAZARDS" TYPOLOGY C - chemical B - biological R - radiological N - nuclear E - explosive C - chemical B - biological R - radiological N - nuclear E - explosive
RAD VS. NUCINCIDENTS ● Nuclear incident Involves a nuclear detonation ● Radiological incident Does not involve a nuclear detonation
TYPOLOGY OF RAD/NUCINCIDENTS ● Unintentional (accidental) mismanaged / unforseeable ● Intentional war criminal incident terrorism
RADACCIDENTS THAT CAUSE EXPOSURE ●Accidental leakage of radiation from improper disposal of nuclear waste ●Defective medical equipment delivers radiation overdose ●Salvaged or stolen equipment is dismantled and its radioactive material is disseminated in the community Exposure occurs when energy traveling in waves or particles (radiation) penetrates the body
RADACCIDENTS THAT CAUSE CONTAMINATION ● Contamination of ground water from nuclear reactor leak ● Emissions from nuclear power plant meltdown ● Explosion in a radioisotope laboratory Contamination occurs when radioactive material in the form of dust, powder, or liquid comes into contact with the body, and the radioactive source on or in the body continues to emit radiation
INTENTIONAL INCIDENTS: HOW TERRORISM IS DIFFERENT Heinous intent … with a hate message They’re out to get us Broader than just those injured/killed Aim is not just to injure and kill – but more broadly to terrorize the entire population and disrupt society (eg, economy, culture, ongoing activities – and infrastructure if the attack is powerful enough) Unconventional Threat lurks afterward North, Hong, Pfefferbaum 2009, P-FLASHIII (Practical Front Line Assistance for Support and Healing, Version 3)
RAD/NUC DEVICES ● Radiation Exposure Device (RED): release of radiation from a source in close enough proximity to expose - eg, a radioactive source is deliberately left in a public place, eg, under a stadium bleacher or in a trash bin ● Radiological Dispersal Device (RDD): dispersal of radioactive material to contaminate people and environments through conventional explosives or other radiological dispersion device - Explosive ("dirty bomb") or non-explosive (eg, CsCl solution spray) - Explosion or fire at any nuclear or radiological facility - Release of radioactive particles in a subway ventilation system ● Improvised Nuclear Device (IND): detonation of a nuclear bomb National Council on Radiation Protection & Measurements (NCRP) 2005. Key elements of preparing emergency responders for nuclear and radiological terrorism: an overview of NCRP Commentary No. 19. http://www.ncrponline.org/Publications/Commentaries/Commentary%20No%2019%20Overview.pdf
HOW RAD/NUCIS DIFFERENT ● Invisible/undetected harm Uncertainty of exposure ● Potential long-term effects (can affect future generations) Health: genetic and birth defects; cancer Environment: contamination ● Involves materials and concepts that are unfamiliar or poorly understood by many people ● "Doomsday" potential (with nukes) - eg, breakdown of societal infrastructures, humankind eradicated
Risk research has shown that radiation is one of the most feared of all hazards, and situations involving radioactive contamination produce a great deal of apprehension, alarm, and dread Becker 2007 BMJ 335:1106-7, p. 1106
IMPLICATIONS FOR POSSIBLE PSBREACTIONS TO RAD/NUCINCIDENTS ● Mass uncertainty, confusion, dread, fear Systematic studies have failed to support news accounts of widespread panic following disasters Extreme mass panic scenarios are rare - actual panic is typically brief, small in magnitude, and not contagious ● Fear of invisible/undetected harm Responses may be uncoupled from actual threat/injury ● Worry/dread over long-term health effects eg, pregnancy and birth defects; cancer longstanding, persistent psychological ramifications ● Helplessness, fatalism, demoralization, nihilism, denial