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Biological Terrorism Plague. 5/9/01. History. Importance One of three WHO quarantinable diseases Estimated 200 million deaths recorded Three prior pandemics Justinian 541 AD Black Death 1346 China 1855. Plague Doctor wearing protective clothing Image: National Library of Medicine.
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Biological Terrorism Plague 5/9/01
History • Importance • One of three WHO quarantinable diseases • Estimated 200 million deaths recorded • Three prior pandemics • Justinian 541 AD • Black Death 1346 • China 1855 Plague Doctor wearing protective clothing Image: National Library of Medicine
Bioweapon Potential • One of top 6 agents identified by CDC • Known attempted uses • Japanese (Unit 731) WWII infected fleas released over China • Larry Wayne Harris, microbiologist, with suspect motives obtained sample thru mail • Weapons programs • U.S. terminated 1970 • Russia – prior program’s status unknown
Bioweapon Potential • Estimated Effect • WHO worst-case scenario • Aerosol release 50kg Y.pestis over city of 5 million people • 150,000 infected • 36,000 die Photo courtesy of the National Archives
Bioweapon Potential • Delivery Mechanism • Aerosol • Bioweapons programs developed techniques to aerosolize plague directly • Pneumonic form would be expected • Proven infectivity of primates
Epidemiology • Three forms of plague • Bubonic • Septicemic • Pneumonic • Human plague most commonly occurs when plague-infected fleas bite humans • Any suspected case in non-endemic areas without risk factors – report immediately
Epidemiology • Naturally occurring human outbreaks parallel and follow epizootics • BT event may also spawn sylvatic plague • Following disasters • Disruption of rat habitats • Transport of disease through rat relocation Photo courtesy of the National Archives
Epidemiology • Incidence naturally occurring plague • Globally • Approximately 1500 cases/year since 1965 • 25 countries reported cases • > 50% Eastern, S. Africa, esp. Madagascar • U.S. • 390 cases/year reported 1947-96 • Southwest region of U.S. endemic
Epidemiology • Transmission • Historically, rat-borne urban epidemics • Now mostly endemic sylvatic plague with sporadic outbreaks • Pneumonic is only form capable of person to person spread • Higher risk in overcrowding, indoor contacts, cold/wet weather
Epidemiology • Risk Factors • Close contact with case • Contact with infected animal • Living or recent travel in endemic area • Peridomestic animals running loose • Residing in crowded conditions • Cool, wet weather • Exposure to a known intentional release
Epidemiology • Factors suggesting BT aerosol • Several cases of primary pneumonic (no or few bubonic) • Peak in number of previously healthy persons with cough, fever, SOB, death • Many with GI symptoms • Occurs in non-endemic area
Epidemiology • Factors suggesting BT aerosol • Epidemic of severe/fatal pneumonia (hemoptysis) • Symptoms 1-6 days after exposure • Occurs in persons without risk factors • No preceding rat-falls
Epidemiology • Surveillance • Any clinical or laboratory suspicion of plague cases should be immediately reported to the local health department and laboratory and if applicable the hospital epidemiologist or infection control practitioner
Microbiology • Nomenclature progression • Bacillus pestis • Pastuerella pestis • Yersinia pestis
Microbiology • Taxonomy • Family Enterobacteriaceae • 11 Yersinia species – 3 human pathogens • Y. pestis • Y. pseudotuberculosis • Y. enterocolitica
Microbiology • Staining • Gram negative coccobacillus • Giemsa, Wright, Wayson stains – bipolar “safety pin” staining Image courtesy of CDC
Pathogenesis • Environmental Survival • Requires host • Does not survive in environment well • Can live weeks in water, grains, moist soil • Lives months/years at just above freezing temperature • Lives only 15 minutes in 55 C • Lives in dry sputum, corpses, flea feces • Inactivated by sunlight in a few hours
Pathogenesis • Highly virulent and invasive • Four routes human disease • Flea-bite (most common) • Handling infected animals- skin contact, scratch, bite • Inhalation – from humans or animals • Ingesting infected meat
Pathogenesis • Intracellular organism • Survives in monocytes/macrophages • Inhalation (pneumonic form) • Deposition into alveoli • Classic lobular pneumonia • Resulting manifestation • liquefaction necrosis, residual scarring
Clinical Features • Three types of Disease • Bubonic • Septicemic • Pneumonic
Clinical Features • Bubonic • Classic • Predominates - 84% all U.S. cases • From contact with infectious material • Usually from bite of infectious flea • Contact with or ingestion of infected animals
Clinical Features • Bubonic • Buboes • Enlarged tender lymph nodes • Usually unilateral • Usually inguinal/femoral in adults • Cervical/submaxillary more common in age < 10 Image: Armstrong & Cohen
Clinical Features • Bubonic • Mortality • 40-60% untreated, <5% treated • Overall case fatality 14% in U.S. • Usually from delayed Dx and Rx • Complications • Often develop bacteremia • Some develop: • Septicemia (secondary septicemic plague) • Pneumonic (secondary pneumonic plague) • meningitis
Clinical Features • Septicemic • Historically 12.6% U.S. cases are 1º septicemic • Secondary if complication of bubonic • If clinical sepsis develops • Primary if no buboes detected • More difficult to diagnose • May gain access through breaks in skin • May be flea-bite without bubo detectable
Clinical Features • Septicemic • Similar to other gram-negative sepsis • Mortality • Overall 30-50% • Overall case fatality 22% in U.S. for primary • > 90% untreated • Still very high with treatment • Usually from late diagnosis and Rx • Empiric antibiotics for sepsis ineffective • 3rd generation cephalosporins
Clinical Features • Pnuemonic • Numbers • Approx. 2% all plague in U.S. are 1º pneumonic • 12% are secondary pneumonic • Usually small % of cases in endemic areas • Secondary if preceding bubonic (most cases) or septicemic • Spread hematogenously to lungs • Interstitial pattern initially
Clinical Features • Pneumonic • Primary if result of droplet inhalation • From other pneumonic plague patients or infected animals • Form expected if aerosolized as a bioweapon • Extremely infectious via droplets and purulent sputum
Clinical Features • Pneumonic • Mortality • Nearly 100% untreated or if delayed > 18-24 hrs after symptom onset • High despite treatment • Overall case fatality 57% in U.S.
Clinical Features • Other complications • Meningitis • Cutaneous disease • Pharyngeal disease • Enteric disease • Sustained occult fever from abscessed intraabdominal buboes
Clinical Features • In BT event pneumonic form most likely • Pneumonic • incubation 1-6 (6 max, 2-4 typical) days for primary • Probably dose dependent • Initial–acute flu-like–F/C, myalgia, malaise, HA • Often prominent GI sx’s – N/V/D, abd pain • Severe pneumonia • Within 24hr of sx onset • Cough, hemoptysis, CP, SOB • Progresses to cyanosis, stridor, severe SOB
Clinical Features • Radiography – usually patchy bilateral infiltrates, consolidation • Death • Usually occurs 2-4 (max 6) days after exposure if untreated • Cause – sepsis, overwhelming pneumonia with respiratory failure Image: Armstrong & Cohen
Clinical Features • Immunity • Several days after infection before detectable antibodies develop • Earliest 5 days • Typical 1-2 weeks (3 weeks max) • Delayed by early successful antibiotics • <5% never • Transient, not life-long immunity after surviving • Antibody levels normalize in months-years
Diagnosis • No rapid tests available – treat first • Report suspected cases to local health dept if no risk factor for naturally occurring disease • Send out samples if not done in hospital • Obtain specimens as indicated: • Blood – attempt 4 samples q30 min • Bubo aspirate (inject 1-2cc saline and aspirate with 20 Ga needle) • Sputum • CSF
Diagnosis • CXR • Inoculate on/in infusion broth, blood agar, McConkey agar • Biochemical profiles if automated system has capacity to detect • Stains – Gram and Wayson’s or Giemsa • DFA testing • Acute serum for F1 antibody • CDC sample for bacteriophage lysis
Treatment • Start immediately upon suspicion of diagnosis delay >1day after symptoms usually fatal
Treatment • Antibiotics • General • Contained casualties – IV • Mass casualties – po equivalent, same as post-exposure prophylaxis • Also need intensive supportive care • Ventilation • Pressors usually not needed • Who to treat • Suspected cases • Index • If suspected release – anyone with fever, cough
Treatment • Special populations • Children • Same as adults but try avoid TCN if <8yo • No chloramphenicol for <2 yo (grey baby syndrome) • Pregnant women • Try to avoid streptomycin • 1st choice gentamicin, same adult dose • 2nd choice doxy, same adult dose • 3rd choice cipro, same adult dose • Breastfeeding women • Same recommendations as pregnant • Immunosuppressed – no different than competent
Treatment • Antibiotics for contained casualties • (For mass casualties, same as PEP) • 1st choices • Streptomycin - FDA-approved • 30 mg/kg IM divided q8-12 kids (max 2g/day) • 1g IM bid adult • bacteriocidal • gentamicin –as effective, more avail, qd dosing • 5mg/kg iv qd, w/levels or load 2mg/kg then 1.7mg/kg q8 • 2.5mg/kg im/iv q8h kids (q12hr for <1wk or premature)
Treatment • 2nd choices • tetracyclines - as good in vitro, good human data • doxycycline • single 200mg iv loading dose (some sources) • 100mg iv bid or 200 mg iv qd adults& kids >45kg • 2.2mg/kg iv q12hr (max 200mg) kids <45kg • Better absorption, distribution, half-life than TCN • 1st choice po therapy for mass casualties • tetracycline • 500 mg po qid adults • 6.25-12.5 mg/kg po qid kids >9yo
Treatment • 2nd choices • Fluoroquinolones–better in vitro, no human data • ciprofloxacin • 400 mg iv q12hr adults • 15 mg/kg iv q12hr kids (max 1g/day) • Levofloxacin • Ofloxacin • Chloramphenicol • 1st choice for meningitis +/- aminoglycoside • Crosses blood-brain barrier • 25mg/kg iv q6hr adults & kids, keep level 5-20 μg/ml • Avoid in kids <2 yo (grey baby syndrome)
Treatment • 2nd choices • Alternatives – sulfonamides • If other antibiotics not available • Ineffective for pneumonic • TMP-SMX • Generally ineffective • Β-lactams, rifampin, aztreonam, macrolides
Treatment • Antibiotic resistance rare • May be expected in BT scenario (engineered agents)
Treatment • Switch to po when improved, tolerates • Usual response • Bubonic – improved in 2-3d, afebrile 2-5d • Duration – 10-14 days or 3+ days after afebrile, improving • Supportive care • Volume status maintenance • Hemodynamic monitoring • pressors not usually needed • Support of multiorgan failure
Treatment • Bubo care • Usually recedes with antibiotics • Rarely become fluctuant/abscessed • Unnecessary I & D increases contact’s risks
Post-exposure Prophylaxis • Also for mass causalities • For all asymptomatic contacts of suspected untreated pneumonic cases • Contact within last 6 days • Untreated pneumonic = <48hr approp treatment • Those within 2 meters of case • Household, hospital contacts • Those who might have been exposed to initial aerosol • Seek out homeless, mental handicaps, homebound
Post-exposure Prophylaxis • Antibiotics • 1st choices • Tetracyclines • Doxycycline • 100 po bid adults and kids >45 kg • 2.2 mg/kg po bid for kids <45 kg • Tetracycline – equivalent dosages • Fluoroquinolones • Ciprofloxacin • 500 mg po bid for adults • 20 mg/kg po bid (max 1g/day) for kids • Others at equivalent dosages
Post-exposure Prophylaxis • Alternatives • Chloramphenical 25 mg/kg po qid • Not in kids <2yo • For pregnant & breastfeeding women • Same as adults above but no tetracycline • Doxycycline may be used • Duration • 7 days since last exposure PEP • 10 days for mass casualties
Prevention • Vaccination - Bubonic only • Killed virulent strain – used in U.S. • Formalin-fixed, no longer commercially available • Future production and licensure unknown • Series • 3 primary (1.0cc, 0.2 cc at 1-3 mo and 5-6 mo later) • 2 boosters 0.2cc at 6 mo intervals then q1-2yrs
Prevention • Vaccination • Indications • Lab workers with fully virulent strains • Military personnel stationed in endemic areas • Efficacy • Based on WWII (0 cases) and Vietnam (3 cases) troops • Protects vs. bubonic only, not pneumonic • Adverse effects • Significant number have mild reactions • May be severe
Infection Control • Mechanism for person-person spread • Not completely understood • Respiratory droplets most likely, not droplet nuclei • Historically prevented by masks • Respiratory Droplet Precautions • Wear mask, gown, gloves, eye protection • Suspected cases - isolate • Immediately respiratory (even for bubonic) • Avoid unnecessary close contact 1st 48 hrs of abx • Duration • 2 days after initiating antibiotics and clinically improved • After sputum cultures negative