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Estimated DPRK Military Energy Use: Analytical Approach and Draft Updated Results. Dr. David F. Von Hippel Nautilus Institute Senior Associate Prepared for the “ DPRK Energy Expert Study Group Meeting ”, Stanford University, California June 26 - 27, 2006.
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Estimated DPRK Military Energy Use: Analytical Approach and Draft Updated Results Dr. David F. Von Hippel Nautilus Institute Senior Associate Prepared for the “DPRK Energy Expert Study Group Meeting”, Stanford University, California June 26 - 27, 2006
ESTIMATE OF DPRK MILITARY SECTOR ENERGY USE: OUTLINE OF PRESENTATION • Approach to Nautilus DPRK Military Energy Use Analysis • Key Assumptionsfor DPRK Military Energy Use: 1990/1996/2000 and 2005 • Overview of Draft Results by Subsector and Fuel • Key differences from previous results • Future Energy Paths, Military Sector • “What if” Analysis: DPRK Fuel Sufficiency During Combat DPRK Energy Expert Study Group
DPRK MILITARY ENERGY DEMAND: OVERALL APPROACH • Overall Approach for Military Energy Use • Estimate number of fuel-using vessels, vehicles, aircraft, armaments from non-classified sources • Estimate hours of use for classes of equipment • Use characteristics of equipment to estimate fuel use for equipment population in each year DPRK Energy Expert Study Group
DPRK MILITARY ENERGY DEMAND: KEY DATA/ASSUMPTIONS • Number of vessels, aircraft, armaments assumed in use for the DPRK military in 2000 and 2005 similar to 1996, 1990 levels • Except additions of some naval vessels pre-2000 • Ground forces in 2005 assumed ~950,000 troops • Ground forces activity in 2000/2005 13-20% lower than estimated 1990 levels • Due to shortage of fuel, parts • Aircraft flight hours per year 50-60% of estimated 1990 levels by 2000/2005 DPRK Energy Expert Study Group
DPRK MILITARY ENERGY DEMAND: KEY DATA/ASSUMPTIONS • Naval force activity at 75% of estimated 1990 levels for 1996 through 2005 for vessels in routine use • Military manufacturing assumed the same in 2000/2005 as in 1996 (80% of estimated 1990 levels) DPRK Energy Expert Study Group
DPRK MILITARY ENERGY DEMAND: KEY DATA/ASSUMPTIONS DPRK Energy Expert Study Group
DPRK MILITARY ENERGY DEMAND: KEY DATA/ASSUMPTIONS DPRK Energy Expert Study Group
DPRK MILITARY ENERGY DEMAND: KEY DATA/ASSUMPTIONS • Coal and Oil use in buildings and for other (non-vehicle/vessel/aircraft) use similar to 1990 • Electricity use falls to 50% of 1990 levels in 1996, 2000, rising slightly again by 2005 DPRK Energy Expert Study Group
DPRK MILITARY ENERGY DEMAND: KEY DATA/ASSUMPTIONS • Military Sector Assumptions (continued) DPRK Energy Expert Study Group
SELECTED UPDATED RESULTS, DPRK MILITARY ENERGY DEMAND • As of 2000, Military accounted for ~8% of total DPRK energy demand, but ~37% of oil products demand (~27% if KEDO oil used for electricity production was included) • Estimated Military fraction of DPRK gasoline and diesel use is much higher (more than 50%)—most in dual-use vehicles DPRK Energy Expert Study Group
SELECTED UPDATED RESULTS, DPRK MILITARY ENERGY DEMAND DPRK Energy Expert Study Group
SELECTED UPDATED RESULTS, DPRK MILITARY ENERGY DEMAND DPRK Energy Expert Study Group
MILITARY FUEL USE UNDER DIFFERENT FUTURE “PATHS” • In ~Sept. 2002, discussions of Military downsizing in DPRK • Projected reduction in military energy use, activity in Redevelopment case versus “Recent Trends” case DPRK Energy Expert Study Group
ESTIMATE OF DPRK FUEL SUFFICIENCY DURING COMBAT • Based on our estimates of fuel use during routine exercises, fuel use by the DPRK military for 30 days of full-time combat would be about 130,000 tonnes • Assumes 50% of ground force equipment inoperable by the end of 30 days • Ground forces are moving (engines of vehicles and armaments running) about half the time • Aircraft cease operations in 24 hours • 90% of naval forces cease operation in 5 days DPRK Energy Expert Study Group
ESTIMATE OF DPRK FUEL SUFFICIENCY DURING COMBAT • At 2000 fuel import/production rates, would take 3 months to restock military fuels, or ~1.5 months if refineries operate at 100% capacity (and if all supplies diverted to military) • Even at equipment levels present after 30 days, 180% of import/production would be needed to sustain combat (90% if refineries operate at full capacity) • Assumes fuel supply lines are not disrupted, therefore an estimate of maximum capability DPRK Energy Expert Study Group
THANK YOU! DPRK Energy Expert Study Group