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This case study examines the impact of rate deregulation in California post-2006, analyzing the effects on ILECs, CLECs, and consumer prices. It delves into the dynamics of duopoly markets, price regulations, and competitive influences from wireless and VoIP services.
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Phone Bill Regulatory Response to Rising Residential Rates Trevor R. Roycroft, Ph.D. Presented at the 2009 NASUCA Mid-Year Meeting June 30, 2009 trevor@roycroftconsulting.org 508-896-0151
Case Study: Rate Deregulation in California • 2006 CPUC implemented a “Uniform Regulatory Framework” for the four largest ILECs in the state. • AT&T, Verizon, Surewest, Frontier • CPUC concluded that market power has been eliminated, and that competition is statewide due to the availability of UNEs. • Identifies wireless and VoIP as contributing to the elimination of ILEC market power. • Rate regulation removed from bundles and ancillary services in 2006. • Transitional price caps for basic service. • 2008 CPUC Order allowed $3.50 per month basic service increases for January 1, 2009 and January 1, 2010, with full pricing flexibility beginning January 1, 2011.
Duopoly Pricing: Follow the leader! • Cox Communications--only California cable operator that offers basic telephone service as a stand-alone option: • Rather than establishing price for basic service based on its costs, Cox offers basic service prices to reflect prices offered by either AT&T or Verizon, depending on the customer’s location. • Cox raised basic rates in response to AT&T and Verizon’s rate increases. • Basic service rates by 25% • à la carte calling features like call waiting and three-way calling, 25% per month for the first feature, and by 100% per month for additional features. • Increased Caller ID prices by 25% after AT&T increased its Caller ID rates. • Evidence of price leadership, where Cox follows the ILEC’s lead on price increases, does not support the proposition that “competition” protects consumers. • Dominant ILECs set prices, and other firms “follow the lead.”
Regulatory Response: Fresh Look at Market Structure is Needed • Duopoly markets (or duopoly markets with a fringe of resale-based CLECs) are not sufficient to protect consumers. • Regulatory decisions made based on the UNE-driven “competition” should be revisited. • Legislative regulatory plans are based on doubtful foundation. • Investigation into market performance needed. • Evaluate remaining CLECs. • Determine where facilities-based providers are serving. • Evaluate pricing behavior. • Price-increase triggers to initiate reviews? • Is investment occurring? • Is previous broadband “commitment” enough?
Other Regulatory “Hooks” • Price cap plan reviews. • Evaluate plans in light of market changes. • GDP-PI Inflation. • Continued availability of capped à la carte services for the ILEC constrains cable price increases. • Merger review. • Service quality review.
California Competition Study Available At: • http://www.turn.org/article.php?id=839