Nuclear Proliferation

1. Nuclear Proliferation Jordan Noonan Andrew Lee Eric Rodriguez Mike Long

2. Thesis • The IAEA and the nuclear non-proliferation treaty represent steps in the right direction for global nuclear safeguards. These protections, however, are outdated and ineffective in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weaponry. We must overhaul current anti-proliferation strategies in order to mitigate these security risks.

3. The IAEA • The International Atomic Energy Agency • Created in 1957, as the “Atoms for Peace” organization, within the UN. • 3 Main Pillars: (Oversee Compliance with NPT) • Safety and Security • Science and Technology • Safeguards and Verification

4. STRENGTHS - “Grand Bargain” Creating a channel for cooperative global nuclear research 1968 signing of NPT 1996 Test Ban Treaty 1990’s 1st Nuclear Weapons Free Zone, in Latin America Former Republics of Russia relinquish all nuclear weapons back into Russian control. 1993 South Africa voluntarily dismantled entire Nuclear wepons program. WEAKNESSES Inadequate verification and enforcement provisions. Lack of universal export control system No Time Table for Disarmament. Allows members to withdraw from the treaty without penalty. Four states with Nuclear weapons not signitories of NPT; Isreal, Pakistan, India, North Korea. The IAEA (cont.)

5. The Nuclear non-proliferation treaty • The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) is an international treaty designed to limit the spread of nuclear weapons. • opened for signature on July 1, 1968. • There are currently 189 countries part of the treaty, five of which have nuclear weapons: the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, and China (the permanent members of the UN Security Council). • 3 Pillars of the Treaty; (1) Non-Proliferation, (2) Disarmament, (3) Peaceful use of Nuclear Technology. • Only four nations with nuclear weapons are not signatories: India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea. • India and Pakistan both possess and have openly tested nuclear bombs. Israel has had a secretive policy regarding its own nuclear weapons program. North Korea ratified the treaty, violated it, and later withdrew.

6. The Khan Network • Abdul Qadeer Khan, the "Godfather" of Pakistan's nuclear weapons program. • Prime Minister Ali Bhutto appointed Khan to run Pakistan’s nuclear research program. • By 1988, he completed 5 underground nuclear tests.

7. The Khan Network (cont.) • Countries associated with: Iraq, Iran, North Korea, Libya, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Algeria, Kuwait, Burma, & Abu Dhabi • Also linked to Osama bin Laden & Al Qaeda • web of sponsors and suppliers, have linked companies and banks in Europe, groups in Asia and the Middle East have provided high-tech equipment and financing for nuclear weapons programs.

8. Soviet Union Nukes • the Soviet Union had 18,000 nuclear weapons at the height of the Cold War. • a large number are unaccounted for, unsure as to how many are actually missing. • Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) 1993 designed to destroy nuclear weapons and increase security in the satellite countries of Russia that housed nuclear weapons but it is not enough. • almost impossible to keep into account of every single nuclear weapon from the Soviet Union and on the market. Dirty Bombs • weaker version of a nuclear bomb • made from radioactive waste • easier to penetrate civilian nuclear waste facilities than a weapons facilities • not a weapon of mass destruction but a weapon of mass disruption

9. Real Threat of Nuclear Attack? • Rogue states can bar IGO’s like the IAEA from inspecting their nuclear facilities. • Terrorists can still create lots of dirty bombs or obtain nuclear weapons and deploy them rapidly. • Very little deterrence for terrorists in using nuclear weapons. • Construction of a bomb would take up to four months. • Size of technical team would have to be immense. • Constant maintenance of nukes takes a lot of resources. • Obtaining the materials necessary for making a bomb is difficult to achieve without arousing suspicion. • Obtaining nuclear fuel is almost exclusively available to large states.

10. Nuclear Weapons and Terrorist Organizations • Acquisition of Weapons/Materials • Purchase off the black-market or rogue states • Seizure of a nuclear stock pile by force or theft • Terrorist Organizations • al-Qaeda • Hezbollah

11. States Linked to Terror Organizations: Libya, Iran, Pakistan Syria and North Korea -Iran; links to Hezbollah anti-Israeli rhetoric -Pakistan; Instability in the nation of al-Qeada’s operations base Terrorist Organizations as a Threat Doctrine of MAD no longer shared Organizational wealth in finance Validation of terrorists’ political agendas through “the bomb” Nuclear Terrorism

12. Thesis • The IAEA and the nuclear non-proliferation treaty represent steps in the right direction for global nuclear safeguards. These protections, however, are outdated and ineffective in preventing the proliferation of nuclear weaponry. We must overhaul current anti-proliferation strategies in order to mitigate these security risks.

13. Realist Rational deterrence theory. Mutually assured destruction (MAD). Proliferation = international stability. Neo-liberal Institutionalism Domestic determinants Economic and political Role of international institutions NPT, IAEA, and U.N. Can Proliferation be Stopped?

14. The Graham Allison Plan No “loose” nukes Bolster security not only of nuclear weapons, but also civilian nuclear material. No new nascent nukes Barr production of new uranium and plutonium. No new nuclear weapons Halt the production of any new nuclear weapons from current states and prevent new nuclear states. New Anti-Proliferation Strategies

15. Anti-Proliferation Strategies (cont.) • Contain North Korea and Iran • If North Korea and/or Iran obtain capable nuclear technology, regional arms races could spell the dissolution of the NPT. • South Korea, Japan, Middle East • Use economic and political pressures.

16. Works Cited • Albright, David. "Uncovering the Nuclear Black Market: Working Toward." Institute for Nuclear Materials Management. Institute for Nuclear Materials Management (INMM)45th Annual Meeting. Orlando, FL. 02 July 2004. 05 Apr. 2008 <http://www.isis- online.org/publications/southasia/nuclear_black_market.html>. • Cooper, Mary H. "Nuclear Proliferation and Terorism: Can "Rogue" States and Terrorists Aquire Nuclear Weapons?" Congressional Quarterly 14 (2004): 299-319. 05 Apr. 2008 <http://www.iaea.org/NewsCenter/Focus/cqr_proliferation.pdf >. • "Nuclear Issues: Facts At a Glance." CDI. 04 Fe • b. 2003. Center for Defense Information. 05 Apr. 2008 <http://www.cdi.org/nuclear/facts-at-a-glance-pr.cfm>. • Traynor, Ian. "Nuclear Chief Tells of Black Market in Bomb Equipment." The Guardian. 26 Jan. 2004. 05 Apr. 2008 <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/jan/26/iantraynor>.