Nuclear Proliferation Challenges

1. Nuclear Proliferation Challenges Nuclear Proliferation and the Developing World Mark Fitzpatrick Senior Fellow for Non-ProliferationInternational Institute for Strategic Studies 9 September 2008

2. Introduction • Nuclear weapons technologies continue to spread to unstable regions. • “Onward proliferation” (or “secondary proliferation”) = Transfer of nuclear items or technology from one proliferator to another. • Historically, proliferation challenge was state to state (formal cooperation and espionage) • USA  Russia • Russia  China • France  Israel • China  Pakistan

3. Non-state actor: A.Q. Khan Network 1987-2003: A.Q. Khan black market network sold nuclear weapons technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya – and others? • Revered as a hero in Pakistan for making nation a nuclear power. • Turned his procurement network into export business.

4. Role of Pakistan in Khan network The Pakistan government role differed with each customer, along continuum of complicity: initiated  authorized  allowed  overlooked. • Iran case: COAS General Beg encouraged nuclear cooperation. But networkIran • North Korea case: Pakistan received Nodong missiles in exchange, and surely knew of nuclear transfer. Khan/Pak.?NK • Libya case: networkLibya. But Pak govt. knew of aircraft deliveries.

5. Role of Pakistan - cont. Iraq case: 1990 offer of “A/B” project. • Fortunately Iraq was suspicious and did not accept. • No known Pakistan government role. • But officials learned in 1995 when IAEA discovered documents about the offer.

6. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program Pakistan has about 60 nuclear weapons, and a growing capacity to produce more. • Primary fissile material is HEU, which gave Pakistan a weapon capability 10 years after Khan in 1975 stole Urenco designs. • Expanding pu production: 2nd HW reactor at Khushab and reprocessing plant at Chasma. • Not “arms race,” but an arms competition, in which India has greater potential. • Shouldn’t Pakistan want to stop the competition before it loses parity? • .

7. Pakistan nuclear weapons security Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal is not at great risk of theft or diversion. • Reform of command and control system. • Army remains in firm control. • Khan and associates are out of business. • But no interviews with IAEA, CIA or SIS. • Pakistan continues to rely on black market for its own nuclear weapons program.

8. Iran’s nuclear program - most problematic Iran seeks a nuclear weapons capability. • 18 years of clandestine work and 14 kinds of safeguards violations. • Khan network was not selling civil nuclear energy. • Economic irrationality. • Indigenous enrichment is not competitive with international market until 10 reactors are operating. • Insufficient uranium ore means Iran cannot be self sufficient in nuclear fuel cycle. • Fuel supply mechanisms under discussion (IAEA fuel bank, Russia Angarsk, etc.) will guarantee fuel supply. • Iran cannot use its own LEU in Bushehr. Now it claims it needs to enrich for domestic reactor at Darkhovin.

9. Military and weapons indicators • Military involvement in nuclear program and work involving weapons development. • Military front company involved in uranium mining, UF4 conversion (green salt) and procurement; experiments with Polonium-210; possession of document from Khan network on uranium metal casting in hemisphere shape. • Development and testing of high voltage detonator, underground testing, missile re-entry vehicle. • Nov 2007 NIE: Iran worked on weaponisation until 2003. • Iran insists the IAEA work plan has been completed and safeguards should return to normal

10. Iran nuclear program - timelines • 2009/2010 is earliest Iran could produce enough HEU for a weapon. • Most likely scenario: stockpile LEU for later breakout • Time for diplomacy is running out, because of Iran mastery of enrichment process. • 3450 centrifuges in place; 6,000 next goal. • Quality more important factor than quantity. • 50% efficiency. Technical difficulties are being overcome. • Political timeline: “democracy ” will come too late. (Up to Iranians to speed up reform clock.)

11. Iran’s Motivations • Prestige • National pride and sovereignty • Leadership in the Gulf region • Survival of the Islamic regime • Deterrence

12. Issue is not nuclear energy • Iran claims US wants to deny it nuclear energy. • President Bush, 13 Sept. 2005, (re: Iran’s nuclear program): “it’s a right of a government to want to have a civilian nuclear program.” • E3+3 June 2006 offer reaffirmed Iran’s right to nuclear energy and offers Western technology. • UAE, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Jordan show that forgoing enrichment/reprocessing is best way to acquire state-of-art nuclear power.

13. Enrichment not denied forever • E3+3 June 2006 package: review enrichment moratorium when: • IAEA confirms all outstanding issues have been resolved & • international confidence in exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program is restored. • 2008 re-packaged offer: R&D could continue ‘as confidence was gradually restored’

14. Grand Bargain with Iran? • Engagement yes, but what cards to bring to the table? • Need to create leverage. • Security assurances e.g., 19 Sept 2005: US “affirmed it had no intention to attack or invade the DPRK” and two sides “undertook to respect each other’s sovereignty…” • Cooperation on areas of mutual interest: -- Iraq and Afghanistan • Does each side have the vision?

15. US-Iran Engagement • Missed opportunities in the past. • 2000 Iran missed; 2003 US missed. • US engagement in 2009 is likely • Change of policy in 2005: US joined E3 engagement strategy; • US joined June 2006 offer of incentives. • Larijani 2006 offer to talk broke a taboo. • Squabbles over who and where • US has talked to Iran in Baghdad. • July 2008 U/S W. Burns at Geneva mtg. • Iran today is not serious about negotiating. Waiting for new US president.,

16. Since 2006, at least 13 countries in the Middle East announced plans to explore civilian nuclear energy.

17. Regional repercussions • Notwithstanding legitimate energy and economic motivations, political factors also play a role, as countries seek to match Iran’s capabilities. • If Tehran’s nuclear programme is unchecked, it could in time prompt a regional cascade of proliferation among Iran’s neighbours.

18. Saudi Arabia? • For Saudi Arabia, a nuclear-armed Iran would present a direct and dire threat. • Lacks technical and personnel infrastructure. • Would it seek to buy a nuclear deterrent? • More likely a nuclear umbrella.

19. Egypt? For Egypt and Turkey, the threat is indirect, and tied to concerns about the balance of power and loss of relative status. • If any country in the region were to follow Iran in developing a latent nuclear-weapons capability, Egypt is most likely. • Its civil nuclear program is far more advanced than any other Arab state. • It has sought nuclear weapons in the past. • It seems to be keeping its options open.

20. Turkey? • Turkey is not likely to be the country most threatened by Iranian nuclear weapons, but it is the Muslim neighbour most able technically to respond in kind. • A hardening EU mood against Turkish accession is adding to a growing alienation from the West in Turkey, and could give Turkey more reason to consider its own deterrent.

21. Regional repercussions - Israel • A nuclear-armed Iran would erase Israel’s nuclear monopoly, which has served for 40 years as a national insurance policy. • Israel’s leaders say they will do everything possible to prevent the advent of a nuclear Iran. • Israel may need to make fateful decisions as to whether and how it can live with a nuclear-capable Iran.

22. Regional cascade? • If any one of Iran’s neighbours were to seek to acquire nuclear weapons in response, this would put additional pressure on others to do the same. • A proliferation cascade would become more likely if Israel changed its doctrine of nuclear ambiguity. • This would increase the pressure on Egypt and perhaps other Arab states to seek their own nuclear deterrents.

23. Regional cascade? – cont. • So far, none of the new nuclear aspirants in the region has yet been known to talk even privately about seeking nuclear weapons. • They want the human and technical infrastructure associated with nuclear-energy in order to provide a counterbalance to Iran. • This lays the ground for a possible future security hedge and bestows national prestige in the context of historic rivalries.

24. Preventing a regional cascade • The danger of a proliferation cascade in the Middle East, while real, is not imminent. • Although some countries may be positioning themselves to be able eventually to produce fissile material, no country is believed to be pursuing a nuclear-weapons programme as a result of Iran’s activities. • The question is how to keep interest in nuclear energy confined to purely civilian nuclear programmes.

25. Preventing a regional cascade - 2 • The introduction of nuclear energy into the Middle East should not be seen as a foregone conclusion. • No commercial contracts have been signed; no irreversible decisions have been made, and most of the national plans have been limited to feasibility studies. • There is time to put in place policies and practices that can serve as a bulwark against a proliferation cascade.

26. Preventing a regional cascade - 3 The proliferation risks of nuclear energy are manageable as long as countries: • Accept full transparency with enforceable verification and • Concentrate on the technologies they really need, while staying away from the sensitive parts of the fuel cycle.

27. Libya – non-proliferation success • In Dec. 2003, Gadhafi announced Libya was giving up its pursuit of nuclear weapons, as well as other non-conventional capabilities. • In 2004,US removed 1,000 tons of nuclear & missile-related equipment. • Enrichment equipment supplied by companies & associates in 20 countries. • Libya cooperated fully with IAEA, which may issue final report this year.

28. North Korea –Libya nuclear link • In 2000 or 2001, Khan Network supplied Libya with 1.75 tons of UF6. • US testing of containers determined ‘with near certainty’ that the material had originated in North Korea. • UF6 did not match any known samples (e.g. from Pakistan, China). • Bank records connect Libyan payments with North Korean receipt of similar amount. • North Korea not known to have a UF6 line, but experts judge it not difficult to do.

29. Nuclear weapons design • Khan network sold Libya the designs for a Chinese-origin10 kt implosion weapon weighing about 500 kg. 95% complete. • Libya said it did nothing with the designs. • But Urs Tinner made copies. • Swiss government in Dec. 2007 destroyed the weapons designs in Tinner’s safe. • Where are the other copies?

30. Pakistan-North Korea connection • In late 1990s, Khan gave North Korea about 20 P-1 and P-2 centrifuges, along with associated material and assistance. • North Korea then sought to procure other parts on its own, using Khan’s supplier list. • In Nov. 2002, CIA concluded NK was “constructing a plant that could produce enough weapons-grade uranium for two or more nuclear weapons per year when fully operational.”

31. Pakistan – North Korea • CIA assesses with ‘moderate confidence’ North Korea has an ongoing enrichment program, but there is no public evidence. • North Korea showed tubes in non-nuclear work, and allowed sampling, which showed uranium contamination.

32. North Korean plutonium program • NK declared it separated 37kg of plutonium and used 6-7kg in its October 2006 test. • CIA estimated 40-60kg and assessed that NK reprocessed 8-9kg before 1992. NK said 90 g. Same issue that led to 1st crisis. • 18,000 pages of operating records from the 5 MW(e) reactor and reprocessing plant from 1986 must be verified. • Disagreement over verification process led US to postpone removing NK from terrorism list and Trading with Enemy Act.

33. North Korea declaration • North Korea has not agreed to declare weapons assembly or testing, nor the weapons. • Removal of plutonium and dismantlement of weapons are goals for Phase III of Six Party Talks. • Verification also in Phase III, but process has to be agreed upon. • Accounting for nuclear assistance to Syria was also postponed.

34. North Korea - Syria • 24 April briefing: compelling evidence that the Syrian facility Israel bombed on 6 September was a plutonium-production reactor, similar to 5MW(e) reactor at Yongbyon. • It almost surely has a military purpose, although there was no reprocessing plant. • Maybe Syria planned to acquire that later, or to reprocess elsewhere. • Syria’s deception efforts tricked many people, including IAEA DG ElBaradei.

35. North Korea - Syria The CIA did not conclusively prove North Korean involvement, but the briefing said: • Multiple visits by Yongbyon officials to Syria before al-Kibar construction began in 2001; • DPRK procurement in 2002 of a reactor component for Syria; • 2006 DPRK and Syrian nuclear officials involved in a cargo transfer to Syria; and • Presence of North Korean officials in region in early 2007 and after the bombing.

36. Conclusions - 1 • The Syria case demonstrates the difficulty of detecting and deterring proliferation. • It also underscores the proliferation danger of research reactors. • Amidst attention given to non-state actors, state-to-state proliferation remains of serious concern. • UNSCR 1540: proliferation to non-state actors must be criminalized.

37. Recommendations All non-proliferation tools must be strengthened: • Transparency: Additional Protocol must be required. • Verification: IAEA inspection tools (e.g. wide-area monitoring) and rights (‘anytime, anywhere’ access). • Enforcement: UNSCRs re Iran; 1540 standards of compliance; penalties for NPT withdrawal. PSI. • Regulate enrichment & reprocessing – best if voluntary. • Conditions of supply: require int’l purchase of sensitive fuel services. (Waste storage is problem.) • Regional arms control: dialogue on conditions for ME NWFZ; moratorium on enrichment/reprocessing. • Deterrence and reassurance.

38. Disarmament = complementary • Disarmament steps also contribute to strengthening of non-proliferation norms. • Complementary steps to strengthen disarmament and non-proliferation norms can produce a virtuous cycle. • IISS Adelphi Paper explores the challenges to the complete abolition of nuclear weapons and what states can start doing to overcome them.