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Korean Politics (POLI 133J) , May 12 Bureaucracy

Korean Politics (POLI 133J) , May 12 Bureaucracy. What are the characteristics of Korea’s bureaucracy? Was Korea’s bureaucracy core of developmental state or crony capitalism? How has meritocratic bureaucracy developed over time in Korea?. Developmental vs. Predatory State.

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Korean Politics (POLI 133J) , May 12 Bureaucracy

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  1. Korean Politics (POLI 133J), May 12Bureaucracy What are the characteristics of Korea’s bureaucracy? Was Korea’s bureaucracy core of developmental state or crony capitalism? How has meritocratic bureaucracy developed over time in Korea?

  2. Developmental vs. Predatory State • Developmental state: To explain the economic miracles of Japan, Korea, Taiwan, Singapore -Key: Weberian bureaucracy (MITI, EPB) • Embedded autonomy (Evans): autonomous bureaucracy + intense connection to business • Crony capitalism (Kang): To explain the financial crisis of 1997

  3. Weberian Bureaucracy • Coherent and autonomous bureaucracy -contrast to state capture • Meritocratic recruitment and promotion -contrast to patronage-based system: political appointments and promotions

  4. Developmental state & meritocratic bureaucracy • Evans & Rauch (1999): “Weberian bureaucracy promotes economic growth.” (cross-national evidence from 35 countries) • Rauch & Evans (2000) and Dahlstrom et al. (2009): Effect of bureaucratic structure on corruption (sample of 35 & 52 countries): -Meritocratic recruitment significantly reduces corruption. • KOR & TWN, with reputation of meritocratic recruitment, are less corrupt than PHL, with reputation of patronage.

  5. What are the characteristics of Korea’s bureaucracy? Recruitment: meritocratic Haengsi (Public Administration Exam): centralized, highly competitive -contrast to “open recruitment system”-decentralized, flexible, market-driven (US, Australia, New Zealand) Promotion: seniority + merit • Highest career civil servants are often appointed ministers.

  6. Predatory Rhee vs. Developmental Park? Evans (1995): • Under Rhee Syngman, the civil service exam was largely bypassed. Only about 4 percent of those filling higher entry-level positions came in via the civil service exam. Nor were those who entered the higher civil service able to count on making their way up through the ranks via a standard process of internal promotion. Instead, higher ranks were filled primarily on the basis of “special appointments” (B. K. Kim 1987, 101– 2). • Under Park, the proportion of higher entry-level positions filled with Haengsi examinees quintupled, and internal promotion became the principal means of filling the ranks above them (B. K. Kim 1987, 101–8). • The policy coordinating role of the Economic Planning Board (EPB).

  7. Patronage (Rhee) vs. Meritocracy (Park)?

  8. Bifurcated bureaucracy (Kang):political (military) vs. professional (expertise)

  9. Gradual development of meritocracy (1)Early Rhee vs. late Rhee New recruits at higher-entry level (Grade III-B) under Rhee: • Proportion of Haengsi recruits: 4.7% (1948-52), 48.3% (1953-59) • Comparison between 1948-60 and 1977-79 = misleading

  10. Gradual development of meritocracy (2)Increasing proportion of Haengsi over time Modes of new recruitment at Grade III-B: • Early Park: Not more meritocratic -special appointments from the military -institutionalized as “Yushin samuguan” in 1977 -abolished after 1988

  11. Gradual development of meritocracy (3)Special appointment vs. internal promotion Modes of appointment at higher levels

  12. Gradual development of meritocracy (3)Special appointment vs. internal promotion Modes of appointment at higher levels

  13. Gradual development of meritocracy (4)Expansion of civil service exams Number of successful applicants in civil service exams • Civil service exam for Grade 9 (V-B), first introduced after the 4-19 Student Revolution of 1960 • Increasing demand from increasing population of university students and professors to expand the civil service exam

  14. Patronage for the military under Park Trend of Recruitment of Grade 5 at the Ministry of Commerce and Industry Source: Ha and Kang (2011) • Gradual increase of Haengsi recruits in the MCI • Lots of patronage appointments of ex-military officers even in a key economic ministry (1961-65, 1976-79). • Not all special appointments were patronage: Eg. Lee Hahn-been

  15. Trend of bureaucratic corruption • Trend of public officials indicted for corruption • Ratio A: Ratio of # public officials indicted for corruption to total # of people indicted for any crime • Ratio B: Ratio of # public officials indicted for corruption to # public officials indicted for any crime

  16. Development of meritocracy (KOR, TWN) & patronage (PHL) • Evans & Rauch data on Weberianness (1970-90): KOR (13), TWN (12), PHL (6) • TWN: Examination Yuan • Development of meritocratic bureaucracy: Limited back door exams & special recruits. • Civil service exam: 10.8% (1954) → 45.3% (1980) • PHL: Principle of meritocratic recruitment through civil service exam • Increasing prevalence of patronage • 50-50 Agreement (1959, 1967) • 1960 survey: 80% without exam (higher for younger officials) • 1972 survey: 2/3 bureaucrats, “corruption=widespread”

  17. Authoritarian Marcos vs. Authoritarian Chiang & Park They all pledged to combat corruption: • Marcos ended up being one of the world’s most corrupt leaders. • Chiang Kai-shek successfully reformed the formerly corrupt KMT. • Park was able to limit corruption. Differences in socio-economic structure: • Unlike Marcos, Chiang & Park were insulated from the big businesses. • Critical role of land reform Differences in external threat: • Communist threat & competition for Chiang & Park

  18. Consequences of failure of land reform in PHL • The landed elite expanded their economic power by diversifying into commerce, manufacturing, and finance. • The landed oligarchy also acquired political power: -Using patron-client relations in election campaigns: Development of clientelism -Exerting influence, through congressmen, on bureaucratic recruitment. • High inequality  high redistributive pressures (continuing demand for land reform)  Congress captured by the landed oligarchy

  19. Consequences of successful land reform in KOR, TWN • Dissolution of the landlords : Absence of powerful private interests to capture the state • Low inequality of assets and income → Expansion of education & middle class → Increasing demand for expansion of civil service exams → Development of meritocratic bureaucracy

  20. Conclusion Predatory Rhee vs. developmental Park? • Exaggerated by previous studies • Favorable pre-Park conditions • Gradual development of meritocratic bureaucracy • Gradual improvement in corruption control Dual role of Park Chung-hee: • Development of a developmental state • Development of chaebol-dominated economy, corrupt collusion between government and chaebol Origin of the developmental state in KOR & TWN: • The critical role of land reform • The role of internal & external pressures

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