1 / 22

Thomas Schelling, Foreward to R. Wohlstetter Pearl Harbor. Warning and Decision , 1962.

Organizational Responses to Two Biological Weapons Events Jeanne Guillemin MIT Security Studies Program. Thomas Schelling, Foreward to R. Wohlstetter Pearl Harbor. Warning and Decision , 1962.

jonah-mack
Download Presentation

Thomas Schelling, Foreward to R. Wohlstetter Pearl Harbor. Warning and Decision , 1962.

An Image/Link below is provided (as is) to download presentation Download Policy: Content on the Website is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use and may not be sold / licensed / shared on other websites without getting consent from its author. Content is provided to you AS IS for your information and personal use only. Download presentation by click this link. While downloading, if for some reason you are not able to download a presentation, the publisher may have deleted the file from their server. During download, if you can't get a presentation, the file might be deleted by the publisher.

E N D

Presentation Transcript

  1. Organizational Responses to Two Biological Weapons EventsJeanne Guillemin MIT Security Studies Program

  2. Thomas Schelling, Foreward to R. Wohlstetter Pearl Harbor. Warning and Decision, 1962. Surprise, when it happens to a government, is likely to be a complicated, diffuse, bureaucratic thing…The danger is not that we shall read the signals and indicators with too little skill; the danger is in a poverty of expectations—a routine obsession with a few dangers that may be familiar rather than likely.

  3. The 1979 Sverdlovsk Anthrax Epidemic March 1980-The US accuses the Soviet Union of violating the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention September 1988-Soviet public health officials give the US State Department a report describing an anthrax epidemic in Sverdlovsk caused by a breakdown in government meat inspection June 1992-US academic team travels to Sverdlovsk (Ekaterinburg) to investigate cause of epidemic

  4. Establishing Valid Cases • KGB list of 64 victims’ names and addresses • Interviews with families/neighbors of 56 victims • Cemetery data • Autopsy tissue data • Hospital records (5 survivors) • Local hospital and factory clinic lists • Veterinary documents/animal deaths

  5. Anna Komina Ceramics factory worker, age 54; resident of affected district Date of onset of symptoms: April 4,1979 Date of death: April 10

  6. 1993.Interior of pipe shop of abandoned ceramics factory. Large, third-story windows on left face northwest.

  7. 1993. Gate of Compound 19 military base, Ekaterinburg. Soldier is allowing truck to enter.

  8. Sverdlovsk, c.1985 Red dots=Nighttime Locations of victims. Addresses obtained from KGB and other lists. Southern cluster is in Chkalovsky rayon. Arrows=homes off map.

  9. Chkalovsky District Only (note inset of entire city) Irregular white lines show Compounds 19 and 32. White rectangle indicates ceramics factory. Red dots=daytime locations of 62 victims, including 11 survivors.

  10. Six villages southeast of Sverdlovsk where 1979 epizootic occurred. Public health measures April through May. Interviews conducted at F, Abramovo, confirmed Veterinary documents.

  11. Ask No Questions: Soviet Public Health Response, Sverdlovsk 1979 • Urban: quick lab diagnosis, screening at clinic level, central hospital ID intensive care, pediatric unit, emergency ambulance transport, autopsy team; 4000 “volunteers” for screening, home disinfection, and distribution of antibiotics; Moscow clinical team on site, vaccine campaign for 50,000; buildings washed, fliers and radio. • Rural: roadblocks, carcasses burnt, enforced human vaccinations, animal sheds destroyed, 3-week village quarantine.

  12. Diagnosis 9 days post April 2 exposure Total 21 deaths Moscow doctors April 12 arrival. Total 25 deaths 17 victims die with no hospital care City clean-up begun. 30,000 vaccinated. April 16, Total 42 deaths Last recorded death May 16. Total 66 valid cases 11 survivors

  13. Sverdlovsk ResearchFindings • Accidental military aerosol emission on April 2 caused 1979 anthrax epidemic that killed an estimated 68 people • First evidence of prolonged incubation in human inhalational anthrax (max. 43 days) • Virulence of anthrax 50 kilometers from source established by animal deaths • No children or young people apparently affected by anthrax aerosol • Dose response: as few as 9 spores per individual calculated (Science 1994 and ASANewsletter 1999, 2001)

  14. 2001 US Postal Anthrax Attacks • Multiple locations: New York, Florida, New Jersey, Washington, DC, Connecticut • Delayed diagnosis (cutaneous and inhalational) New York and New Jersey • Delayed diagnosis (inhalational) New Jersey and Washington, DC • Mystery cases: New York (Oct.25) and Connecticut (Nov.14)

  15. First Known Letters-NBC and NY Post, 9/18/01 Postmark Onset/Age/Sex Date/DX Outcome September 22 (NY Post)/31/F October 19/C Alive September 25 (NBC)/38/F October 12 /C Alive September 26 (USPS-NJ)/39/M October 18/C? Alive September 28 (AMI)/73M October 15/I Alive September 28 (USPS-NJ)/45/F October 18/C Alive September 29 (ABC)/6mos/M October 15/C Alive September 30 (AMI)/63/M October 4/I Dead (Oct.5) October 1 (CBS)/27/F October 18/C Alive

  16. Second Known Letters (Daschle and Leahy)October 9, 2001 Onset/Age/Sex Date/DX Outcome October 14 (USPS-NJ)/35/M October 19/C Alive October 14 (USPS-NJ)/56/F October 28/I Alive October 15 (USPS-NJ)/43/F October 29/I Alive October 16 (USPS-DC)/56/M October 21/I Alive October 16 (USPS-DC)/55/M October 23/I Dead October 16 (USPS-DC)/47/M October 26/I Dead October 17 (USPS-NJ)/51/F October 29/C Alive October 19 (NY Post)/34/M October 22/C Alive October 22 (FedMail)/59/M October 25/I Alive October 23 (NY Post)/38/M October 28/C Alive

  17. Evidence of Envelope Leakage and Anthrax Dispersal/Chronicle of Events October 12 NY cutaneous case and ? of unopened letter October 15 (Monday) Daschle letter dispersion underestimated October 16 (Tuesday) “err on the side of caution” at Hart, antibiotics distributed; House offices buildings close October 17 (Wednesday) Anthrax at Dirksen SOB; Senate buildings closed October 18 (Thursday) NJ cutaneous case; Brentwood environmental tests positive October 19 (Friday) NJ exposure and cutaneous case cause shutdown; Mr. Richmond diagnosed with inhalational anthrax at night. October 20 (Saturday) 2nd Brentwood worker hospitalized October 21 (Sunday) Richmond test results; Mr. Morris dies. Brentwood closed in afternoon and antibiotics made available October 22 (Monday) Mr. Curseen dies; Gov. Ridge press conference

  18. Anthrax as a Disease: The Public Health Model Consequence: CDC focuses on (outdoor) soil contamination as cause of index case Consequence: CDC misses DRES report. Consequence: CDC relies on low-risk exposure model for industrial setting Consequence: Post Office fails to warn workers Consequence: erroneous dose response “threshold” Consequence: institutional memory loss when US veteran anthrax experts left out

  19. Anthrax as a Weapon: Federal Crime and Terrorism Models • Consequence: FBI shuts Florida and New York sites as crime scenes (CDC excluded) • Consequence: Classified DRES and Patrick Reports on dispersal not forwarded to CDC • Consequence: US BW veterans left out • Consequence: confused public communication concerning risk of anthrax material (strain, source, and weaponized dispersal) and perpetrator

  20. Conclusions 1.Weapon models and public health models should inform each other 2. Government secrecy obstructs public health response and delays diagnosis 3. Public trust is lost without credible and complete risk information

More Related