Evolution of the EU-NATO relations

1. Evolution of the EU-NATO relations Fruska gora, July 25th 2009. Adel Abusara

2. Outline of the presentation • Preliminary remarks • History of the EU-NATO relations: • Pre-ESDP period • Proto-ESDP period • Move from aspiration to operations • NATO developments • Atrophy in transatlantic relations • Future or what is to be done

3. HistoryPre-ESDP period • Cold War – NATO vs. Warsaw Pact (+neutrality or non-alignment) • WEU – weak security attempt to contain Germany (Brussels Treaty 1948.) • Failure of different attempts to create supranational defence arrangement (most notably EDC 1954.)

4. History Proto-ESDP period (1) • 1989 – end of the bifurcation of military alliance structures – demise of the Warsaw Pact • NATO side – period of self-examination, finding new raison d’être • EC/EU side – Maastricht Treaty (1992): • Creation of the CFSP(“...common defence policy which might in time lead to common defence” TEU); • rebirth of the WEU as a European defence organization providing a ready-made mechanism for the MS to exploit

5. History Proto-ESDP period (2) • WEU as a model for understanding the EU – “variable geometry” (intergovernmental, complement, not alternative to NATO, kept defense provision away from the EU) • The EU-WEU relationship: European pillar of NATO – ESDI (first mentioned in 1991 NATO Strategic concept)+ defense component of the EU! • “Petersberg tasks” 1992. WEU – expanding its operations to encompass “humanitarian and rescue tasks, peace-keeping tasks, and tasks of combat forces in crisis management” + institutionalization of WEU • 1994. NATO decides to make available assets and capabilities for WEU operations

6. History Proto-ESDP period (3) • Amsterdam Treaty: • Strengthening of the commitment on military security • Closer institutional relations with the WEU with a possibility of its integration into the Union • Inclusion of the Petersberg tasks in the text (Finland, Sweden) • High Representative for CFSP (+ Secretary General of the WEU) symbolically J. Solana!

7. History From Aspirations to Operations • Turning point – St. Malo agreement (change of attitude of T. Blair, reason - Kosovo) – start of the ESDP • The EU should have “the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so” • Two means of implementing EU-led operations: with NATO assets and capabilities, or without them • Cologne meeting of the European Council 1999: EU and NATO activities should be “complementary” and not “competitive” • Helsinki meeting of the European Council 1999: formal launching of the ESDP • Autonomous capacity of the EU to react when NATO as a whole is not engaged! • The force: 60.000 troops operational at 2003, capable of staying in the field at least 1 year. • Also, creation of institutions to support the decision (Political and Security Committee, Military Committee, Military Stuff , etc.)

8. History From Aspirations to Operations • WEU going to history (although it still exists, but without a major role) • European Defense Agency, European Institute for Security Studies, EU Satellite Centre, European Security and Defense College • May 2003 – “existing operational capacity across the full range of Petersberg tasks, limited and constrained by recognized shortfalls” • June 2004 new plan “Headline Goal 2010” • Operational centre of the EU • First non-NATO military structure to emerge in post-Cold War Europe

9. NATO Developments • Evolutionary development of NATO in contrast to revolutionary development of ESDP • 4 NATO summits as staging posts: Rome 1991(new strategic concept), Brussels 1994 (PfP), Madrid 1997 (start of the enlargement), Washington 1999 (NATO position on ESDI-accepting the autonomy of Europe) • Prague 2002 Declaration on ESDP – NATO giving EU access to NATO assets and capabilities for operations in which NATO itself is not engaged military

10. NATO Developments (2) • 2003 “Berlin plus”- very important, provides for EU access to NATO operational planning, NATO capabilities and common assets, NATO European command operations and the NATO defense planning system adapted to the needs of Europeans • Berlin-plus missions of he EU: Concordia (Macedonia), Althea (BiH-symbolic replacement of NATO’s SFOR mission)

11. Political cooperation and consultations of the EU and NATO • Formally they started in 2001. with exchange of letters between NATO Gensec and Sweden, who presided the EU at the time • May 2001. first official meeting of ministers of foreign affairs • Regular consultations on ambassadors level, level of military committees + Gensec of NATO and HR of the EU

12. Atrophy in Transatlantic Relations • Quality of US – Europeans relations as significant (the most important) factor in “division of labor” between the EU and the NATO • Relative military weakness of the Europeans vis-à-vis US at the end of the century, and therefore incapability of sustainable Balkan diplomacy • Incomparable military budgets after September 11

13. Atrophy in Transatlantic Relations (2)US “making the dinner” and Europeans “doing the dishes” (Kagan) • Despite expectations on both sides of the Atlantic (e.g. Huntington), EU didn’t (try to) become superpower. Why? • Europe has developed over the past half-century genuinely different perspective on the role of power in IR, based on unique historical experience • Modern European culture is constant rejection of the past • Europe is trying to “multilateralise” US • So, what Europe wants? US umbrella, dealing with itself only? “EU foreign policy is the most anemic all the products of EU integration”.

14. Atrophy in Transatlantic Relations (3)US “making the dinner” and Europeans “doing the dishes” (Kagan) • US “hyperpower” (Vedrin) • EU as American project • The great paradox is that the passage to post-modern Europe was made possible by US, and by their decision not to take the same passage • Madeleine Albright 1998 concerns about 3 Ds: “decoupling” transatlantic link, “duplicating” defence reources and “discrimination” against the non-EU European NATO members • “US must sometimes play by the rules of the Hobbesian world, even though in doing so it violates European norms” • The importance of French return in NATO

15. Future or what is to be done? • Uncertainty about the future of EU – NATO relations: what if they want to act in different ways in certain situation? Overlapping capacities • How long will EU use Berlin-plus arrangements? • Have the EU and NATO shaped themselves completely? Is their own future certain?

16. Thank you. adel.abusara@ccmr-bg.org