EU, NATO, AND THE POLITICS OF CONDITIONALITY

1. EU, NATO, AND THE POLITICS OF CONDITIONALITY Angel Angelov

2. STRUCTURE OF THE LECTURE I Introduction to Conditionality II Enlargement Conditionality III The EU and NATO Enlargement Conditionality

3. I INTRODUCTION TO CONDITIONALITY Definitions Generations Characteristics

4. 1. DEFINITION The law of conditionality: Whatever comes into existence does so in dependence on conditions, and in the absence of those conditions ceases to exist. (Sangharakshita, A Guide to the Buddhist Path) A new world order can be created, and development aid, by its conditionality, is one of the instruments to do so. (Peter Uvin, �Do as I Say, Not as I do�: The Limits of Political Conditionality)

5. 1. DEFINITION I will provide you with �x� on a condition you do �y� The idea - old as politics itself Recent addition to the lexicon of IR

6. 1. DEFINITION The use of fulfilment of stipulated political obligations as a prerequisite for obtaining economic aid debt relief most-favoured nation status access to subsidized credit membership in desired regional or global organizations

7. 2. GENERATIONS OF CONDITIONALITY A. First generation Economic conditionality B. Second generation Political conditionality

8. A. First generation of Conditionality Late 1970s - economic crisis in the Third World Reasons - excessive government spending, over-valued currencies, etc. Prescription - domestic economic reforms Economic reforms - condition for assistance

9. B. Second generation of conditionality The end of the Cold War Democracy and human rights - primary concern in development Free markets and free elections - essence of aid Development aid - dependent on political reforms

10. 3. CHARACTERISTICS OF CONDITIONALITY Power asymmetry Demander�s availability of alternative sources Donor�s necessity for interaction with the demander Elaboration of the conditions Demander�s commitment to reform

11. II ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY Enlargement conditionality: 3rd generation of conditionality Rational Limitations

12. ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY : 3rd GENERATION OF CONDITIONALITY Triggering factors: Financial crisis in the Third World First generation End of the Cold War Second generation NATO and EU post-Cold war enlargements Third generation

13. 1. ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY AS A THIRD GENERATION OF CONDITIONALITY Focus: First generation economic conditions Second generation brought in the human rights consideration Third generation �full package�

14. 1. ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY AS A THIRD GENERATION OF CONDITIONALITY Features of the enlargement conditionality 1990s - beyond a simple listing of membership criteria Complex and elaborated system of conditions Extensive and institutionalized monitoring

15. 1. ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY AS A THIRD GENERATION OF CONDITIONALITY Goals: Previous generations more immediate results Enlargement conditionality longer term perspective and sustainability

16. 1. ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY AS A THIRD GENERATION OF CONDITIONALITY Better equipped for bringing and sustaining reforms The benefits associated with membership: sufficiently large as to induce far-reaching concessions

17. 2. RATIONAL Justifying rejection Ensuring the contribution potential of the newcomers Protection of the club�s basic values and interests Motivating particular set of reforms in the candidates

18. Geographical limitation Temporal limitation 3. LIMITATIONS

19. III EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY  Membership conditionality Characteristics Rational Limitations

20. 1. MEMBERSHIP CONDITIONALITY  A. EU membership conditionality B. NATO membership conditionality

21. A. EU membership conditionality  Copenhagen conditions: democracy and protection of human and minority rights a functioning market economy implementation of the acqui Fourth basic condition: �good neighbourliness� (Agenda 2000 )

22. B. NATO membership conditionality  �Study on NATO Enlargement� Functioning democratic political system Market economy Democratic civil-military relations Minority protection Good-neighbourliness Ability to provide a military contribution and achieve interoperability

23. 2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EU AND NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY Power asymmetry Is there a power asymmetry between EU/NATO and the applicants? Demander�s availability of alternative sources Are there available alternatives to the EU/NATO membership? Donor�s necessity for a particular interaction with the �demander Is there a lack of an urgent need for EU/NATO to enlarge? Elaboration of the conditions Are EU and NATO imposing conditions unilaterally? Demander�s commitment to reform Could the applicants have undertaken the required reforms if EU/NATO membership was not conditioned on them?

24. Is there a power asymmetry? �Carrot and stick� approach Carrot - positive conditionality If you do �x� we provide you with �y� membership - encourages a peaceful transformation of the social, political and military systems Stick - negative conditionality If you do not do �x� we will not provide you with �y� denial of membership �Carrot and stick� approach = significant power asymmetry

25. Are there available alternatives to the membership in EU/NATO? Membership affiliations during and after the Cold War In economic terms - EU membership is the most attractive option A dangerous security vacuum Russia - not in a position, nor requested to assist Neutrality is not an option Membership in NATO � the most reliable option

26. Is there a lack of an urgent need for EU/NATO to enlarge? No enthusiasm for �big bang� enlargement Significant mismatch between demand and supply

27. Are EU and NATO imposing conditions unilaterally? NATO alone sets the conditions and the timetable for the accession The applicants � excluded from the decision-making Partnership for Peace / Stability Pact for SEE �Take it or leave it�

28. Could the applicants have undertaken the reforms if membership was not conditioned on them? At its best- form of paternalism At its worst - imposes an alien agenda Problem of timing

29. 3. RATIONAL OF THE NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY Justifying rejection - keep the unwanted applicants away Ensuring contribution potential of the newcomers - sensibility on the inclusion of �free riders�

30. 3. RATIONAL OF THE NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY Protection of the club�s basic values and interests - widening should not obstruct deepening Motivating particular set of reforms - enlargement is one the most influential foreign policy instruments

31. 3. LIMITATIONS TO THE NATO ENLARGEMENT CONDITIONALITY Geographical limitation limited to the North-Atlantic area Temporal limitation limited to the awarding of membership

32. CONCLUSION Effective environment shaping instrument Reasons: functions in an environment of power asymmetry has no viable alternative the demand of membership exceeds the supply many reforms are triggered by EU�s and NATO�s carrot and stick approach