Norms and Institutions. Origins, Change and Effects

1. Norms and Institutions.Origins, Change and Effects Prof. Dr. Karl-Dieter Opp Universität Leipzig, Institut für Soziologie (Emeritus) University of Washington (Seattle), Dept. of Sociology (Affiliate Professor) opp@sozio.uni-leipzig.de / oppkd@u.washington.edu

2. Power point presentation can be downloaded from: http://www.uni-leipzig.de/~sozio/mitarbeiter/m29/ content/dokumente/527/OppVorlesungNormen.ppt Basic articles can be downloaded from dropbox.com (You will get an email that allows you to download the articles and book chapters from a seminar about norms and institutions held at the University of Washington (Seattle). The folder includes the power point presentation.

3. Overview of Goals and Contents This lecture is not intended as an inventory or description of existing norms or institutions. • explanation of the formation (or origins) of norms and institutions, • explanation of the stability and change of norms and institutions, and • (only briefly) explanation of the effects of norms and institutions. The goal is explanation: Further, this is an introduction to, critical analysis and extension of the most important extant theories . Opp, Norms and Institutions

4. Content • I. Introduction • II. Basic Concepts • III. The Measurement of the Norm Dimensions • IV. Are Explanations of Norms and Institutions Theories? • V. The Problem of Social Order: The Classical Explanation of Norm Setting (Hobbes) • VI. Peaceful Cooperation without a State: Spontaneous Norm Emergence in the State of Nature and beyond (Axelrod) • VII. Resolving Disputes in Shasta County: Robert C. Ellickson‘s Theory of Spontaneous Norm Emergence • VIII. Resolving Coordination Problems: The Origins of Conventions • IX. Externalities and Second-Order Public Goods: Norms as Solutions of Collective Action Problems (Coleman) • X. Private-Interest Sanctioning and the Emergence of Norms (Opp) Opp, Norms and Institutions

5. XI. Other Mechanisms: Some Suggestions • XII. The Origin of Norms by Design: Collective Norm Making • XIII. The Effects of Norms and Institutions • XIV. A Toolkit for Institutional Analysis • XV. Summary: An Inventory of the Mechanisms of Norm Emergence • XVI. How to Get a Grade – Requirements for Papers Problem: not clear how far we will come – I will probably drop some themes! Opp, Norms and Institutions

6. A Note: The Curse of Forgetting Prediction: 90% of what you will have learned until Thursday will be forgotten after – say – half a year! Here is the curve of forgetting (Hermann Ebbinghaus): Opp, Norms and Institutions

7. What can you do to achieve a higher curve – forget less? • Repeat what you have learned in the afternoon. • Repeat everything next week – maybe everyday part of the slides. • Read the basic readings about the theories presented! • Read more about norms! • Write a paper! Why might this lecture be didactically less useful than a seminar? Time between the different topics is short, so there is no time for repetition – in contrast to weekly seminars (???). Opp, Norms and Institutions

8. I. Introduction I.1. Norms in Everyday Life Examples in everyday life – what are norms in this lecture? What is notregulated in this room? Some examples for “spectacular” norms? Are there norms about sanctions? Are there norms about what reward are acceptable? How would you define the concept of norm? Opp, Norms and Institutions

9. I.2. Some Facts about Norms The following facts should be explained by the theories (or mechanisms) to be discussed: • Norms change over time – examples? • Norms differ across societies – examples? • Norms are conditional – examples? (One must not lie – correct?) • There are relationships between norms – e.g.: constitutional law and specific laws. • The specificity of what norms prescribe (= normative content) varies across norms. E.g. the role of a father does not specify every detail of what a father has to do. Compare this with the detailed prescription of fines for the violation of traffic laws. • The precision of norms varies across norms. See paragraphs of the constitutional law. Opp, Norms and Institutions

10. I.3. Questions about Norms • Descriptive questions – see the previous slide (what are "facts" about norms). These are descriptive statements about norms. • Explanatory questions about • origins • stability and change, and • effects of norms. • Normative questions: "validity" ("Geltung") of norms – what "is" justice, how should/must or should not/must not one behave? • Can such judgments be true? Opp, Norms and Institutions

11. I.4. What Social Science Deals with Norms – and how (Empirically or Normatively)? • Sociology, • political science (e.g. norms about international relations), • anthropology, • economics (property rights, law and economics …) • social psychology (internalization …), • jurisprudence, • philosophy. Opp, Norms and Institutions

12. I.5. Institutions How would you define the term “institution”? Examples for institutions? Some basic facts about institutions – similar to those of norms: Institutions change over time – examples? institutions differ across societies and cultures – examples? institutions (i.e. the norms constitutions are made up of) are conditional, there are relationships between the norms of an institution – again: constitutional law ...; the specificity (normative content) of the norms of an institution differ across institutions; the precision of the norms of an institution differ across institutions. Opp, Norms and Institutions

13. I.6. Questions about Institutions These are the same questions as about norms: • Descriptive questions • Explanatory questions • Origins • stability and change, and • effects of norms. • Normative questions. Opp, Norms and Institutions

14. I.7. What Social Science Deals with Institutions – and how (Empirically or Normatively)? Same answer as for norms: • Sociology, • political science (e.g. norms about international relations), • anthropology, • economics (property rights, law and economics …) • social psychology (internalization …), • jurisprudence, • philosophy. Opp, Norms and Institutions

15. II. Basic Concepts II.1. Norms The following list consists of some definitions from the literature. There are many more definitions! Question: What are the criteria used in the definitions? (Perhaps make notes when we go through the definitions.) Opp, Norms and Institutions

16. (1) "A norm will be defined as an expectation about how one ought to act, enforced by the threat of sanctions or the promise of reward" (Kerr 1995: 33). • (2) "In this model … social norm … is a term for behavioralregularities that emerge as people interact with each other in pursuit of their everyday interests" (Posner 2000: 26). • (3) “ … a social norm is (i) a behavioural regularity that is (ii) based on a socially shared belief how one ought to behave which triggers (III) the enforcement of the prescribed behaviours by informal social sanctions" (Gächter and Fehr 1997: 276 – italics in the paper). • (4) R. H. McAdams (1997) summarizes the definitions of an extensive literature (see the quotations on pp. 339-340): "Roughly speaking, by norms this literature refers to informal social regularities that individuals feel obligated to follow because of an internalized sense of duty, because of a fear of external non-legal sanctions, or both" (340). Opp, Norms and Institutions

17. The definitional characteristics are: • expectations of third parties that an action ought to be performed (1); (NOTE: this is not a "cognitive" expectation = prediction); • shared normative expectations (“oughtnes”) of third parties (3); • sanctioning (positive or negative) of norm violation (1)(3); • regularity of a behavior (2)(3) – no reference to beliefs…; • internalization of norm (“feel obligated”) (4); • felt obligation of the performance of an action (= internalization) that is not formally prescribed (4); • fear of sanctioning (4) and – one could add – expectation of rewards (positive sanctioning). PERHAPS IDENTICAL WITH “SANCTIONING” (see before)? Some definitions consist of several criteria (4). Opp, Norms and Institutions

18. NOTE: no author provides any reason why he or she chooses the definition he or she suggests! NOTE: some definitions include causal statements (2, 3, 4). Or are these separate empirical propositions (2)? Two questions arise: (1) Is a simple or complex definition (one consisting of several criteria) preferable? (2) What is the most useful dimension (property) or what are the most useful dimensions to be included in a definition? Opp, Norms and Institutions

19. Opp, Norms and Institutions

20. What dimensions are most useful for a definition of norms? Suggestion: oughtness should be the central criterion. Reason: This is rarely addressed in the literature, as we will see, and its explanation is of interest. Thus: A norm could (and should!) be defined as a statement that one shouldbehave in certain situations in a certain way or that one should have certain attitudes, preferences or cognitive beliefs. Acceptance of a norm means the extent to which a statement describing a norm (see definition before) is approved of. (“Internalization” refers to a relatively strong acceptance.) Opp, Norms and Institutions

21. Some implications: • All other definitional characteristics could be dependent or independent variables. • Conditionality is taken account of in the definition. • The norm does not only refer to behavior. Also cognitive beliefs or attitudes or preferences may be subject to oughtness – see religious beliefs. Opp, Norms and Institutions

22. II.2. Institutions Some examples for definitions: • (1) "We define institutions as a system of human-made, nonphysical elements – norms, beliefs, organizations, and rules – exogenous to each individual whose behavior it influences that generates behavioral regularities." (Greif and Laitin 2004: 635) • (2) "In general, historical institutionalists work with a definition of institutions that include both formal organizations and informal rules and procedures that structure conduct." (Thelen and Steinmo 1992: 2). • (3) "Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction" (North 1990: 3). Opp, Norms and Institutions

23. Note that • the definitions are very broad – see the first definition: “institutions” refers to almost everything! • It is not clear why the definitions are so broad. • Organizations and norms are denoted as “institutions” – why? Is this theoretically meaningful? Suggestion: We understand by institution phenomena for which there are so far few convincing theories: these are “institutions” as “rules of the game” (Definition 3 by D. North). Thus: “Institutions” are, by definition, systems of norms. Opp, Norms and Institutions

24. Examples for institutions: Constitution of Germany, the US, and other “basic” laws Inheritance laws of a country Voting rights Institution of the market Health care system Institutions for regulating common pool resources System of rules for getting a Ph.D. or, in general, a doctorate Opp, Norms and Institutions

25. II.3. Values There are different definitions as well. A frequent definition reads: values are relatively general norms such as human rights. Why do we need a concept that denotes relatively general norms – if it is not clear how general a norm must be in order to be called a value? Why not distinguish simply between more or less general norms? Sometimes “values” are defined as attitudes (evaluations) – here the term attitude/evaluation is clearer! Thus:we don’t need the concept of value! However, using it in the above sense does not hurt either. Opp, Norms and Institutions

26. II.4. Sanctions There are different definitions as well, e.g.: • (1) "Sanctions refer to any kind of reactions to a behavior, positive or negative, that attempt to alter the behavior, or decrease or increase its frequency" (Labovitz and Hagedorn 1973: 284). • (2) "... people receive physical or psychological rewards and punishments for their behavior, which encourages or discourages them to conduct themselves in a similar way in the future" (Labovitz and Hagedorn 1973: 284). • (3) "The terms 'sanction' and 'effective sanction' will be used interchangeably, indicating ... an action on the part of a norm beneficiary that has some effect in moving the focal action in the direction intended by the sanctioner" (Coleman 1990: 40). Opp, Norms and Institutions

27. The definitional criteria are: • Reactions to a norm violation with the goal to influence future behavior (1) – intention of the sanctioner relevant; • reward/punishment from the perspective of the sanctionee – the person who is the target of the sanction – for following a norm or for refraining from norm violation (2); • reaction to norm violation that changes the sanctioned behavior in the future (3 – also second part of definition 1) – effect of the reaction relevant. Opp, Norms and Institutions

28. Which definition is to be preferred? We can thus distinguish the following definitions: • intention definition (first definition before), • reward-punishment definition (second definition before), • effect definition (third definition before), • combination of the definitions. One question social scientists are concerned with is to explain when and how individuals react to norm violations. This speaks in favor of the intention definition. Opp, Norms and Institutions

29. Another interesting question is the extent to which behaviors intended to change behavior actually reach their goal, i.e.: when are sanctions effective? See questions of deterrence or effectiveness of laws. This speaks in favor of the effect definition and the reward defi- nition (rewards are conditions for effectiveness). Conclusion: Each of the three definitions refers to theoretically interesting phenomena: either their origins or effects or both are the subject of explanations… Important: when one speaks of “sanctions” one should always tell what concept is used! Opp, Norms and Institutions

30. Note the following implication of the definitions: reactions to a norm violations that are only intended to hurt the norm violator (“revenge”) are not sanctions! Useful? (Example: instructor gives low grade!) Perhaps the intention definition could be extended: Sanctions = df. reactions to a norm violation with the goal to influence future behavior or to hurt the violator (i.e. to impose costs on the norm violator). Opp, Norms and Institutions

31. Question: Do the definitions imply that a sanctioner may be Interested in influencing the behavior of non-violators (general deterrence)? Definitions seem to refer only to the target of the sanctions. Whether there is general deterrence has to be determined empirically. Alternative: extend definitions … Question: Does our theme – explaining the origin and effects of norms – violate the postulate of a value-free social science? Opp, Norms and Institutions

32. II.5. Cited Literature in II: Coleman, James S. 1990. "The Emergence of Norms." Pp. 35-60 in Social Institutions. Their Emergence, Maintenance and Effects, edited by Michael Hechter, Karl-Dieter Opp, and Reinhard Wippler. New York: Aldine de Gruyter. Gächter, Simon, and Ernst Fehr. 1997. "Social Norms as a Social Exchange." Swiss Journal of Economics and Statistics 133:275-292. Greif, Avner, and David D. Laitin. 2004. "A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change." American Political Science Review 98:633-652. Kerr, Norbert L. 1995. "Norms in Social Dilemmas." in Social Dilemmas: Perspectives on Individual Groups, edited by David A. Schroeder. Westport, Conn.: Praeger. Kuran, Timur. 1998. "Moral Overload and Its Alleviation." Pp. 231-266 in Economics, Values, and Organization, edited by Avner Ben-Ner and Louis Putterman. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Labovitz, Sanford, and Robert Hagedorn. 1973. "Measuring Social Norms." Pacific Sociological Review 16:283-303. Opp, Norms and Institutions

33. McAdams, Richard H. 1997. "The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms." Michigan Law Review 96:338-433. North, Douglass C. 1990. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Opp, Karl-Dieter. 2000. "Die Entstehung sozialer Normen als geplanter und spontaner Prozeß." Pp. 35-64 in Normen und Institutionen: Ursachen und Wirkungen, edited by Regina Metze, Kurt Mühler, and Karl-Dieter Opp. Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag. Posner, Eric A. 2000. Law and Social Norms. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Opp, Norms and Institutions

34. III. The Measurement of the Norm Dimensions In order to test hypotheses about norms (or institutions) one needs to measure norms and institutions. Question: Can norms be measured at all? Interactionists claim that norms form in the process of interaction. For example, whether a defendant has committed a crime such as theft (§242 in the German StGB – see next slide), i.e. has violated a norm, is negotiated in the court. Is the argument correct? What is negotiated in the court? How are decisions made if norms are vague – such as: one should not harm others? Assume, you mention this norm if somebody lights a cigarette next to you, and the smoker thinks that this norm does not apply in this situation! Opp, Norms and Institutions

35. § 242 Diebstahl (1) Wer eine fremde bewegliche Sache einem anderen in der Absicht wegnimmt, die Sache sich oder einem Dritten rechtswidrig zuzueignen, wird mit Freiheitsstrafe bis zu fünf Jahren oder mit Geldstrafe bestraft. (2) Der Versuch ist strafbar. Opp, Norms and Institutions

36. In order to measure norms, the following phenomena are to be measured – all are components or dimensions of the existing norms definitions: • behaviors: regular behavior and sanctions as reactions to norm violations and, thus, behaviors; • attitudes and motives: internalization = norm conformity is an intrinsic motive (= acceptance of a norm); • kinds of oughtness (should/must/is allowed to) anddegree of oughtness; • cognitive beliefs about the conditions for a norm to hold (conditionality) and about the probability of sanctioning; • intention to punish or reward behavior. Thus, the measurement refers to phenomena external to an individual (behavior) or internal (all the rest). Opp, Norms and Institutions

37. Which methods are most appropriate to measure the norms dimensions mentioned before and what are the problems of these methods for measuring norms? • Interview? • Problems? • Observation (participant or non-participant)? • Problems? (E.g. measurement of sanctions or attitudes? SEE SLIDE 39.) • Analysis of documents? • Problems? (What do people include in documents: always the truth? Important: possibility of access to events of the distant past! SEE NEXT SLIDE.) • Qualitative or quantitative methods? Thus: each method has its problems. In measuring norms, each method should be checked in regard to its usefulness. Opp, Norms and Institutions

38. Question: What are the problems of measuring norms if documents are analyzed – such as diaries or minutes of a parliamentary session where norms are reported? Hint: writing a text is a behavior (or a sequence of behaviors). What could be the motives or incentives to write a text in a certain way? Is it always a goal of the writer(s) to tell the truth? What about errors (misperception) – perhaps actors want to tell the truth but they don’t know it! Opp, Norms and Institutions

39. Question: To what extent can sanctions be measured by observation? • If sanctions are defined as actions with the intention to punish a norm violation, then subjective phenomena must be ascertained which cannot be directly observed. • This holds also for sanctions which are defined as behaviors that are rewarding for the targets of a sanction. • If sanctions are simply defined as reactionsto norm violation then causality must be determined. For this one needs a theory or experimental design! Opp, Norms and Institutions

40. Question: Are there possibilities to avoid the measurement of the norms dimensions because measuring subjective phenomena is difficult? (Think of “revealed preferences”!) One possibility might be to infer the existence of norms from behavior.The assumption could be: the more frequent a behavior is performed by the members of a group, the more likely it is that the behavior is normatively demanded. Correct? Are there examples for regularly performed behavior where no oughtness is involved? Taking a certain route to the bus every morning, taking the bus instead of a tram, buying regularly the same yoghurt Opp, Norms and Institutions

41. Contents of the rest of this section: • Discussion of some “conventional” measurement, illustrated with the procedure of J.M. Jackson: • Jackson, Jay M. 1966. "Structural Characteristics of Norms." Pp. 113-125 in Role Theory. Concepts and Research, edited by Bruce J. Biddle and Edwin J. Thomas. New York: Wiley. • Some examples from existing research. • Discussion of the factorial survey, based on: • Beck, Michael, and Karl-Dieter Opp. 2001. "Der faktorielle Survey und die Messung von Normen." Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie 53:283-306, • Opp, Karl-Dieter. 2002b. "When Do Norms Emerge by Human Design and When by the Unintended Consequences of Human Action? The Example of the No-Smoking Norm." Rationality & Society 14:131-158 (see also Opp 2000). Opp, Norms and Institutions

42. III.1. The Procedure of J.M. Jackson Jackson measures • behaviors that are performed more or less frequently, and • evaluations of the behaviors: approval, attitudes, normative expectations (= oughtness). Those dimensions can be measured in a two-dimensional coordinate-system: Opp, Norms and Institutions

43. Example: frequency of raising your hand per session in this lecture (or: hours per week reading). E.g. evaluation of one other student or average of evaluation of class overachiever (Streber) e.g. frequency of hand raising of a student (may range from 0 to 8 per session = empirical maximum value) slug (Faulpelz) What are other possible curves – e.g. curve of a „deviant“? Opp, Norms and Institutions

44. Questions: • What does the curve mean? (Only oughtness?) • Which dimensions could be represented on the y-axis and the x-axis? • Could the curve also describe the norm of groups? (Example: students of this class evaluate different frequencies of attendance and the average is computed. What different forms of curves could exist?) • Is it possible to construct measures which describe different properties of a norm? • Is there always a value of y for each value of x? • Can conditionality be represented in the coordinate system? Opp, Norms and Institutions

45. Can the change of norms over time be depicted in the diagram? • Jackson constructs group properties, i.e. a group norm, on the basis of individual properties. Could a group norm be defined independently of an individual distribution of norms? IMPORTANT: such measures are based on individual properties!!! • Can the coordinate system be used for theoreticalpurposes? (What hypotheses could be formulated? E.g. could network density in a class affect the shape of the curve?) • How could these properties be measured in a questionnaire? Opp, Norms and Institutions

46. Critique? There is no theory so far! But Jackson formulates some hypotheses, such as: “… the greater the consequence behavior has for a group and its central concerns, the narrower will be the range of tolerable behavior” (p. 115). The hypotheses are often not very clear (how can the “consequence” and “the central concern” for a group be measured?), not very informative, and they are formulated ad hoc, i.e. without applying a theory! There is so far no systematic attempt to use these measures in a theory. Thus: this is an example for a classification and measurement, that may be used for descriptive purposes. But the theoreticalrelevance is so far not clear. Opp, Norms and Institutions

47. III.2. Some Examples from Research From the DFG-project on the East German revolution – for details see Opp, Karl-Dieter, Peter Voss, and Christiane Gern. 1995. The Origins of a Spontaneous Revolution. East Germany 1989. Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press. This is a translation from German: „Die volkseigene Revolution“ (1993). Items for the measurement of the acceptance of a protest norm: Politics should be left to the elected representatives of the people. A citizen should become politically active only if he or she believes that he or she can achieve something. Violence against persons to achieve political goals can be morally justified. If a state oppresses free expression and other basic rights of the citizens then also violence of the citizens is justified. Five answer categories, from “fully disagree” to “fully agree.” Opp, Norms and Institutions

48. CONTINUATION What do you think about the following statement(s): “I think that violence against objects is morally justified. Does this hold never, rarely, sometimes, most of the time or always?” What are the situations when yourself would be willing to use violence against objects: If some highway is constructed near your apartment. If the right to demonstrate will be restricted. If the police uses firearms against demonstrators. …. Answer categories “yes” or “no” Opp, Norms and Institutions

49. THE FOLLOWING IS FROM: Opp, K.-D., K. Burow-Auffarth, P. Hartmann, Th. von Witzleben, V. Pöhls, and Th. Spitzley. 1984. Soziale Probleme und Protestverhalten. Eine empirische Konfrontierung des Modells rationalen Verhaltens mit soziologischen Hypothesen am Beispiel von Atomkraftgegnern. Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag (124-127): If I wouldn’t do anything against nuclear power plants I would have a bad conscience. If I do something against the construction of nuclear power plants I sometimes feel that I do something that I actually should not do. Five answer categories: fully agree, agree, indifferent, disagree, fully disagree. Opp, Norms and Institutions

50. Opp, Norms and Institutions