Four th Generations of Modern Warfare (4GW)

1. Centre of Excellence - Defence Against Terrorism Fourth Generations of Modern Warfare (4GW) • COL Engr. JÁNOS TOMOLYA Ph.D. • HUN Army • Chief of Capabilities UNCLASSIFIED

2. Subject : 4th GW Time : 20 minutes Classify : Unclassified Agenda : • Introduction; • Different classification of war (epochs, waves, forms); • Asymmetric Warfare; • Military cultures; • Fourth Generation of modern warfare; UNCLASSIFIED

3. How can we avoid being like the French knights at the Battle ofAgincourt? The Next War?

4. Future Warfare

5. Or this one?

6. UNCLASSIFIED

7. Number of terrorist attacks2003-2011

8. Military Expenditure SIPRI: 1531 billions USD in 2009 UNCLASSIFIED

10. 1. Different classification of war: Epochs • Dr T. Lindsay Moore and Robert J. Bunker : • 4 epochs, based on energy sources • human energy • animal-based energy • mechanical energy • post-mechanical energy: Advanced technology warfare Non-Western warfare UNCLASSIFIED

11. Waves Alvin and Heidi Toffler developed a theory of warfare based on the economic andsocietal changes of civilization. • Agricultural war • Industrial-based war (late of 17th century) • Knowledge-based war (from 1980s) UNCLASSIFIED

12. Forms of warfare • Symmetric • Dissymmetric • Asymmetric /Eric Walters/ • After WWII more than 160 armed conflicts; 75% of them were asymmetric UNCLASSIFIED

13. Symmetric In symmetric conflicts, the two opposingadversaries dispose of armed forces that are similar inall aspects such as force structure, doctrine and assets and have comparable tactical, operationaland strategic objectives. UNCLASSIFIED

14. Dissymmetric A conflict is dissymmetric when one of the opposing forces is superiorby means of force structure, doctrine and assets, but both parties are striving for similar politicaland military objectives. UNCLASSIFIED

15. UNCLASSIFIED

16. 2. Asymmetric Warfare (AW) One of the opponents is unable or unwillingto wage the war with comparable force structure, doctrine and assets and has different politicaland military objectives than his adversary.

17. What is it? David and Goliath warfare Unsophisticated vs. the sophisticated (technologically) Poor countries or entities against rich countries or rich entities Threat can be internal or external (i.e. Israel, Vietnam or Afghanistan) Often state sponsored/supported Attacking opponent via indirect means such as Terrorism Critical infrastructures Avoids combat w/ conventional forces Tends to have a purpose that focuses on a force, but not always the case Misc. unconventional means i.e., poisoning water/food supplies, exploitation of media by staging scenes to sway public opinion. Asymmetric Warfare (AW)

18. 3. Military cultures Clausewitz: „War is an act of force, and there is no logical limit to the application of that force.” The way of application of force depends on the military culture. UNCLASSIFIED

19. Kinds of Military Cultures • Material-centric; • Movement-centric; • Guerilla warfare • Forms: terrorism, guerilla warfare, orthodox warfare; • Types: anarchism; equality-based; tradition-based; pluralist; secessionist; divider; reformer; • Used methods: coup d’état; exhausting, focus on military, warfare in build-up areas; • Orthodox warfare UNCLASSIFIED

20. Material-centric • Indirect approach • Strategy of „indirect approach” • Characteristics: • Daggering wars; • Defence; • Strategic objective: exhausting of enemy • Indirect warfare- not only with military means • Main services: air force, navy • Preferred by: maritime powers UNCLASSIFIED

21. Movement-centric • Strategy of „direct approach” • Characteristics: • Blitzkrieg; • Offence; • Strategic objective: destroy the enemy • Direct warfare- decisive maneuvers • Main services: land force, • Preferred by: continental powers UNCLASSIFIED

22. Guerilla warfare • Strategy of „indirect approach in irregular form” • Supported by people • Characteristics: • Hit and run actions; • Offence; • Strategic objective: exhausting of enemy, provoke a collapse internally • Media • Indirect warfare- not only with military means • Main services: land force UNCLASSIFIED

23. 4. Generations of Warfare • COL BOYD • Non-linear warfare • Focuses on moral-mental-physical portions of enemy & as single entity • Focus on the enemy and environment • Knowledge of strategic environment • Interact w/ environment appropriately UNCLASSIFIED

24. New dimensions UNCLASSIFIED

25. Trinity • Clausewitz: „the war is monopoly of the state” government • society army • people UNCLASSIFIED

26. 1GW=Age of Napoleon • Massed manpower UNCLASSIFIED

27. 2 GW= Age of Firepower • Massed firepower... But still in lines UNCLASSIFIED

28. 3 GW= Age of Maneuver UNCLASSIFIED

29. 4 GW= Age of Independent Action Cells Asymmetric warfare in irregular form UNCLASSIFIED

30. 4 GW= Age of Independent Action Cells

31. Role of Technology in 4GW UNCLASSIFIED

32. The “generations of war” model Peace of Westphalia Nuclear Weapons Proliferate Fall of USSR state vs. state Precursor activities – going back to Alexander & Sun Tzu (and before) 2 GW 1GW 3 GW States & non-states wage war New weapons & concepts State-vs-state— only “legal” form of war New commo & transport networks 4 GW Nonstate armed groups: partisans, insurgents, anarchists, criminal organizations, etc. States & non-states wage war 1600 1700 1800 1900 2000 UNCLASSIFIED

33. Definition • 4GW can be defined as a method of warfare that uses the following to achieve a moral victory: • Formless and most deadly kind of war • Undermines enemy strengths (this may seem obvious, but most of modern warfare has involved direct attacks on enemy strengths -- find the enemy army and destroy it). • Exploits enemy weaknesses. • Uses asymmetric operations (weapons and techniques that differ substantially from opponents). UNCLASSIFIED

34. Drivers The rise of 4GW is both a product and a driver of the following: • The loss of the nation-state's monopoly on violence. • The rise of cultural, ethnic, and religious conflict. • Globalization (via technological integration). UNCLASSIFIED

35. Characteristics • Violent non-state actor (VNSA) fighting the state. • lacks hierarchal authority • lack of formal structure • patience and flexibility • ability to keep a low profile when needed • small size • VNSA’s forces are decentralized

36. Tactics • 4GW is fought on the tactical level via: • Rear area operations -- 4GW warriors do not confront a nation-state's military but rather it society.  • Psychological operations -- terror. • Ad-hoc innovation -- use of the enemy's strengths against itself • Human shields

37. Ethnic cleansing Attacking C4I networks Exploitation of rules of engagement (ROEs) and International laws of war (ILOW) Exploitation of humanitarian relief organizations i.e. Red Crescent, CAIR, etc… Shift in focus from enemy’s front to his rear; Use the enemy’s strength against him Tactics of 4GW

38. Differences • Many of the methods used in 4GW aren't new and have robust historical precedent. However, there are important differences in how it is applied today. These include: • Global -- modern technologies and economic integration enable global operations. • Pervasive -- the decline of nation-state warfare has forced all open conflict into the 4GW mold. • Granularity -- extremely small viable groups and variety of reasons for conflict. • Vulerability -- open societies and economies. UNCLASSIFIED

39. Differences II. • Technology -- new technologies have dramatically increased the productivity of small groups of 4GW warriors. • Media -- global media saturation makes possible an incredible level of manipulation. • Networked -- new organizational types made possible by improvements in technology are much better at learning, surviving, and acting. UNCLASSIFIED

40. Formless and most deadly kind of war 4GW ops are intelligence driven. Requires constant preparation and resourcefulness Distinguishing a combatant from a non-combatant (civil) can be extremely difficult Can hit anytime, anywhere, anything and anyone 4th Generation Warfare (4GW)

41. Winning a 4GW conflict • Victory in 4GW warfare is won in the moral sphere. The aim of 4GW is to destroy the moral bonds that allows the organic whole to exist -- cohesion. This is done by reinforcing the following (according to Boyd): • Menace. Attacks that undermine or threaten basic human survival instincts. • Mistrust. Increases divisions between groups (ie. conservatives and liberals in the US). • Uncertainty. Undermine economic activity by decreasing confidence in the future. UNCLASSIFIED

42. Center of Gravity Is The People • Leverage unconventional capabilities againstinsurgents. Become cellular like “them”. Defeat a networked threat with a network. • Develop small independent action forces (SIAF). • Establish disciplined, well trained and highly mobile, counter guerrilla forces. UNCLASSIFIED

43. Power of Perception & Influence As “Ammo” • Money is ammunition • Food is ammunition • Medicine is ammunition • Education is ammunition • Fuel is ammunition • Employment is ammunition • Recognition is ammunition • Respect is ammunition • Information and knowledge is ammunition

44. Summary UNCLASSIFIED

45. Questions? UNCLASSIFIED