Introduction To Asymmetric Warfare (AW), 4 th Generation Warfare (4GW) And Maneuver Warfare (MW)

1. Introduction ToAsymmetric Warfare (AW),4th Generation Warfare (4GW)And Maneuver Warfare (MW)

2. Credits • Be advised- all information contained in this brief are not my original thoughts, with exception of some opinions. The concepts you are being introduced to are derived from years worth of work from myriads of people and organizations. The people whose work you see before you are all noted on slide 43 titled “Sources”. Those not listed on the sources page, but who have helped provide insight via emails or their books, are William Lind, author of the Maneuver Warfare Handbook” and GySgt/LtCol John Poole, USMC, retired author of “One More Bridge to Cross” and “Phantom Soldier” http://members.Aol.Com/posteritypress. Another worthwhile read is Spirit, Blood and Treasure edited by Major Donald Vandergriff, USA. • This brief has been put together without profit or gain, but has been put together to ensure the word of today's threat and concepts of maneuver warfare, to counter today's threats, to get out to all those fighting for our country in any capacity. • Any mistakes or errors in this brief are mine. • Most important is that I want to thank several key individuals who have been mentoring me through the years via website, emails, etc…. They are Colonel G.I. Wilson USMC retired, Mr Chuck Spinney, Major Chris Yunker, USMC, retired, Dr Chet Richards, Col USAFR (ret.). • I also want to thank Major Kristan Wheaton USA, Major Anthony Milavic USMC retired, and Mr. Rich Forno and his assistants of www.Inforwarrior.Org for the g2-fwd list serve which has provided me a wealth of information, assistance in real world operational planning, and learning for the past several years. • Semper fidelis all, Gunnery Sergeant Wiley Bob Howard USMC

3. Objectives • Provide a basic orientation to AW, 4GW and MW. • This orientation is to serve several purposes: • First, identify current & future threats our Marines can expect to engage in combat. • Last, provide the Marine a direction on how to effectively engage these threats by introducing the Marine to maneuver warfare.

4. Asymmetric Warfare (AW) Sources: http://www.picsearch.com http://www.cs.cas.cz/ hakl/ Art_Galery/ Caravaggio_Michelangelo, _1573-1610

5. Asymmetric Warfare (AW) • What is it? • David and Goliath warfare • Unsophisticated vs the sophisticated (technologically) • Poor countries or entities against rich countries or rich entities • Threat can be internal or external (i.e. Israel, Vietnam or Afghanistan) • Often state sponsored/supported • Attacking opponent via indirect means such as • Terrorism • Critical infrastructures • Avoids combat w/ conventional forces • Tends to have a purpose that focuses on a force, but not always the case • Misc. unconventional means i.e., poisoning water/food supplies, exploitation of media by staging scenes to sway public opinion. • Examples? Vietnam, Hannibal, a-bomb, War & Peace tactics (Tolstoy), computer hackers, deception tactics (i.e. Serb/Iraqi decoys against coalition aircraft); use of children to kill soldiers (Sergeant 1st Class Nathan Ross Chapman, 1st SFG(a), assigned to 5th SFG(a)) SFC Chapman was KIA 4 JAN 2002 while on patrol near Khost by a 14-year-old boy; other examples of child soldiers are Colombia & Vietnam.

6. Asymmetric Warfare (AW) • Why so dangerous to our country? • Our over-reliance on technology • Our open society & our belief that the US is impervious to a foreign attack. “Complacency kills” • Can hit anytime, anywhere, anything • Our greed or failing moral character; legal & illegal businesses turning the blind eye to activities that could harm the security of the US i.e., immigrant smuggling, drug dealing, money laundering, illegal selling of technologies and equipment. • Uneducated advisors to senior government officials, or the officials themselves, who deploy forces w/out long-term considerations. Forces deployed for perceived “quick fix” ops forces become isolated from the local populace over a period of time, eventually becoming a soft target because of the force being perceived as an occupation force vice a helping hand. Examples: US forces in Vietnam; Somalia; Soviet forces in Afghanistan (although actually an occupying force, the Soviets are an example of what can happen to a force operating without clear objectives on foreign soil over an extended period of time); potential exists for forces stretched out all over the current Balkans region i.e. Bosnia, Kosovo and Macedonia.

7. 4th Generation Warfare (4GW) Source: http://www.stopislam.com

8. 4th Generation Warfare (4GW) • Formless and most deadly kind of war • 4GW ops are intelligence driven (i.e. WTC attack; China’s hacker attacks on US.) Countering the threat requires an intensive intelligence effort to drive counter-4GW ops. • Requires constant preparation and resourcefulness • Distinguishing a combatant from a combatant can be extremely difficult (i.e. use of mosques or churches to plan terrorist attacks - Levant/Asia; refugees/displaced persons infiltrated w/ agent provocateurs - Balkans; exploitation of fragmented cultures w/in a country for purposes of breaking down a society - al-Qa’ida vs US; exploitation of rules of engagement as in Somalia.)

9. 4th Generation Warfare (4GW) “Fourth generation war will require much more intelligence gathering, analysis, and a greater dissemination capability to serve a highly flexible, interagency command system. At the same time, the fact that fourth generation war will include elements of earlier generations of war means our forces must be prepared to deal with these aspects as well … therefore, it will be essential for leaders to make an accurate analysis of the war they are about to enter. The complex mix of generations of war with their overlapping political, economic, social, military, and mass media arenas makes determining the type of war we are entering more critical than ever”. Col T.X. Hammes, USMC, "The Evolution of War: The Fourth Generation,"http://www.d-n-i.net/fcs/hammes.htm

10. 4th Generation Warfare (4GW) • What is it? • Stateless, or can be state, supported warfare w/ possible interstate spillover • Hides behind religion/ideologies • Examples? WTC, anthrax attack, FRY, US vs. Iraq • Why dangerous? • Current us forces designed to fight against a nation state • Our over-reliance on technology • War and transnational crime intertwined - hard to see enemy (gangs, mercenaries, narco-traffickers, religious extremists, rogue states, and mafias) • Can hit anytime, anywhere, anything and anyone

11. Sources Of AW And 4GW Conflict • Lack of resources • Growing population (4 billion early 70s; now 6 billion) • Lack of water • Lack of arable land • Lack of food • Lack of land • Lack of minerals • Information/technology i.e. China • Examples of all the above Israel, Syria, Jordan, Haiti, Africa and Afghanistan. Haves and have-nots • Especially multi-ethnic areas i.e. Liberia, Rwanda, former Yugoslavia and Somalia. • Nepotism - clans taking care of their own

12. Sources Of AW And 4GW Conflict (Continued) • Major trends • Fragmentation - large nation breaking down into smaller states. • Integration - global networking in terms of international commerce, communications, and production of goods. “Blurred distinction of war and peace” • I.e. WTC, anthrax attack. • “Technology’s role - The technologies which support globalization of commerce are recognized and exploited by 4GW actors. • WWW and global financial networks have established “lines of communication” for export of western culture and free markets. • 4GW actors with a little funding can use these LOCs as avenues of advance/attack.” (By Major C. Yunker USMC) • Exploitation of web sites that contain sensitive unclassified information. Exploitation of web sites that contain classified information, but posted on the Internet because of a strong belief in the freedom of information act (FOIA.) Examples are not cited for security reasons.

13. Sources Of AW And 4GW Conflict (Continued) • Exploitation/distortion of religion to create a united front i.e. al-Qa’ida’s jihad vs. US; Former Yugoslavia.

14. Tactics Of AW / 4GW • Ethnic cleansing • Human shields • Attacking C4I networks • Exploitation of rules of engagement (ROEs)/laws of war (LOW) • Exploitation of US laws/US Constitution and lack of laws to fight the current global war on terrorism (GWOT) i.e. John Walker Lindh & Jose Padilla & the presses abused right to freedom of speech (see notes below). • World trade center • Employment of WMD • Exploitation of humanitarian relief orgs i.e. Red Crescent, CAIR, etc… • Flooding refugees into neighboring countries (regional instability)

15. Objectives Of AW / 4GW • “Objectives of 4GW - varies, but includes: ideological objectives (i.e. Islam, neo-Nazis) destabilize state by force for gain (i.e. drug cartels)” — Major Chris Yunker, USMC • Can be revolutionary (complete overthrow or breakdown of a government) • Can be sub-revolutionary (changing portions of a government to suit the groups objectives) • Political objectives (IRA) • Cultural/ethnic objectives (Kosovo)

16. Maneuver Warfare (MW) The Way To Fight Back

17. Maneuver Warfare (MW) • What is it? • “A warfighting philosophy that seeks to shatter the enemy’s cohesion through a series of rapid, violent and unexpected actions which create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation which he cannot cope.” FMFM1, Warfighting • How can this be dangerous to the enemy? • Emphasis is focused to destroy the enemy morally vice just w/in the physical and mental realm. • “The moral is to the material as three to one” - Napoleon. • Thorough understanding and employment of mw concepts. USMC MW concepts provide all marines a basic foundation to plan and execute MW ops. MW concepts will naturally cause the friendly force to produce a rapid decision cycle, which when employed, will help crush the enemy aggressively, rapidly and with extreme prejudice.

18. Maneuver Warfare (MW) • Key MW concepts in accordance w/ USMC doctrine • Create fog/friction for the enemy • Fluidity/disorder • Fog/friction - rapidly changing environment (confusion/fog) causes friction by making the easy difficult. • Ex. Taking a hill under fire from multiple directions. • In MW, fire supports maneuver • Tempo is a weapon • Surprise, boldness/initiative/violence, speed, stealth & agility • Key to gaining the initiative

19. Maneuver Warfare (MW) • Key MW concepts in accordance w/ USMC doctrine (continued) • Decentralized command & control (C2) • Commander’s intent - commander’s end state as to what he wants done to the enemy. Must be known two levels up. Keeps higher, adjacent and sub elements in sync. Intent can be same as mission for platoon & below • Mission statement - tells you what to do & when, but not how. • Mission tactics - your mission to support commander’s intent. Provides task and purpose to those assigned to prosecute the mission. • Focus of effort - task that is required to ensure the success of the mission. • Main effort - unit assigned to accomplish focus of effort • Surfaces & gaps - • Avoid surfaces - results in slowing momentum or attrition warfare • Exploit gaps by penetrating enemy’s weakness and driving deep to shatter enemy’s ability to fight i.e., destroying C2/C4I nodes, artillery, log nodes etc. • Finding gaps is done by employing recon pull. Whatever recon elements finds the gap, then becomes the focus of effort in ref to support and accomplishing the mission. Recon pull is not mentioned in USMC doctrine, but is noted here since it is believed by the author of this brief as being an important concept needing further observation and employment.

20. So What Now? • Purpose of briefing the MW concepts thus far, is to show how all Marines must synchronize their minds as a unit, vice an individual, in order to accomplish an assigned mission in garrison or the field. • Practicing the mindset in everyday matters will result in a more dynamic “make it happen” type unit, vice a unit always waiting for guidance from higher headquarters. Not taking initiative. • Next to learn is the thought process needed to execute the mission in a manner needed to break the enemy’s will.

21. Time-competitive Decision Making:Where Are We Going From Here? • Fighting back • Is going to introduce the reader to miscellaneous thoughts concerning MW. • Intro to the late Col John Boyd • This will provide the reader a common background not only of the genesis of today’s USMC doctrine, but to also note the character of the man himself. What is most important in MW more than anything else is the value of the individual, and that individual’s responsibility to develop himself, his character, into a deadly weapon to defeat the enemy. Ideas/doctrine will change and fail; weapon systems will be rendered useless or outdated; but it is individual character that causes the Davids to be the Goliaths. • Col Boyd's ideas • The Boyd cycle aka “OODA loop”

22. Fighting Back • Focusing on the basics • Exploit the traditional Marine culture of (intel and warfighting) • HUMINT a significant, underdeveloped need, • Individual competence in warfighting and understanding conflict • Learning Boyd's cycle and MW concepts • Effective I&W - focus on knowing the enemy, his culture and way of conflict, not focused on technical surveillance. • Plan now/rehearse now/fight later • Initiative, initiative, initiative!! - And a Marine culture that allows and takes advantage of initiative. Practice MW concepts in garrison as well as the field. • Sensitizing • Science, tech, weather, crime, sociology, psychology, etc

23. Colonel John Boyd • Rebel enlisted/fighter pilot/man of character, recognized “as smart and competent by marines” • “Hallmark - interested in understanding the truth about conflict, wherever it led him.” Source # 15. • Developed “competitive decision making on the battlefield.” • 40 second Boyd • Boyd cycle (aka OODA loop) • Attacking enemies’ thought process and shattering his morale/decision making process • Priorities (in order) • People • Ideas • Hardware

24. Colonel John Boyd9 Mar 97

25. Colonel John Boyd 11 March 1997  To the Editor:  I was deeply saddened to learn of the passing of Colonel John Boyd, USAF (Ret). How does one begin to pay homage to a warrior like John Boyd? He was a towering intellect who made unsurpassed contributions to the American art of war. Indeed, he was one of the central architects in the reform of military thought which swept the services, and in particular the Marine Corps, in the 1980’s. From John Boyd we learned about competitive decision making on the battlefield—compressing time, using time as an ally. Thousands of officers in all our services knew John Boyd by his work on what was to be known as the Boyd Cycle or OODA Loop. His writings and his lectures had a fundamental impact on the curriculum of virtually every professional military education program in the United States—and on many abroad. In this way, he touched so many lives, many of them destined to ascend to the highest levels of military and civilian leadership.  Those of us who knew John Boyd the man knew him as a man of character and integrity. His life and values were shaped by a selfless dedication to Country and Service, by the crucible of war, and by an unrelenting love of study. He was the quintessential soldier-scholar—a man whose jovial, outgoing exterior belied the vastness of his knowledge and the power of his intellect. I was in awe of him, not just for the potential of his future contributions but for what he stood for as an officer, a citizen, and as a man.  As I write this, my mind wanders back to that morning in February, 1991, when the military might of the United States sliced violently into the Iraqi positions in Kuwait. Bludgeoned from the air nearly round the clock for six weeks, paralyzed by the speed and ferocity of the attack. The Iraqi army collapsed morally and intellectually under the onslaught of American and Coalition forces. John Boyd was an architect of that victory as surely as if he’d commanded a fighter wing or a maneuver division in the desert. His thinking, his theories, his larger than life influence, were there with us in Desert Storm. He must have been proud of what his efforts wrought.  So, how does one pay homage to a man like John Boyd? Perhaps best by remembering that Colonel Boyd never sought the acclaim won him by his thinking. He only wanted to make a difference in the next war … and he did. That ancient book of wisdom—Proverbs—sums up John’s contribution to his nation: " A wise man is strong, and a man of knowledge adds to his strength; for by wise guidance you will wage your war, and there is victory in a multitude of counselors."* I, and his Corps of Marines, will miss our counselor terribly.  Sincerely,  C.C. Krulak General, U. S. Marine Corps Commandant of the Marine CorpsSOURCE: THE ESSENTIAL BOYD BY GRANT T. HAMMOND * Proverbs 24:5-6

26. Boyd’s Ideas • “Consistent with Sun Tzu's writings, - Sun Tzu Updated for 21st Century.” Source #15. • Non-linear warfare • Focuses on moral-mental-physical portions of enemy & as single entity • “Work to defeat enemy plan, rather than his forces (consistent w/ Sun Tzu)” source #15 • Moral values is central. Weak values=weak foe • Focus on the enemy and environment • Knowledge of strategic environment (pri. 1) • Interact w/ environment appropriately (pri. 2) • Combo of rapidity, initiative, harmony & variety • Time is also a very important aspect. • Constant situational awareness (aka. SA) remembering the real target is your enemy’s perception. • You want an “organization(s) and organisms” that are able to adapt in a rapidly changing environment.

27. SOURCE: http://www.belisarius.com/modern_business_strategy/spinney/ev_epis/ooda_loop_sketch_13b.htm

28. Aids To Executing The Boyd CycleIn A Rapidly Changing Environment • Keep things simple and flexible • Well rehearsed SOPs/templates • Decision making games • Think out of the box (be unorthodox in your thinking) • People not afraid to be themselves & make mistakes (boldness/initiative/judgment) • Strong character • Leadership traits & principles • Faith/religious beliefs • Develop good instincts • Develop an internal flow state based on constant rehearsal and strong character

29. Aids To Executing The Boyd Cycle In A Rapidly Changing Environment • Training like you are going to fight • Individual training • Initiative driven, done on own time if needed. • Training & rehearsals should become part of your instincts. • React drills • Unit training • Same as above • Assigning people w/ certain abilities to the right jobs, cross train later in order to create depth w/in your section. • Professional military education • Builds your awareness to support your orientation and observation phases of the Boyd cycle. The more ideas the better as long as you can think, adapt, and manipulate data for your needs.

30. Aids To Executing The Boyd Cycle In A Rapidly Changing Environment • Liberal education • Aids the individual decision making process as noted above. • Education must be a daily activity; the mind must not be still. • Nature/history walks/exercises/rehearsals • Mental scenarios • Provides full perspective of man and activity interacting in a natural environment • I.e., weather impacts on operations and equipment • Assess the performance levels of your personnel in a dynamic environment

31. A Simplistic Orientation To Ooda Loop Using Mw Concepts

33. OODA Loop:Observation • What’s happening? • Where’s the enemy? • What are his surfaces & gaps - • Where are his critical vulnerabilities, and how can I neutralize him? • What opportunities is the enemy presenting to me that I can exploit? • What strengths do I need to avoid?

35. OODA Loop:Orientation • Assessing your current situation • Shaped by your alertness, desire, education, culture and accumulated experiences. • How to I carry out my commander’s intent and mission based upon this current observation? • What choices can I/he make? • What are his/my limitations? • What are his/my surfaces & gaps? How can I/he exploit them? • What are my/his surfaces & gaps? How can I/he exploit them? • How can I put the enemy in a dilemma? How can he put me in a dilemma?

36. OODA Loop:Orientation • What choices can I/he make? (Continued) • Third platoon (conducting recon pull) at the north detected a gap in the enemy defense revealing an artillery battery. Third platoon is now my focus of effort since they are now best able to accomplish my mission of neutralizing the enemy’s ability to control LOC chokepoints by fire.

38. OODA Loop:Decision • Third platoon is now my point of main effort (focus of effort) • I now direct the majority of my fire support assets to third platoon’s mission. • My remaining forces will create a diversion to draw the enemy’s attention away from the gap by third platoon.

40. OODA Loop:Action • Third platoon has just called for fire deep in the enemy’s rear and destroyed all artillery pieces. They are about to attack the C3 node. • Second platoon will go and reinforce third platoon. First platoon will attack enemy forces from the south east as a diversion. Sniper observer teams w/ division recon will seize key terrain and call for fire on time critical targets threatening our current position. • Enemy forces have just surrendered. • Now the decision cycle begins again during this evolution for this company commander. But, while all of these independent decisions and activities are taking place, other small unit leaders are conducting their own OODA loops in order achieve the commander’s intent and mission.

41. Last Note On TheBoyd Cycle • You were just presented a very simplistic mini scenario on how the Boyd cycle essentially works in conjunction with other maneuver warfare concepts. There are no right or wrong answers since everyone’s cycle is different although the OODA loop process may remain the same. Different experiences, different observations may very well result in different actions and decisions. But, the important point to note, is whether or not the commander’s intent and mission were accomplished. That is the bottom line.

42. Conclusion • This concludes the basic orientation to AW, 4GW and MW. Competitive decision making is an art and skill that must be developed day in and day out as a way of life so decisions can become more second nature, more instinctive in that your mind can process information way faster subconsciously than consciously. • The next page includes sources for further research, study, practice and teaching. Semper fidelis…

43. Sources • “Terrorism Today And Tomorrow” article by Col Gi Wilson, USMCR, Sgt J.P. Sullivan, LACSD, And LtCol Hal Kempfer, USMCR • “ Fourth Generation Warfare Is Here” by Harold A. Gould And Franklin C. Spinney • “OSS Statement On National Strategy For Terrorism And Other Threats” Press Release Source: OSS Inc. • “Anticipating The Nature Of The Next Conflict,” by GI Wilson, F Bunkers And JP Sullivan • “Terrorism: How Vulnerable Is The United States?” by Stephen Sloan From Terrorism: National Security Policy And The Home Front, Edited By Stephen Pelletiere, published by The Strategic Studies Institute Of The U.S. Army War College, May 1995. • “Will 2GW Thinking Creep Into A 4GW Operation???” article By AFP; Comment By F.C. Spinney. • MCDP 3 Expeditionary Operations by USMC, Chapters 1& 2. • The Essential Boyd, by Grant T. Hammond (can be found on www.belisarius.com This site Is run by Dr Chet Richards). • “The OODA Loop Sketch” found on www.belisarius.com • “MCI 7401- Warfighting” USMC • Art Of War, by Sun Tzu (many translations) or go to www.sonshi.com • On War, by Carl Von Clausewitz (several translations) or go to www.clausewitz.com • Warfighting FMFM-1 USMC • Defense and the National Interest at http://www.d-n-i.net is a storehouse of info like Belisarius.com pertaining to AW, 4GW, and MW by Mr. Chuck Spinney. • Edited w/ comments by Chris Yunker, Major, USMC • Related links can be found via http://www.angelfire.com/journal2/howie137/howie137.htm