Postulated Russian Strategic Nuclear Force Production and Deployment: 2024

1. Postulated Russian Strategic Nuclear Force Production and Deployment: 2024 James R. Howe VP, Threats, Technology and Future Requirements Vision Centric, Inc. Presented to SMDWG 25 Jan 2018 256-489-0869 James.r.howe@visioncentricinc.com 100 MT WH PAK-DA? UNCLASSIFIED

2. Study Objective Objective– Using open sources estimate Russian 2024 Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF) force structure based on: 1) Existing deployed force levels (including modernized/life extension systems) and planned retirements 2) Planned IOC’s for RS-26, RS-28, RS-X-29, Tu-160M3, PAK-DA and Borei SSBN build rates 3) Planned production: Pres Putin 2012—”Russia will build 400 new ICBM’s by 2022” NOTE- The public decision on producing RS-28 & RS-29’s was made ~ 1 year later, so not included in the 400. Also 400 IC/SLBM’s is within Votinsk’s production capability. 4) Demonstrated missile production capabilities – Russia could have three missile production plants: -- Votinsk built 38 IC/SLBM’s in 2014, 50 in 2015, >40 in 2016 – can produce 400+ by 2022 -- Krasnoyarsk built >4,000 liquid SLBM’s and is building RS-28 Sarmat – could build 10-30/yr -- Khrunichev built ~400 liquid fueled ICBM’s (SS-19), and currently is producing the Proton and Angara SLV’s, and may build the RS-X-29. Could build 10-30/yr 5) Given the planned SNF force levels and capabilities of conventional missiles w/advanced technology WH, it is believed a significant portion of the force will have a conventional mission. Given the number of variables that exist, the baseline estimates used are what is believed to be a conservative estimate of what Russia could deploy by 2024 (baseline study) While both Krasnoyarsk (RS-28) and Khrunichev (RS-X-29) could produce 10-30+ missiles/year, the rate of 10 missiles/year for each was used. --- During the Cold War, USSR built over 200 IC/SLBM’s/year UNCLASSIFIED

3. Russian Integrated Strategic Offense/Defense System – Will be completely Modernized by 2022—Why the URGENCY? Focus of this brief is on Russian Strategic Offense (Nuclear and Non-nuclear), -- Relationship w/Aerospace Defense Forces -- Space, cyber warfare and strategic indirect warfare issues will also have to be addressed. -- President Putin 22 Dec 2016—Strategic non-nuclear forces are a high force development priority; 2nd priority in 2018-2027 State Armament Program • Aerospace Defense Forces (VKO) (2015) • Space Command • Air & Space Defense Command (PRO/PKO) • -- Moscow ABM • -- S-400/500 units • -- Civil/passive Defense • Russian Air Force • Counter force operations? • Strategic Offense • Nuclear • -- ICBM • -- SLBM • -- Bomber • -- SSN/SSGN LACM? • Non-Nuclear • -- Kinetic • -- Cyber The combination of a declining state creating need -- strategic/theater nuclear superiority providing means , -- together with effective air/missile defenses and extensive civil defenses reducing vulnerabilities -- means Russia will be willing to accept far more risk --US/NATO risk adverse BM/C4ISR Integrated Cyber-Radio Electronic Combat UNCLASSIFIED

4. Nuclear Weapons and Warfare are not Immune to the March of Technology • V. Mikhaylov, Minister of Atomic Energy, and First Deputy Minister, proposed creating a force of 10,000, Low yield, “clean”, highly accurate nuclear weapons – confirmed by CIA 22 June 2000 (1) Yeltsin reportedly signed presidential decree authorizing development 29 Apr 99 • Goal is to “…make the threat realistic”…“make nuclear weapons an instrument of policy” …” provide usable military force” • “Evidence of Russian operational testing of new sub-kiloton nuclear warheads”– CIA 30 Aug 2000 (1) -- Large number of low-yield nuclear tests against equipment and biological targets • Russia reportedly has deployed precision nuclear WH w/50-200 ton yields on SLBM’s. • Col-Gen Muravyev, Dep CINC of the RVSN -- [Strategic missile systems should be capable of conducting ‘surgical’ strikes… using both highly accurate, super-low yield nuclear weapons, as well as conventional ones…” “…groupings of non-nuclear MBR (ICBM’s) and BRPL (SLBM’s) may appear…” ] Moscow Armeyskiy Sbornik, 1 Dec 1999. • President Putin –”Russia is creating a new generation nuclear weapons …these will be things which do not exist and are unlikely to exist in other nuclear powers.” -- e.g. Drone torpedo w/100 MT WH; Sea bottom based SLBM’s; Precision, low-yield, “clean” nuclear weapons? “discrete” EMP weapons? Neutron? Other tailored nuclear weapon effects? – Russia is developing a spectrum of nuclear weapons which can maintain escalation dominance all along the conflict spectrum – from “de-escalate” conflicts to conducting major nuclear warfare. 1) Declassified CIA documents • Russia Has a Very Different View of Nuclear War Than The US and is developing the policy/doctrine/forces to implement • The most cost-effective way to deter the US is with nuclear weapons UNCLASSIFIED

5. What Are Russia’s SNF Implementing Activities? • Putin – 2012 “ Russia will build 400 new ICBM’s by 2022”—(Note: all w/4-10+ WH capability) -- A simple calculation illustrates how many IC/SLBM nuclear warheads Russia could have deployed by 2022 due to SNF modernization, new production and MIRVing: 400 IC/SL X 4 RV’s = 1600 WH 400 IC/SL X 7RV’s = 2800 WH 400 IC/SL X 10 RV’s = 4000 WH Plus ~ 50 SS-18/Sarmat X 10/15 = 500/750 WH Plus refurbished Delta IV’s = 384-960 WH Plus 30 “like new” SS-19 = 180 WH Plus 78 SS-27 Mod 1 MIRV = 312-780 Plus RS-X-29 new liquid (6-12 RV’s?) = TBD • Life extension and MIRV’ing could allow a much slower rate of new SNF production—but it isn’t • By 2024 Russia’s Votinsk could produce an additional 100-200 IC/SLBM’s: Krasnoyarsk 20 more RS-28’s @ 10/yr. and Khrunichev an additional 20-40 RS-X-29’s @ 10 or 20/yr. Potentially 2976-6670 IC/SL WH ( Plus > 800 bomber WH) Great Uncertainty -- Numbers -- Types -- WH loadings -- Missions Consequently, life extension & MIRV’ing to maximize near-term firepower and new production missile WH numbers/throw-weight will far exceed New START limits and raises questions about Russian intentions UNCLASSIFIED