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STRATEGIC FORCE ATROPHY. Weaknesses highlighted in numerous reports. Erosion of: Senior leadership interest People and expertise Research and development Technology Infrastructure Congressional support
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STRATEGIC FORCE ATROPHY Weaknesses highlighted in numerous reports. Erosion of: • Senior leadership interest • People and expertise • Research and development • Technology • Infrastructure • Congressional support “Our lack of nuclear weapons production capability – and our stricture against not only development but design – holds our future hostage.” Defense Science Board 2007 Summer Study
THE APPROACHING DELIVERY PLATFORM CLIFFS ALCM/ACM BOMBER MINUTEMAN III TRIDENT D-5 SSBN/SSGN
STRATEGIC COSTS(1990 - 2008) DOD TOA (CY$B) STRATEGIC FORCES (CY$B) 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 INCREASE=34% 6.5% of FY90 DOD TOA C O S T DECREASE=55% NON-STRATEGIC FORCES 2.1% of FY08 DOD TOA STRATEGIC FORCES 1990 2008 1990 2008 FISCAL YEARS CY$: FY07
Strategic Warheads Tactical Warheads Production Capacity Strategic Warhead Uncertainty Tactical Warhead Uncertainty US / RUSSIAN STOCKPILE COMPARISON RUSSIAN STOCKPILE U.S. STOCKPILE + UNCERTAIN CHEMICAL CAPABILITY + UNCERTAIN BIOLOGICAL CAPABILITY 2005 2009 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2000 1995 1990 1985 1980 STOCKPILE ASYMMETRIES MORE PRONOUNCED AT LOWER LEVELS
THE ILLOGIC OF ZERO • Is it feasible? • Is it verifiable and enforceable? • Is it inherently stabilizing and hence sustainable? • Is it desirable? “The means for creating a world without actual nuclear weapons would have to be of a basic political kind, not a matter of technical arms control. Secure nuclear abolition would be consequence, not cause; and in the journey it has to be cart, not horse.” Sir Michael Quinlan
2 1.5 Wartime Fatalities (% of world population) WW I 1 .5 0 1800 1600 1700 1900 STRATEGIC DETERRENCE A PARADIGMCHANGE IN WARFARE 2.5 WW II 2000 “Better a world with nuclear weapons but no major war than one with major war but no nuclear weapons.” Sir Michael Quinlan