SS474: TERRORISM & COUNTERTERRORISM Lesson 3: Understanding Contemporary Terrorism

1. SS474: TERRORISM & COUNTERTERRORISMLesson 3: Understanding Contemporary Terrorism • Admin: • 1) Assignment #1 due 8 Sept (next week) • 2) Wednesday, 30 August: Guest Lecture –BG(r) Russell Howard (E hour, Thayer 348)

2. History Review • What patterns and trends of historical terrorism inform our understanding of future threats? • C2 • Strategic goals, objectives • Weapons, tactics • Targeting • Fundraising/Friendraising • Similar outcomes re: group existence, changes in political environment • What else? • Future projections? • Who will likely turn to terrorism, and why?

3. History Review • Why do people resort to violence in pursuit of political or ideological ends? • Political contexts • Social contexts • Other options to achieve goals? • Implications for government policy?

4. History Review • What motivates terrorists? • Vision - “shape the future” • Power to achieve vision • Belief in higher cause • What else? • What role do economics, psychology, sociology or other grievances play in motivating terrorist groups?

5. History Review • What can we learn from historical examples of state response to terrorist organizations? • What works? • What doesn’t? • Why?

6. Discussion Questions • What is your understanding of the new model of terrorism? • Compare and contrast the old and new terrorism for indicators relating to capabilities and future trends. Why did this shift occur? • What are the implications of the shift from old to new models of terrorism? • What is Al Qaeda? How and why did Al Qaeda evolve as it did? • How did Al Qaeda ascend to power? What are Al Qaeda's significant achievements? • How should we think of Al Qaeda today? • How do transnational terrorist organizations develop? • What are the implications of this evolution for counterterrorists? • Terrorist Network Analysis

7. Contemporary Terrorism • Website competitions

8. Elements of the New Terrorism BG Howard’s model (updated) - “8 Ways Terrorism Has Changed” • America is at risk • Terrorists are more violent – different political aims • Terrorists have global reach and are transnational non-state actors – implications for “homeland security” • Terrorists are better financed – zakat, charity orgs., wealthy donors • Terrorists are better trained in tradecraft, AW, IW • Terrorist cells are more difficult to penetrate (esp. AQ) • Terrorists have access to more lethal weapons (Soviets, bio/nukes) • Success and/or failure are difficult to measure – no clear outcome

9. Elements of the New Terrorism • Global in scope and strategic objectives • Generational in scope; epic struggle, David vs. Goliath- Bin Laden as Robin Hood • “The number of the brothers is large . . . I do not know everyone who is with us in this base or this organization.” – Bin Laden as Pied Piper., with a constant call to jihad as the duty of every good Muslim • Educated members as martyrs in AQ; longer planning cycles (9/11 hijackers arriving in U.S. as early as 1994) • Evolution into a political social movement, a global insurgency against Western-oriented globalization • Afghanistan and Iraq offering new locations for Jihad, indoctrination, tactical training, network formation

10. Elements of the New Terrorism • Increasing number and lethality of attacks • Attacks are carried out not by AQ or some other centralized group, but by affiliates and wanna-bes • Use of children and female suicide bombers by terrorist organizations • Info Ops – role of technology • From DVDs and web videos to Al Jazeera • Availability of info on government security, CT efforts • EW – another role of technology • Taking instruments from our daily life—the backpack, the car, the shoe, the cell phone—and turning them into weapons. Goal – damage the trust necessary for a successful open society • Shifting from small groups to motivated and resourceful individuals (Madrid, London)

11. A “Protean Enemy” Al Qaeda is an increasingly decentralized organization, constantly evolving, and employs a "virtual network" concept learned from American right-wing extremists, which makes it harder to detect and destroy. Willingness to adapt its mission enables it to forge broad alliances with other terrorist organizations and attract new recruits (including women). Ability to secure coordination with other like-minded groups (like Hezbollah) and its links with organized crime (a crime boss in India gave $100,000 to Mohammad Atta, the 9/11 hijack leader) underscore the advanced stages of organization (professionals sharing ideas, cross-training, resources, joint planning, etc.) that al Qaeda has achieved. Stern, 2003

12. Netwar: A Modern Form of Asymmetric Warfare • Netwar: Information-related conflict at a grand level between nations or societies. • It means trying to disrupt or damage what a target population knows or thinks it knows about itself and the world around it. • A netwar may focus on public or elite opinion, or both. • It may involve diplomacy, propaganda and psychological campaigns, political and cultural subversion, deception of or interference with local media, infiltration of computer networks and databases, and efforts to promote dissident or opposition movements across computer networks.(John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, 1993; 2001)

13. Networked Terrorism • Social interactions • Affiliation networksTies developed at events or activities, like sporting events, clubs, or religious meetings • Communities of identity • Communities of locality • District or geographic region in which people live, interact, or under which they are governed • Examples: neighborhood, village, city, town or province • Communities of interest • Communities formed around a common interest or shared experience • Examples: prisoners or inmates, members of the military, scientists, sports enthusiasts, and hobbyists comprise communities of interest.

14. Networked Terrorism Three important concepts in social network analysis (SNA): diversity, redundancy, and adaptability • Diversity of identity = individuals often have multiple identities: a familial identity, an employment identity, a religious identity, an academic identity, etc. • Redundancy = individuals sharing multiple identities across networks (e.g., two individuals attending the same church, graduating from the same university, and working in the same office building). • Multiple shared identities (location, religion, education, and employment) means that some links between sets of individuals may be disproportionately strong. • Adaptability = relationships change over time - a social network may evolve as a person’s interests change, he moves to another community, or his position within that community shifts.

15. Terrorist Network Structures Source: Networks and Netwars: The Future of Terror, Crime, and Militancy, John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt (eds.), November 2001

16. Terrorist Network Structures Source: On Distributed Communications: Introduction to Distributed Communications Networks, Paul Baran, August 1964 UNCLASSIFIED

17. Global Terrorism Networks Interconnected terrorist groups, criminal organizations, individuals, etc. around the world.

18. Global Terrorism Networks Interconnected terrorist groups, criminal organizations, individuals, etc. around the world. Shared strategies Sharing tactics, training Cross-fertilization, inter-organizational learning Shared profits from trafficking in drugs, arms, other contraband Increasingly connected via technologies/Internet

19. Strategy and Training • Establish training camps – developing the will to kill and the skill to kill • Operational space: Geographic isolation • Teachers: Experts in relevant knowledge, e.g., military combat experience • Committed learners • Time, money, and basic necessities • Afghanistan • Algeria • Bosnia • Chechnya • Colombia • Egypt • Indonesia • Japan • Kashmir • Lebanon • Libya • Northern Ireland • Peru • The Philippines • Somalia • Spain • Sri Lanka • Sudan • Syria • Turkey • United States • Uzbekistan Think back to your basic training or basic officer courses...

20. Global Salafi Network Interconnected by common ideology (Militant Islam revivalist movement), with strong bonds formed through fighting together, family, etc.

24. Terrorist Networks Even though it’s a decentralized network, there are still critical functions that enable the network to operate • Critical functionary roles – can become a hub of multiple networks • weapons procurement • financier (funder or banker) (particularly in Halawa system) • document forgerer • human traffickers • Support individuals (trusted contacts) can and sometimes do support multiple networks; can provide supplies/facilitate trafficking of weapons & funds to multiple networks • Example: 60% of day spent moving legitimate charity money around; 20% of day on Hamas transactions, other activity on side • Some may get profit for doing these support/function roles

25. Different members of the network play support and action roles

26. Networked Terrorism Implications: • We tend to target operational (attack/combat) cells and overlook support cells that disseminate propaganda, recruit members, procure supplies, maintain transport, forge false and adapted identities, facilitate travel, and organize safe houses. • For example, operating through front, cover, and sympathetic organizations, Al Qaeda and its associate groups established charities, human rights groups, humanitarian organizations, community centers, and religious associations to raise funds and recruit youth. (Gunaratna)

27. Networks to Map Table 3: Networks to Map Krebs, 2002 - http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue7_4/krebs

28. Knowledge Transfer and Terrorist Networks • Learning Organizations = committed to capturing knowledge, analyzing it, forming new doctrine and tactics which are informed by lessons from the past • Learn from each other • Learn from trial and error (IRA example) • Media showcasing ‘best practices’ to others • Managing public image (PR) (becoming more sophisticated) • Emerging professional networks in the terrorist world

29. Knowledge Transfer and Terrorist Networks The network challenge • “As far back as 1968 the PLO . . . had welcomed terrorists from around the world to their guerilla camps in Jordan for training, indoctrination, and the general building of transnational revolutionary bridges. In this respect, the Palestinians pioneered the ‘networking’ dimension of international terrorism still in evidence among many groups today.” Bruce Hoffman, 1997, p. 82

30. Knowledge Transfer and Terrorist Networks The network challenge • “Strategic partnerships” between Al Qaeda and groups like Hezbollah, Jemaah Islamiya, HT, IMU, and MILF, as well as drug cartels in Latin America and other criminal organizations • For example, “Hezbollah . . . trained Al Qaeda fighters in Sudan, Lebanon, Iran . . .” (Gunaratna, 2002, p. 196)(why would Shiite Muslims work so closely with Sunni Muslims?)

31. Challenges of Terror Networks • Overall CT challenge: How to fight a network of networks • Specific challenges include: • Identifying network members, especially when membership is hidden until demonstrated by overt behavior • Determining network structure, leadership/decision-making cells • Intelligence gathering/Infiltrating the network • Defending against an attack from unknown network members

33. 1. Joining the Jihad • 1.1 Decide on Jihad • 1.2 Joining the Jihad in Spirit • 1.3 Praying Honestly for Martyrdom

34. 2. Financially Aiding the Jihad • 2.1 Jihad Through Money • 2.2 Tending to the Fighter’s Family • 2.3 Tending to Families of Martyrs • 2.4 Supporting the Families of Wounded and Imprisoned Fighters • 2.5 Collecting Donations • 2.6 Paying the Alms Tax for the Mujahidin

35. 3. Other Support for Jihad • 3.1 Outfitting a Fighter • 3.2 Healing the Wounded • 3.3 Sheltering the Mujhadin and Providing them with Hospitality • 3.4 Freeing and/or Ransoming Prisoners

36. 4. Public Education • 4.1 Praising the Mujahidin and Commemorating their Exploits • 4.2 Defending the Mujahidin • 4.3 Exposing the Hypocrites and Defeatists • 4.4 Urging People Toward Jihad • 4.5 Distributing books and Brochures • 4.6 Advising Muslims and the Mujahidin • 4.7 Distributing News of the Jihad • 4.8 Keeping Scholars Informed • 4.9 Spreading News of Prisoners

37. 5. Aiding the Mujahideen Directly • 5.1 Encouraging the Mujahidin • 5.2 Guiding the Mujahidin • 5.3 Concealing the Mujahidin’s Secrets

38. 6. Jihad Through Prayer • 6.1 Praying for the Mujahidin • 6.2 Qunut: Prayers in time of calamity

39. 7. Preparing for Active Jihad • 7.1 Physical Training • 7.2 Weapons Training and Marksmanship • 7.3 Swimming and Horsemanship • 7.4 First Aid

40. 8. Intellectual Preparation • 8.1 Learning the Jurisprudence of Jihad • 8.2 Hostility and Hatred of the Infidels • 8.3 Electronic Jihad

41. 9. Living as a “Good Muslim” • 9.1 Discouraging Friendship w/ Polytheists • 9.2 Abandoning Luxury • 9.3 Boycotting Goods • 9.4 Avoid Employing Hostile Labor • 9.5 Raising Children to Love Jihad

42. Questions?