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INTERNAL EMERGENCY PLAN CASE 1 Example Slovenia Ike van der Putte

This project is funded by the European Union Projekat finansira Evropska Unija . INTERNAL EMERGENCY PLAN CASE 1 Example Slovenia Ike van der Putte. Internal Emergency Response Plan for Butan Plin See session 22 for Guideline and Contents IERP.

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INTERNAL EMERGENCY PLAN CASE 1 Example Slovenia Ike van der Putte

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  1. This project is funded by the European Union Projekat finansira Evropska Unija INTERNAL EMERGENCY PLAN CASE 1Example SloveniaIke van der Putte

  2. Internal Emergency Response Plan for ButanPlin See session 22 for Guideline and Contents IERP

  3. The establishment ButanPlind.d. is situated in the industrial zone Šiška in northern part of Ljubljana Vertical LPG Storage Vessels (250m3) Railway Car unloading Station Cylinder Filling Station View of Site from Top of Vertical Storage Vessels

  4. 1. Scope of the Plan (1) • This plan provides details of the emergency response measures for a release of LPG in ButanPlind.d. which may give rise to: • Jet fire at ruptured hose during loading/unloading activities; • Pool fire after spill during loading/unloading activities; • Explosion of the vapour cloud (UVCE). • The maximum quantity of released LPG is either: • 50 or 90 m3, depending on the size of the railway car (full railway car release scenario) • 6 m3 (one minute release scenario).

  5. 1. Scope of the Plan (2) • Potential knock-on effects of a vapour cloud explosion and a pool fire are also considered. • A vapour cloud of LPG formed in a major-accident scenario could explode either inside or outside the ButanPlin site. This may cause injuries to personnel, damage to buildings and infrastructure and additional fires in ButanPlin and/or surroundings. • In the case of a pool fire, the first knock-on effect is a BLEVE (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion) of the neighbouring railway car, which may then cause further events as follows: • A pool fire engulfs an adjacent railway car leading to a BLEVE. A missile or the thermal radiation generated by the BLEVE damages another LPG storage vessel. • The resultant damage is such that a further release of LPG occurs and a vapour cloud is formed. This vapour cloud would give rise to similar effects as that formed in the case of the full railway car release.

  6. 2. Extent of Planning • The extent of on-site emergency planning is defined by an LPG release scenario which leads to a: • Jet fire • Pool fire • BLEVE • UVCE. • Geographically, the extent of this plan is defined as the site boundary of ButanPlin. • The extent of off-site emergency planning (municipal planning) is defined by an LPG release scenario which leads to a: • BLEVE • UVCE. • Geographically, the extent of municipal planning is defined by the maximum radius of effect, i.e. 700m, see next slide

  7. Summary of the worst case results of the modelling exercise (1) Summary of Results for 90 m3 Car Release

  8. Overpressure damage effects • The overpressures required to directly injure humans are significantly higher • than those required to damage buildings. Injuries resulting from secondary • impacts, such as building damage/collapse or flying debris, are more likely to • occur and therefore the distances to the following overpressures are usually • determined for each scenario modelled: • 0.207 bar Steel frame building distorted and pulled away from • foundations; Rupture of storage tanks. Serious damage to • buildings and equipment. • 0.138 bar Partial collapse of walls and roofs of houses. • 0.021 bar “Safe distance” – 95% probability of no serious damage • beyond this point; 10% of glass windows broken.

  9. Heat Radiation Effects • 37.5 kW/m2 Sufficient to cause damage to process equipment • 12.5 kW/m2Minimum energy required for piloted ignition of wood, • melting plastic tubing, etc • 4.5 kW/m2Sufficient to cause pain to personnel if unable to reach • cover within 20 seconds, however, blistering of skin • (first degree burns) is unlikely

  10. Summary of the worst case results of the modelling exercise (2) Results for 6m3 1 minute release scenario

  11. The estimated duration of the full railway car release scenario is around 20-30 minutes. After the railway car has emptied, the explosion hazard will be significantly reduced. It is difficult to predict the length of time required to evaporate the spilled liquid. However, it may take an additional 30 minutes for the remaining pool to evaporate after the tanker has emptied. Therefore, it is estimated that the explosion hazard is unlikely to persist for longer than 60 minutes following commencement of the release. Based on this estimation, it is considered that in the case of vapour cloud formation, a period 15 to 30 minutes, after an alert is raised, should be an appropriate response time for the implementation of protective measures at the municipality level In the case of the 6m3 (one minute release) scenario, the explosion hazard is likely to persist for less than 5 minutes. After this time, the liquid remaining on the ground may pose a risk though not significant.

  12. Co-ordination • Close co-ordination of internal (ButanPlin) and external (municipal – MOL) • planning is particularly important for the cases which lead to an UVCE. • Monitoring of the situation, • measurement of explosive concentrations and • the movement of the cloud, • prompt evaluation of possible developments and • avoidance of ignition sources in the cloud's path • will be the focus of the activities at this stage. • Based on these, recommendations and decisions about • implementation of protective measures will be given

  13. Geographic Extent of Municipal Protection and Rescue Plan

  14. Basis for classification of an incident • If re-activation of the excess flow valve on the railway car is not successful, • the expected consequence is the full car release scenario. • The maximum released quantity is 90 m3 of LPG. • This is MAJOR ACCIDENT potential. • If re-activation of the excess flow valve on the railway car succeeds, it is the • released quantity which determines major accident potential and further • emergency actions. The quantity of released gas is evaluated based on • duration of release and visual control of the cloud (white fog, heavier than air, • is formed). Based on the following figures an incident should be classified: • less than 30 seconds release duration – NOT MAJOR INCIDENT • more than 30 seconds release duration – MAJOR INCIDENT

  15. Timeframes for implementing tasks in the case of emergency

  16. 3. Implementation and Use of the Plan (1) • . ECC=Emergency Control Centre MCT=Main Control Team FCT= Forward Control Team Investigate and report Remediate End

  17. 3. Implementation and Use of the Plan (2) • The implementation of the plan is dependent on the evaluation of whether the • Operators/Forward Control Team (FCT) are capable of: • Stopping the release of LPG in less than 30 seconds, or • Control the fire before it eventually causes a BLEVE of an adjacent railway car. • If so, it means that the incident is brought under control by the FCT and that its • development into an off-site major-accident is prevented. • If the FCT response is not successful and the situation indicates that there is a • potential for a vapour cloud to cross the site boundary or that a BLEVE could occur, • the alarm is raised and the Notification Centre (Regional Centre for Communication, • Ljubljana) is alerted. The person responsible for implementing the • MPRP at MOL is notified by the Notification Centre and implementation of the • MPRP is requested/ recommended. • The Notification Centre alerts the necessary external emergency services.

  18. Specification of actions and tasks when implementing PRP

  19. Site incident Controller Concept of Communication in case of Emergency

  20. 4. Resources • The following resources are available at the site: • Six professional and nine voluntary firemen • Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) • - Breathing Apparatus – 2 pieces • - Fireproof trousers and jackets – 7 sets • - Helmets - 9 • - Firemen belts - 9 • Hoses • - Type B, 200 m • - Type C, 375 m • Fire extinguishers • - S9, 90 pieces • - S100, 6 pieces • - S50, 3 pieces • Rescue ropes • These resources enable effective implementation of the PRP.

  21. 5. Monitoring, Notification and Warning (1) Monitoring, notification and warning of the on-site personnel, off-site personnel, neighbouring industry and the public is split between ButanPlin, the Notification Centre and the MOL. ButanPlin is responsible for on-site monitoring, notification and warning, as well as first notification, i.e. raising alarm in the case of major incident. In the event that the incident is classified as major, the first external call is to the Notification Centre. The responsible person at MOL is also alerted. After activation of the on-site ECC, the Main Control Team acts according to Figure given in terms of communication.

  22. 5. Monitoring, Notification and Warning (2) General monitoring of the facility, and particularly the LPG storage vessels, during an incident is performed by the Communicator between FCT and MCT and/or voluntary firemen who are at stand-by alert and are back-up for the professional firemen who carry out the fire-fighting. In the case of vapour cloud formation, four voluntary firemen take positions approximately 20m inside the site from the boundary/fence, on the north, south, east and west side. They measure the concentration of gas in the air with handheld devices (explosion meters) and notify the Communicator between FCT and MCT and the Site Incident Controller about movement of the cloud inside ButanPlin. The communication is performed by Ex rated radios. On the side(s) where the vapour cloud crosses the ButanPlin boundary members of the EES firefighting unit take over further measurements and notification about movement of the cloud. Off-site notification and warning to adjacent establishments is the responsibility of ButanPlin. Off-site notification and warning to the public is the responsibility of the Notification Centre and MOL. This is specified in the MPRP

  23. 6. Mobilisation of Resources First Level Operators and members of the FCT/Site Personnel 1 do not need any mobilisation approval but react immediately after an incident occurs • Second Level • The Site Incident Controller and Communicator between FCT and MCT • classify the incident and assess the situation in terms of potential • major-accident development. • They also assess the capability of the FCT to control the event and prevent • escalation. If the incident is classified as a Major Incident, the Site Incident • Controller of ButanPlin notifies the Notification Centre and the responsible • person/authority at MOL for approving implementation of the MPRP • Third Level • The third level covers mobilisation of resources according to the MPRP. • The responsible person for approval is specified by the MPRP.

  24. 7. Management and Administration • The on-site Emergency Response Team (ERT), i.e. team of respondents to • emergency situation, is made up of two basic groups: • Main Control Team - in the event of an emergency, the Main Control Team (MCT) • manages the overall emergency. It ensures that a proper evacuation is taking place, • that emergency services have been called and that other essential tasks, including • traffic control and site access control, are carried out. MCT informs SHV • representative about the incident. • Forward Control Team - the Forward Control Team (FCT) responds to the location of • the incident, in fire gear or other protective clothing as appropriate, with the objective • of achieving control of the source of the emergency in a safe manner.

  25. 8. Protection, Rescue and Relief • According to the Act on protection against natural and other hazards, the • following protection measures are envisaged: • evacuation • partial sheltering • technical. • Partial sheltering and technical measures apply for the whole endangered area, • while within this plan, evacuation is planned for ButanPlin facilities only. • The protective measures depend on the incident • Due to physical properties of LPG (heavier than air, an aphyxiant) immersion • in vapour cloud should be avoided. Besides fire/explosion, lack of oxygen is • the main hazard associated with immersion in vapour cloud. • In general, the site Main Incident Controller will take responsibility for protection • measures For Evacuation paths from buildings and assembly point see nest slide

  26. Evacuation Paths

  27. Protection Measures • Protection measures depend on the incident. There are two main incidents • which require implementation of protection measures: • BLEVE • UVCE • In the case of a BLEVE protection measures apply particularly for those directly • responding to the incident, residents and others within a radius of 400m of • the site. • In the case of UVCE protection measures apply to the area with a radius • of 700m of the site.

  28. In the event of BLEVE • Evacuation of Butan Plin industrial facilities. This applies for non-members • of the FCT. Evacuation paths are depicted (see slide). • Open the windows to prevent glass break due to explosion • Partial sheltering which is aimed at avoiding exposure to overpresuure and • thermal radiation. Recommendations are: • take position in the upper floors of buildings; • find shelter behind solid wall; • avoid buildings of light constructions and windows; • cover skin; • use helmet if available.

  29. In the event of UVCE • DO NOT USE OPEN FIRE! DO NOT START ENGINES/CARS! DO NOT USE ANY • DEVICE WHICH MAY CAUSE EXPLOSION! • Evacuation of Butan Plin industrial facilities. This applies for non-members of the • FCT.Evacuation paths are depicted . • Close windows at ground level and on the first floor (preventing gas access into the • building) and open the windows in the upper floors to prevent glass break due to • eventual explosion • Partial sheltering which is aimed at avoiding exposure to overpressure and • thermal radiation. Recommendations are: • leave risk area • do not enter (or re-enter) risk area • avoid immersion in vapour cloud • keep away from sewage coverings • take position in the upper floors of buildings • find shelter behind solid wall • avoid buildings of light constructions and windows • cover skin • use helmet if available.

  30. In the case of release without ignition • Turn off valves in order to prevent leaking • Stop operations in the Filling Plant and workshops • Turn off gas stoves in the offices • Switch the electricity off • Cover all drains in the Filling Plant area in order to prevent gas • flowing through drains. • In the case of jet fire/pool fire • Turn on deluge system • Perform cooling of the surroundings to prevent secondary fires • Remove other railway cars if possible

  31. Training Programme for ButanPlin Personnel

  32. References COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 96/82/EC of 9 December 1996 on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances(OJ L 10, 14.1.1997, p. 13) – consolidated version DIRECTIVE 2012/18/EU OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 4 July 2012 on the control of major-accident hazards involving dangerous substances, amending and subsequently repealing Council Directive 96/82/EC Planning for Emergencies Involving Dangerous Substances for Slovenia. Final Report. Contract no: SL-0081.0011.01. 28 February 2002. I.van der Putte: Regional Environment Accession Project (REAP). Nethconsult/BKH Consulting Engineers/RPS. Subcontractors: AEA Technology, URS/Dames & Moore, EPCE, Project Management Group, REC Hungary

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