Highlights of the Dec. 1, 2004 Meeting on Lasers in Space: Lessons Learned

1. By Michael. J. Kavaya NASA Langley Research Center to Working Group on Space-Based Lidar Winds 28 June – 1 July, 2005 Welches, Oregon Highlights of the Dec. 1, 2004 Meeting on Lasers in Space: Lessons Learned

2. Dec. 1, 2004 Special meeting of the Space Technology Alliance (STA) Laser/Optical Technology Working Group (SLOTWG) Chair: David Tratt Topic: Lasers in Space: Lessons Learned At Missile Defense Agency, Arlington, VA 14 presentations ~ 60 attendees Meeting Facts

3. Pulsed Lidar Space Missions: History • Launch • Apollo 15, 16, 17 1971-2 Ranging, Moon Success • MOLA I 1992 Ranging, MarsS/C Lost (Contamination) • Clementine 1994 Ranging, Moon Success (BDMO/NASA) • LITE 1994 Profiling, Shuttle Success(Energy Decline by 30%) • Balkan 1995 Profiling Success (Russia) • NEAR 1996 Ranging Success • SLA-01 1996 Ranging, Shuttle Success • MOLA II 1996 Ranging Success(Bar dropouts) • SLA-02 1997 Ranging, Shuttle Success • MPL/DS2 1999 Ranging S/C Lost • VCL 2000 Ranging Cancelled • SPARCLE/EO-2 2001 Profiling, Shuttle Cancelled • Icesat/GLAS 2003 Ranging+ProfilingLaser 1, 2, 3 Anomalies • Messenger/MLA 2004 Profiling, MercuryCost/Schedule Slips(Arr 2007) • Calipso 2005 Profiling • ADM 2007 Wind Demo. (ESA) Was 2006 • LOLA/LRO 2008 Altimeter, Moon • Mars Smart Lander 2009 Ranging, Mars * *Since 1990, NASA, launched & no reported problems, free-flyer: 1/7

4. Lidar In-space Technology Experiment (LITE) Mark Storm Cloud-Aerosol LIdar with Orthogonal Polarization (CALIOP) John Stadler Clementine laser altimeter Lyn Pleasance Near Earth Asteroid Rendezvous (NEAR) laser altimeter Cheng SPAce Readiness Coherent Lidar Experiment (SPARCLE) Michael J. Kavaya SPARCLE Gary D. Spiers Tropospheric Emission Spectrometer (TES) and Space Interferometry Mission (SIM) laser metrology systems Asbury LAser MaPper (LAMP) Spiers Aura Microwave Limb Sounder (MLS) laser local oscillator Pickett Geoscience Laser Altimeter System (GLAS) Abshire GLAS telemetric anomaly analysis, Parts 1 & 2 Davis GLAS science perspective Spinhirne Vegetation Canopy Lidar (VCL) Blair MESSENGER Laser Altimeter (MLA) Anne-Marie Novo-Gradac Meeting Agenda

6. 30% Added comments by MJK in red Optics that were exposed to UVchanged in storage over 10 years

15. Not a science mission; not funding limited; 2 people = entire management team; sensor by McD/LLNL; built prototype before mission; used electrolytic capacitors = big no-no! – lucky;

17. SPAce Readiness Coherent Lidar Experiment – SPARCLE Lessons Learned Michael J. Kavaya NASA Langley Research Center Michael.J.Kavaya@nasa.gov Dec. 1, 2004

18. Background Our 1997 sales pitches took credit for 30 years of coherent Doppler lidar wind measurements, and 25 years of aircraft based wind measurements. We also took credit for about $11M in technology funding since 1993 (NASA + IPO + SBIR) Lesson Learned 4 The aircraft experience did not help us with space cost (unless one thinks the lack of aircraft experience would have led to more problems). Lesson Learned 5 The technology funding in the past enabled the mission to be proposed, but should not affect bottoms up costing for space. Heritage Credit? Audience: Yes!

19. Background We learned the hard way that some groups at MSFC had multiple people, but only one outstanding and very competent individual The process of having a second or third string person assigned to our project, going several weeks while getting frustrated, then taking more time to slowly communicate to their management that it was not going well, then having another individual assigned, and starting all over again, was very time consuming. Only when very frustrated and behind schedule, would management assign the first string person, and they would do this without removing any existing work from the individual, often overcommitting him/her Lesson Learned 8 To this day, I don’t know how to be sure a project will get the first string civil servant. It is also dangerous to assume you will recruit a first string contractor after mission award. If the talent is available as a contractor, discuss it with the contractors’s supervisor and put that contractor’s cost into the proposal. The A-Team?

20. Background From the first moment, intense pressure was applied to the two co-PIs to deliver a requirements document to the Project Office The culture was entirely geared to a black/white, 0/1, alive/dead mentality and did not want to discuss anything with us The PIs issued the document on Feb. 6, 1998 with these introductory words: “The PIs recognize that some combinations of lidar settings and errors, shuttle conditions and errors, and atmospheric conditions are statistically rare events, and have the potential to cause errors in excess of mission objectives. The PIs will work with PM, PE, …, to discuss these situations, and, in some cases, to relax the instrument requirements.” As an example, one requirement we chose was a minimum of 25 hours of data; We later learned that more than a month had been lost as the thermal engineer was stuck at 24 hours of operation, trying to get to 25. Lesson Learned 9 The culture did not understand the words “iteration” or “gray area”. The idea of throwing a requirements document over the fence was hopelessly inappropriate. Develop a system of constant communication to the PI and and core team and allow a “living” requirements document. The world will not end. SPARCLE Requirements Chronology

21. The under costing of the proposal was admittedly a big mistake by the core team and others The beauracracy and culture problems, second string people, old grievences, rivalries, CYA, poor management, and poor communication add to cost and schedule in incalculable ways At cancellation, different factions each tried to form a “sound bite” reason for the failure that absolved them, and which were all huge oversimplifications The lidar technology did not cause any trouble, and would probably have worked fine The country would have benefited immensely if SPARCLE was completed even at twice the original amount Conclusions

28. SLTC busy with GLAS

32. Son of GLAS

33. Substantial schedule delays & budget overruns

35. For a CD ROM with the complete presentations, contact:Dr. David M. Tratt, JPL818-393-9274