Temptations and Constraints of Authoritarian Modernization in Russia

1. Temptations and Constraints of Authoritarian Modernization in Russia Vladimir Gel’man (European University at St.Petersburg / University of Helsinki) Free University of Berlin, 31 January 2017

2. Authoritarian Modernization in Russia…

3. Authoritarian Modernization in Russia… • “Authoritarian modernization” – a mode of achievement of socio-economic progress (growth and development) under an authoritarian regime; • “Modernization” is understood here as a “narrow” elite-driven technocratic project; • Most of attempts of modernization in the distant past were authoritarian, but recent “success stories” – South Korea (1972-1987); Chile under Pinochet: post-Mao China, etc. are relatively rare; • To what extent this project is feasible for present-day Russia and “Why Russia is Not South Korea” (Guriev, Zhuravskaya, 2010)? • Choices in favor of this project in Russia were made every time since 1991

4. Authoritarian Modernization in Russia… • Strong intellectual advocacy of “authoritarian modernization” from debates of the 1960s (Huntington, 1968) to present day (Popov, 2014); • Arguments – reducing risks of political instability and populist policies as side effects of democratization; • … but the evidence is mixed: “for every Lee Kwan Yew of Singapore, there are many like Mobutu Sese Seku of the Congo” (Rodrick, 2010), great diversity among autocracies (Przeworski et al., 2000); • Post-Communist Russia is neither Singapore, nor Congo: some advancements of socio-economic developments in the 2000s, but also many shortcomings and, finally, questioning if not denial of “authoritarian modernization” project, especially after 2014

5. Authoritarian Modernization in Russia… • Why the evidence of “authoritarian modernization” is so mixed and uneven: • (1) structure-induced legacies of the past – previous trajectory of socio-economic development, quality of bureaucracy and of the state; • (2) agency-driven choices: varieties of authoritarian regimes and institutions as well as of threats to their survival; • (3) agency-driven choices: ideas and perceptions of political leaders and policy-makers, which drive their policy choices

6. Authoritarian Modernization in Russia… • … and what about Russia? • (1) Structure-induced factors: relatively developed country in terms of GDP/per capita, human development, etc. – Russia was already “modernized” well before post-Soviet period; • But: • Poor quality of bureaucracy and of the state, partly inherited from the past and aggravated in post-Soviet period – obstacles to the rule of law; • Semi-peripheral position in the global economy and relative international isolation (low linkages with the West) – obstacles to global integration;

7. Authoritarian Modernization in Russia… • (2) agency-driven choices - electoral authoritarian regime as a consequence of failed democratization and flawed economic reforms under Gorbachev and Yeltsin; • Combination of worst elements of both democracy and authoritarianism: • Unavoidable defects of democracy - “political business cycles”, “distributional coalitions”, “veto players” are in place; • Unavoidable defects of authoritarianism – lack of political competition and accountability, intentional building of inefficient institutions; • Negative effects of rent-seeking and bad governance skyrocketed

8. Authoritarian Modernization in Russia… • (3) agency driven choices: ideas – relatively negligible role vis-à-vis interests in the post-Communist world (Hanson, 2010; Hale, 2015); • “good Soviet Union” as a normative ideal for current Russia’s rulers (retrospectively oriented worldviews – a la “Making Russia great again”)? • Perceptions of existential threat from the West, focus on information manipulations; • 2014 - a major turn from agenda of economic development to geopolitical agenda?

9. Authoritarian Modernization in Russia… • “King’s dilemma” – economic development caused popular demands for political changes (2011-12 protests in Russia); • “Politician’s dilemma” (Geddes, 1994) – no way for full-fledged reforms of the state as a whole, only on a limited scale (“pockets of efficiency”); • Challenge of unfulfilled promises – ambitious plans, which cannot be implemented properly because of insufficient potential; • … and the challenge of mediocrity (too high self-estimations, too low performance)

10. Authoritarian Modernization in Russia… • Controversies of post-Soviet authoritarian modernization project: • Ideas: “modernization” as a technological devise for legitimation of political status quo (and ideas barely met reality); • Political and economic institutions – poor protection of property rights, lack of the rule of law, special interests rules; • Policies – “insulation” of government not always led to success stories: mixed record of policy-making; • To what extent post-Soviet achievements (at least, until 2014) were made because of authoritarian modernization project or despite to it?

11. Authoritarian Modernization in Russia… • Some case studies of policy reforms in Russia in the 2000s and 2010s as instances of authoritarian modernization project; • tax and budgetary reform – optimization of taxation system and tax rates under the new Tax and Budget Codes (“success story”); • school education reform – implementation of the Unified State Exam and failure of a number of other innovations (partial success and controversial outcomes); • administrative reform – structural reorganization of government apparatus and reform of civil service (total failure); • some other policies (pension, labour reforms, etc.) used as comparative referents • Why outcomes are so diverse?

12. Authoritarian Modernization in Russia… • Constrains to “authoritarian modernization” project are heavily dependent upon political and institutional environment of policy reforms: • Set of constrains: • (1) nature of regime (electoral conditions, degree of repressions); • (2) poor quality of the state (partially inherited from the past); • (3) design and configuration of political institutions (issues of accountability, and fragmentation of policy-making) • “dual executive” model – low autonomy of government, no parliamentary accountability, government as a team of managers hired by the president; • aggravation of principal-agent problem in the wake of major reforms (the politics of redundancy, direct encroachment of the president in key policy directions); • fragmentation of decision-making within the “power vertical”

13. Authoritarian Modernization in Russia… • Russia in the 2000s – a major testing ground for authoritarian modernization project: • high popularity of Putin and his initial commitment for policy reforms (at least, during first term in office in 2000-2004); • rapid economic growth (6-8% annually till 2008 crisis); • the restoration of state capacity after the “roaring 1990s” and major recentralization of governance; • BUT: • fragmented cabinets of ministers under Kasyanov (2000-04) and Fradkov (2004-07); • reform program “Strategy-2010”, approved in 2000, was only partly implemented, let alone “Strategy-2020” program • What went right and what went wrong?

14. Authoritarian Modernization in Russia… • “Success stories” are possible only if and when certain conditions met: • (1) policy reform as a top priority of a popular and capable political leader; • (2) reformers are “insulated” from the influence of special interest groups and able to coordinate directly with the head of the state; • (3) policy changes are adopted and implemented very quickly and brought immediate positive effects; • If so, then “authoritarian modernization” could be successful on some arenas despite major constrains; • … and this is why “success stories” are so rare

15. Authoritarian Modernization in Russia… • “Authoritarian modernization” project more often resulted a la Mobutu rather than a la Lee Kwan Yew not only because of some personal qualities and political preferences of the leaders; • it faces with major political and institutional constrains due to the shortage of drivers of changes and high risks of dis-equilibrium; • at best, “authoritarian modernization” brought some partial and temporary effects, in the worst case, it came in vain (see policy reforms under Medvedev – legal reforms, reforming of police, etc.); • the current trends of regime and the state in Russia left almost no room for “authoritarian modernization” project • What will be next?

16. Authoritarian Modernization in Russia… • Thanks for your feedback! • (vgelman@eu.spb.ru)