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Stephen M. Maurer Science Policy PP190-01/PP290-01 April 13, 2006

WMD Terrorism: Risks & Responses . Stephen M. Maurer Science Policy PP190-01/PP290-01 April 13, 2006. Introduction. Terrorism Intent Capability CBRN Technology (Mostly B and R) Viewpoints Barriers to Entry Social Psychology Cost-Benefit Necessary Conversations. Terrorism.

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Stephen M. Maurer Science Policy PP190-01/PP290-01 April 13, 2006

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  1. WMD Terrorism: Risks & Responses Stephen M. Maurer Science Policy PP190-01/PP290-01 April 13, 2006

  2. Introduction Terrorism Intent Capability CBRN Technology (Mostly B and R) Viewpoints Barriers to Entry Social Psychology Cost-Benefit Necessary Conversations

  3. Terrorism Overview Intent Rational Goals The Case for Mass Violence The Case for WMD Capabilities Necessary Conversations

  4. Terrorism Intent

  5. Terrorism The Rational Actor Hypothesis Thanatos & Romanticism The Socialists Patients Collective (1975) Cult and Suicide Analogies Youth

  6. Terrorism Traditional Rationales for Terrorists: “No Alternative” Revolution – Destroying and Replacing the State Destroying the Economy Publicity & Propaganda Obtaining Concessions/Forcing Withdrawal Provoking a Crackdown Catalyzing Diplomacy/Foreign Intervention Supporting Major Military Operations Credibility Blocking Political Solutions Money Holding Territory

  7. Terrorism Traditional Rationales for Sponsors Large vs. Small Sponsors Benefits: A Cheap Foreign Policy Capability Increases Nuisance Value But Only if Sponsor Can Renounce. Drawbacks: Difficult to Terminate Miscalculation (El Dorado Canyon) Isolation Inconsistent With WMD

  8. Terrorism Mass Violence Libyan Arab Airlines Flight 114 (February 1973) Operation Mt. Carmel (July 21, 1973) September 11 Is Mass Violence a Sensible Strategy?

  9. Terrorism Deaths in “Total Wars.” Napoleonic Wars France (5%) American Civil War North (1.4%) South (2%) World War I France (4.4%) German (3%) World War II Germany (6%) Japan (2.7%) USSR (18%)

  10. Terrorism Novel Weapons Western Front (1914) US and England (1930s) London (1940) Berlin (1944) Korea (1950) Baghdad (2005) Lessons: People are Resilient Modern State is Resilient WMD

  11. Terrorism Capabilities

  12. Terrorism Probabilities of Failure Lone Actors vs. Complexity Technology Tradecraft Getting People to Die Getting People to Kill Simple Attacks Suicide Bombers (25% failure rate) Complex Attacks Israeli “Wrath of God” Teams Nazi Saboteurs

  13. Terrorism 9/11 Conspiracy Mid-1999: KSM gives Hazmi, Abu Bara, and Khallad basic training in English phrases, reading phone books, renting apartments, etc. 1999: Yemeni citizens Khallad and Abu Barra cannot obtain visas and are unable to learn English. Mid-1999 Yemeni police arrest Khallad by mistake as part of the Cole investigation. Khallad’s father gets him released. January 2000 Hazmi and Mihdar enter the US. KSM relaxes security so that they can receive support from San Diego Mosque.

  14. Terrorism 9/11 Conspiracy March 2000 Mihdar starts “ranting and raving” over a security deposit. May 2000: Hazmi and Mihdar give up trying to learn English. Flight school becomes impossible. June 2000: Mihdar goes AWOL and tells his cousin that Bin Laden is planning five attacks in the US. Bin Laden prevents KSM from firing him. June 2000 Hazmi is bored in Mihdar’s absence and asks KSM for permission to search for a wife on the Internet. He tells a coworker that that he will “become famous.”

  15. Terrorism 9/11 Conspiracy May 2000 Atta, el Shehhi and Jarrah complete flight training. – January 2001 Atta is a rude and abusive student. Fourth Hamburg plotter fails to obtain entry visa. October 2000 KSM sends Moussaoui to Malaysia for flight training, but Moussaoui decides to work on a different plot instead. KSM recalls Moussaoui, and sends him to the US for flight training. Interviewed by FBI on August 15 2001 and arrested on immigration charges the following day. 2000-2001: Nine “muscle hijackers” fail to obtain travel documents, back out, or are removed by the leadership. Pilot hijackers meet muscle hijackers and help them rent apartments, etc.

  16. Terrorism 9/11 Conspiracy Summer 2001 Atta, el Shehhi, al Hamzi, Jarrah, and Hanjour make at least six trips to Las Vegas. Sept. 11, 2001: Hanjour, Mihdar and one muscle hijacker are flagged by CAPPS. Fourth airliner hijacking fails.

  17. Terrorism Can Terrorism Afford Failure? Budget Morale: Messianic Expectations, Example, and Futility. Necessary Conversations (I) Neither Peace Nor War Talking about Casualties Low Probability, High Consequence Events Business as Usual: Pork Barrel, Bioshield

  18. WMD

  19. WMD Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear

  20. Nuclear Nuclear Weapons Atom Bombs vs. H-Bombs. Blast, Flash, Fallout.

  21. Doing Policy: Barriers to Entry “The Secret of the Atomic Bomb” The Plutonium Route The Enriched Uranium Route A Surprisingly Durable Barrier No Go Theorems? Approximately true for Nuclear… A Quick Way Home? Clever Technologies State Sponsors Theft Nuclear

  22. Radiological Overview Introduction Physics + Health Physics Estimating the Damage Would the Public Be Sensible? Necessary Conversations

  23. Radiological Introduction “Radiological Dispersion Devices” Very Low Barriers to Entry Weapons of Mass Disruption?

  24. Radiological An Easy Physics Problem: Curies  Rads 1400 Curies Cesium-137 @ 1km2: 140 REMs/yr. @10km2: 13 REMs/yr Richard Muller, “The Dirty Bomb Distraction, Technology Review http://muller.lbl.gov/TRessays/29-Dirty_Bombs.htm

  25. Curies Rads (Computer) Radiological 1 REM 0.1 REM 0.01 REM Brooke Buddemeier, “Misuse of Radioactive Material: First Responder Considerations” (2003), http://www-cms.llnl.gov/seaborginstitute/training/radiological_response_2.pdf

  26. Radiological Health Physics: Benchmarks 0.6 REM/year Denver 0.5 REM/year Radiation Workers

  27. Radiological Health Physics Rads  Expected Excess Cancers Late (stochastic) effects follow a linear or linear quadratic relationship 100 Dose (in Rads) 2,400 (Over 30 years) = 80 60 Cancer Induction Rate 40 20 2400 rem Courtesy: Christine Hartmann-Siantar, LLNL

  28. Radiological Caveat: 20 REM = ??? Ottawa U – International Center For Low-Dose Radiation Research (Jan. 2002)

  29. Radiological One Year, No Evacuation: 1km2 1000 people @ 140 REMs = 60 deaths cf. Sept. 11 10km2: 10,000 people @ 13 REMs = 60 deaths cf. Fallon Cancer Cluster

  30. Radiological What Will It Cost? Direct (Negligible) Evacuation Clean Up

  31. Radiological Evacuation Richardson et al. One week/400,000 people $4.1 billion estimate Benefit @ EPA $6.1m/life standard: ~ 100 deaths ~ $600m

  32. Radiological CleanUp Scenario 1) Formal Plans: 0.1 REM/yearNational Response Plan Protective Action Guide Scenario 2) Public Panic

  33. Radiological Would the Public Really Panic? Imaginability + Memorability Dread + Familiarity (Banning the Threat is Not an Option) Manner of Death Examples: Nuclear Weapons, Radon, Denver, WWII Bombing

  34. Radiological Scenario 3: Elite Panic. ABC and NBC: “Several hundred thousand dollars...” Hart Senate Office Building “More than $23 million…” Brentwood Post Office “More than $100 million…”

  35. Radiological Necessary Conversations (II) The Response is The Damage. Discussing Dirty Bombs Ex Ante. Challenges Nuclear Power Politics Cheap Shots and “Everyone Knows…” A Tipping Dynamic?

  36. Chemical World War I World War II Barriers: A Very Industrialized Weapon (Bhopal)

  37. Biological Overview History Barriers to Entry Synthetic Biology

  38. Biological History Between the Wars World War II The Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb? Classical Programs The Soviet Program

  39. Biological Barriers to Entry Identifying Organisms Obtaining Pathogen Cultures Hardiness, Virulence, Antibiotic Resistance Manufacturing & Safety Delivery Wet Agent Dry Agent Contagious Disease

  40. Biological Not Just Biology Knowledge More Than Equipment

  41. Biological Synthetic Biology Identifying Organisms Obtaining Pathogen Cultures Hardiness, Virulence, Antibiotic Resistance Manufacturing & Safety Delivery Wet Agent Dry Agent Contagious Disease

  42. Biological Synthetic Biology Self-Governance Screening Experiments of Concern Reporting Dangerous Behavior Collecting Safety/Security Knowledge Invest in New Technologies

  43. Biological Necessary Conversations (III) Prognosis Short-Run Long-Run: Not Like the A-Bomb?

  44. WMD Terrorism: Risks & Responses Stephen M. Maurer Science Policy PP190-01/PP290-01 April 13, 2006

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