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Arizona Debate Institute 2011

Arizona Debate Institute 2011. Resolved: The United States Federal Government should substantially increase its democracy assistance for one or more of the following: Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen . Opening Topic Lecture Dr. Dave Hingstman. The “Arab Spring” region.

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Arizona Debate Institute 2011

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  1. Arizona Debate Institute 2011 Resolved: The United States Federal Government should substantially increase its democracy assistance for one or more of the following: Bahrain, Egypt, Libya, Syria, Tunisia, Yemen. Opening Topic Lecture Dr. Dave Hingstman

  2. The “Arab Spring” region

  3. Assembling an affirmative case on this topic, or how to give the gift that keeps on giving • Choosing some kind of “democracy assistance.” • Deciding who will “deliver the assistance.” • Determining a “recipient” for the assistance.

  4. CIRCLES OF “DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE”

  5. Election Assistance • Helping to keep elections fair and honest • Giving advice about election procedures • Polling voters about their political opinions

  6. Political capacity building • Building political opposition and encouraging gender, class and ethnic minority inclusivity • Strengthening local governance • Encouraging the development of “checks and balances” (executive, legislative, judicial) • Developing formal accountability

  7. Civil Society Capacity Building • Civic education to make participation work • Building independent media & free speech • Encouraging intermediary groups like civic organizations, churches, clubs, and PTAs • Helping to enforce the rule of law

  8. Economic, political and security aid • Development aid to start new enterprises and increase economic growth • Funds to allow existing governments to buy off or kill off opposition • Weapons sales and military/police training to deal with internal or external threats

  9. Diplomacy and direct intervention • Negative conditionality on aid and trade • Positive conditionality on aid, trade, or international recognition • Military intervention and post-conflict rule • Condemnation and sanctions • Covert support for subversive opposition

  10. Why is the meaning of “democracy assistance” so hard to pin down? • Foreign policy “experts” disagree: neoconservatives vs. realists vs. liberal internationalists • US political ideologies disagree: conservative, moderate, liberal, radical left • Political communities disagree: EU social policy vs. US libertarianism

  11. Debate strategic tradeoffs and “democracy assistance” affirmative choices • Element of surprise! Arguments against politics cases may not apply to this affirmative • Kritik leverage. The less the aid interferes with local autonomy, the easier it is for the affirmative to argue that the plan can rethink traditional assumptions and be accepted. • Solvency leverage. More interference means more influence and bigger material changes.

  12. Who delivers the assistance? The question of agency

  13. US Department of State programs Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor (DRL) • funds external nongovernment organizations • provides small short-term grants for civil society organizations focused on democracy and human rights protection • has the best ability to administer and assess outcomes • contacts allows coordination with other aspects of US policy, particularly military

  14. US Department of State programs Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) • Provides direct support to independent civil society groups, media, and human rights monitors • Does not require host government approval, although has caved in to local pressures at times • More flexible than USAID projects, but smaller-scale, shorter-term with less money

  15. US Department of State programs Public Diplomacy & Public Affairs • communication with international audiences, cultural programming, academic grants, educational exchanges, international visitor programs, and antiterrorism education

  16. US Agency for International Development programs Office of Democracy & Governance (DG) within Bureau for Democracy, Conflict & Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA) • Distributes most of nonmilitary assistance to countries in the Middle East & North Africa ($400 million vs. $70 & $53 for MEPI & DRL fy11) • Supports US AID country missions on democracy & governance programming, administering the Governing Justly and Democratically (GJD) objective • Activities require cooperation of host government

  17. US Department of Defense programs Center for Complex Operations • Can help post-conflict states to stabilize during political transitions • May be able to help civil-military relations • Cooperates with development agencies like USAID in Afghanistan and Iraq

  18. US Department of Defense programs International Military Education & Training (IMET) • Trains personnel from other countries in military procedures and civil-military relations • Emphasizes respect for democratic values, human rights and the rule of law • Generally described as “security assistance”

  19. US Nongovernmental Organizations National Endowment for Democracy (NED) • Funded directly by US Congress with bipartisan support beyond the executive branch • Focused on Egyptian and Tunisian political transition support & Libyan opposition groups • Strongly associated with neoliberal democracy promotion among left-critical writers.

  20. International Nongovernmental Organizations Foundation for the Future • Half of its funding from USFG, but also from other Western and Arab governments • Perceived as independent (based in Jordan) and is accepted by certain civil society groups that won’t US money directly • $35 million has been promised in the past but not delivered and Foundation is running short

  21. We the People • In a critical affirmative, the legitimacy and wisdom of state action is in question • The participants in a debate round can express their feelings and educate others about what happens in other places by bearing witness and refusing complicity with oppression • Assistance might be given through transnational grassroots efforts that bypass the state

  22. Debate strategic tradeoffs and “delivery agent” affirmative choices • Agency is key to advantage claims and solvency proofs. Each agent has characteristic strengths and weaknesses. • Negative teams often will choose to advocate agents not discussed by the affirmative. Policy debate is comparative.

  23. RECIPIENTS OF DEMOCRACY ASSISTANCE

  24. Egypt and democracy assistance + • Mubarak overthrow and military promises of upcoming elections makes assistance key now • Viewed in the region as the “bellwether” state of the Arab spring that must succeed • Relative openness of Egyptian society allows for greater possibilities for gender, religious, and ethnic inclusiveness

  25. Egypt and democracy assistance - • $65 million of US Economic Support Funds reprogrammed for democracy assistance in FY 2011 • Concerns exist about antagonizing the military government with aggressive support of local NGOs. US has existing strategic relationship with the Egyptian military that affects Israel and the Palestinians directly. • Muslim Brotherhood participation may be an issue in new programs

  26. Tunisia and democracy assistance + • After Ben Ali’s overthrow, Tunisians will elect a constituent assembly in October. • US had almost no aid presence in Tunisia before and USAID is scrambling to support democratic development ($20 million) and post-crisis stabilization ($12 million in fy11) • Tunisians seem to be exercising their speech and other liberties.

  27. Tunisia and democracy assistance - • Because the US and Tunisia did not enjoy good relations before Ben Ali’s overthrow, the extent of its influence through aid is unclear. • Because Tunisia was a very closed society, conservative Islamic elements may have great sway over the election and social control. • Unlike Egypt, Tunisia is not well connected to large-scale social advantage claims or “Middle East stability.”

  28. Libya and democracy assistance • Gaddafi continues to hang on to Tripoli, although some are predicting that the rebels will be victorious soon. • NED has funded civil society groups in the rebel stronghold of Benghazi. • Democracy assistance would likely focus on post-conflict transition stability • Gaddafi’s links to terrorism and oil may allow for large advantage claims

  29. Yemen and democracy assistance • Saleh is in Saudi Arabia recovering from wounds received in an attack on June 3 • If he is removed, democracy assistance would focus on political transition in a manner similar to the Egyptian & Tunisian aid programs • US-Yemen relations have been based on anti-terrorism cooperation, so that may be the focus of advantages and negative case arguments • USAID & DoD have given a small amount of economic support & counterterrorism funds in the past, but the need is great

  30. Bahrain and democracy assistance • With the help of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain has suppressed its Arab Spring opposition movement, at least for the moment. • US fears loss of its 5th Fleet base which is used to contain Iran • Shia religious sentiments in opposition groups raise question of Iranian involvement • But Obama criticized the arrest of opposition leaders on May 19, and USFG has attempted to provide democracy support through MEPI

  31. Syria and democracy assistance • Assad’s security forces have counterattacked against rebels near the Turkish border • Any USFG democracy assistance would be for opposition members & human rights activists • USFG policy now is to increase criticism and tighten economic sanctions • Proximity to Israel, Iraq, Turkey, Lebanon and Iran allows for big advantage claims and negative case arguments • Non-state-based opposition works well given the scope of alleged human rights violations by the Syrian regime

  32. Debate Strategy and Choice of Recipient • Choose a recipient [country, group, culture] who best proves your assistance advantage • Choose a recipient who is likely to accept or reject the assistance • Choose a recipient who preempts your opponent’s argument ground

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